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ABSTRACT
This work is an attempt to think the essential nature of the interrelationships
among religion, science, and theology (RST) out of Heidegger’s engagement with the
question of Being. Three primary questions initially motivated this inquiry: First, how are
the interrelations (if any) among religion, science, and theology to be understood?
Second, is a relation of “dialogue,” in some sense, possible among the three elements of
the RST triad? And third, does theology have a rightful place in the public square
dominated by the view that science serves as the “gold standard” for rationality and truth?
The inquiry interweaves five threads, or lines of inquiry, which are posited as pertinent in
the current RST discourse and central to Heidegger’s thought. The first thread consists of
the chapter themes: phenomenology, truth, technology, and ethics. The other four
threads—comportment toward things, reflection, thinking, and destiny—each “crosscut,” or traverse, the chapter themes.
By Heidegger’s lights, each cross-cutting thread harbors a duality: comportment
toward things as objectification or non-objectification; reflection as Reflexion or
Besinnung (mindfulness); thinking as calculative or meditative; and destiny as fate or the
sending of Being (Geschick). Heidegger’s critique of each duality—and the expanded
global context suggested here for thinking the RST relation—offer fresh opportunities for
reinscribing the customary formulation of theology (i.e., reflection upon religious
ii

experience and belief) as a basis for a compelling dialogue among religion, science, and
theology today.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
When we consider what religion is for mankind, and what science is, it is
no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the
decision of this generation as to the relations between them. We have here
the two strongest general forces . . . which influence men, and they seem
to be set one against the other—the force of our religious institutions, and
the force of our impulse to accurate observation and logical deduction.1

1.1

Thesis and Scope
For decades, the religion-science relation—and the closely related science-

theology relation—have been customarily framed as a contested field of possible
positions or states in which the two realms of meaning in each duality can be construed as
being in relation to each other (or not). One of the more well-known frameworks
employed in studying both relations is the four-position model of conflict, independence,
dialogue, and integration developed by theologian and physicist Ian Barbour.2 No
consensus exists among participants in the scholarly “conversation” as to how things
stand within each binary and between them. However, some theologians, such as Philip
Hefner and J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, contend—via quite different approaches—that

1. Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Free Press, 1967), 181-82.
First published in 1925 by Macmillan.
2. Ian G. Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990). (Hereafter
cited as RIAS.) He has consistently employed this fourfold typology in subsequent publications, including
Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues ([San Francisco]:
HarperSanFrancisco, 1997), hereafter cited as RAS, and Ian G. Barbour, When Science Meets Religion:
Enemies, Strangers, or Partners? ([San Francisco]: HarperSanFrancisco, 2000).
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postmodern critiques of the philosophy of science and epistemology provide new
possibilities for genuine dialogue between science and religion, theology, or both.3
This dissertation is an inquiry into the possible contribution the thought of
philosopher Martin Heidegger can make to the question of whether dialogue, in some
important sense, is possible in the religion-science and science-theology relations, and,
more generally, how the threefold relation of religion, science, and theology is best
characterized or thought. Through his creative appropriation of the phenomenological
method, Heidegger wrote extensively about science, theology, and the religious
dimension of existence, and consistently affirmed theology’s rightful place in public
discourse.
My thesis is that: (i) contemporary explications of the religion-science and
science-theology relations are conducted in the mode of metaphysical (i.e.,
representational, reason-seeking and -giving) thinking; and that (ii) Heidegger’s thought
provides resources for complementing such thought with non-metaphysical (i.e.,
reflective, meditative, noncalculative) thinking in ways that open a space for meaningful,
significant dialogue in these relations. In defending this thesis, I shall argue that nonmetaphysical thinking is a possibility--and a necessity—for thinking the religion-sciencetheology relation fruitfully in our time.4

3. Philip Hefner, The Human Factor: Evolution, Culture, and Religion (Minneapolis: Fortress,
1993); J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, Duet or Duel? Theology and Science in a Postmodern World
(Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1998).
4. Although Heidegger famously declares that “science does not think” in What Is Called
Thinking? (trans. J. Glenn Gray [New York: Harper & Row, 1968], 8), he also states that scientists are
capable of reflective, mindful thinking. See Martin Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” in The Question
Concerning Technology, and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), 18182.

2

In sum, my primary purpose is not to critique or reinterpret Heidegger’s work, but
rather to bring his thought—and my own—to bear constructively upon the contemporary
discourse regarding these relations. I call this agenda “thinking, with Heidegger,” an
inquiry which is at once complementary and innovative, imaginative, and constructive.

1.2

Context
This section provides a rationale for framing this inquiry in terms of the RST

relation rather than either the religion-science or science-theology relation. I present brief
background information about the field of religion-science-theology studies before and
since its ostensible founding in the 1960s.

1.2.1

Religion-Science, Science-Theology, or Religion-Science-Theology?
In a recent essay reflecting upon the study of the interrelationships among

religion, science, and theology, theologian Philip Hefner offers reasons for regarding the
religion-science duality as the primary focus for analysis and reflection.5 In the same
compendium of essays, theologian Michael Welker defends the primacy of the sciencetheology binary.6 In this section, I shall briefly describe their views and then proffer a
potential bridge between these dualities as an initial step in thinking the religion-sciencetheology relation holistically.

5. Philip Hefner, “Religion-and-Science,” in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed.
Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 562-76.
6. Michael Welker, “Science and Theology: Their Relation at the Beginning of the Third
Millennium,” in Clayton and Simpson, Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, 551-61.
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Welker favors the study of the science-theology binary for two reasons.7 First, he
contends that meaningful discourse between religion and science is inherently
problematic: “There is no such thing, and there can be no such thing, as a discourse
between a religion and a science, not to speak of a discourse between ‘religion as such’
and ‘science as such’, whatever that might be” (Welker, “Science and Theology,” 552).
For Welker, the academy is the arena for meaningful discourse, so theology and religious
studies are the appropriate dialogue partners for science. Second, he observes that
reflection upon the religion-science relation runs the risk of settling for nonspecific
“comparative observations” between the two fields. While he acknowledges that “general
methodological reflections” are indeed necessary for fruitful interdisciplinary discourse
of any sort, science-theology interaction should aim for producing mutually enriching
results, formulated as testable truth-claims, in specific topics that are meaningful to each
field:
. . . the great potentials of the Science and Theology discourse lie neither in the
establishment of a meta-level above their area of research, nor in attempts to
synthesize both approaches. The great potential of these dialogues lie instead in
raising boundary sensitivities and in gaining specific insights into conceptual
limits and the dangers of pernicious reductionisms. (Welker, “Science and
Theology,” 558)

7. More precisely, Welker restricts the possibility of meaningful dialogue to that between
Theology and Science (each with capitalized initial letters). Each of these “moves between elementary
authentic experience, observations, and thoughts [characteristic of theology and science, without capital
letters] on the one hand, and elaborate theories [characteristic of THEOLOGY and SCIENCE, in capital
letters], on the other” (Welker, “Science and Theology,” 557). That is, theology and science are minimalist
in the sense that the former entails only minimal levels of conviction and “existential influence,” while the
latter merely requires “immediate observations and reflections about nature and natural events” without
appealing to a theoretical framework (555-56). At the other extreme, THEOLOGY and SCIENCE are
maximalist in the sense that each entails “an elaborate interconnection of thought and conviction,” bolstered
in the case of SCIENCE by “tested experience related to nature and its texture” (554). On his view,
dialogue is only possible between these minimalist and maximalist expressions of theology and science.

4

Examples of topics that meet Welker’s criteria include “cosmological and natural
religious questions,” “evolutionary theory and genetic research,” and “divine action”
(553).
In contrast, Hefner favors engaging science “from a stance within religious
experience” (Hefner, “Religion-and-Science,” 562) rather than primarily with theology
(or its nontheistic equivalent), for two primary reasons: first, theology is increasingly
isolated as a separate discipline within the academy, and second, Hefner construes
“religion” broadly in terms of Tillich’s (arguably universal) notion of ultimate concern.
Also, he notes that the terminology of “theology” and “theologian” is foreign to the
world’s religious communities outside of Christianity (566-69).
Hefner calls the task of undertaking such engagement religion-and-science. He
contends that religion-and-science is rooted in the beginnings of human history as the
primordial quest for meaning and order. In this context, he defines meaning as “the
establishing of a link or a ‘fit’ between what is important to us in our own lives and the
world in which we live” (563). “Since . . . our experience of the world, to a significant
degree, is mediated through scientific knowledge, the work of forging links of meaning is
itself our most significant engagement with science” (ibid.) Moreover, Hefner
distinguishes between what he calls the doing of religion-and-science and the study of
such doing. He cites his theological model of the created co-creator8 as an example of
the doing of religion-and-science and cites his reflective essay as an example of the study
of the doing of religion-and-science (562-63).
8. “Human beings are God’s created co-creators whose purpose is to be the agency, acting in
freedom, to birth the future that is most wholesome for the nature that has birthed us . . . . Exercising this
agency is said to be God’s will for humans” (Hefner, The Human Factor, 27).
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To emphasize, Hefner views religion-and-science as an activity originating from
within, or out of, religious experience, rather than a disinterested approach as commonly
taken, for example, in religious studies:
We do not simply observe religion-and-science or study its components; the
grappling with meaning vis-à-vis that which is most important to us requires our
full engagement, because it is the meaning of our lives that is at stake, not just the
mapping of an academic terrain. (Hefner, “Religion-and-Science,” 566)

In contrast to Welker, Hefner does not limit the study of religion-and-science in
order to conform to an academic understanding of religion and its mode of discourse.
Instead, such study takes place at the “border” between academic and religious
communities, and necessarily incorporates different modes of thinking: “Academia
fosters the critical thinking that is essential, but it is ambivalent about religion-andscience, because discernment, authenticity of experience, and confessional thinking are
not its criteria of success and advancement” (574).
Ian Barbour agrees with Hefner in viewing the religion-science binary as primary.
Like Hefner, Barbour invokes Tillich’s universalizing articulation of the nexus of religion
in his own broad definition of “religion” as “total life-orientation in response to what is
deemed worthy of ultimate concern and devotion.”9 For Barbour, the experiences and
beliefs of the religious community are primary; these form the basis for the secondary, or
derivative, activity of theological reflection. Barbour also notes that, unlike theology,
religion and science as everyday practices are unreflective. Consequently, he

9. Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1966), 10.
(Hereafter cited as Issues.)
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acknowledges an important role for the philosophies of religion and science in his
analysis of the religion-science relation:
Scientists and theologians have usually tried to relate science directly to religion,
neglecting the contribution that philosophy can make to the clarification of issues.
On the other hand, professional philosophers have often had little contact with
either the scientific or the religious community, and their abstract formulations
sometimes bear little resemblance to what scientists and theologians are actually
doing. The point of departure for philosophy of religion must be the worshiping
community and its theological ideas; only then can philosophy serve a function
both critical and relevant to religion. Similarly, philosophy of science must be
based on the actual practice of scientific work. (Issues, 11)
Is the border between religion-and-science and science-and-theology perhaps
more porous than their ardent defenders claim? First, as prima facie evidence, consider
two examples, which could easily be multiplied. As mentioned earlier, Hefner cites his
theological model of the created co-creator as an example of the doing of religion-andscience. Barbour first published his fourfold typology as “Ways of Relating Science and
Theology” (emphasis added) in 1988.10 Two years later, he published the same typology,
together with essentially the same detailed explication, as “Ways of Relating Science and
Religion” (emphasis added)!11
Second, the current literature in the “subfields” (as I would like to regard them) of
religion-and-science and theology-and-science already contains language that appears to
connect them fundamentally. I have in mind statements that regard theology, in some
10. Ian G. Barbour, “Ways of Relating Science and Theology,” in Physics, Philosophy and
Theology: A Common Quest for Understanding, Robert J. Russell, William R. Stoeger, and George V.
Coyne, eds. (Vatican City State: Vatican Observatory, 1988), 21-45.
11. Barbour, RIAS, 3-30. The sections on Conflict, Independence, and Dialogue in these two
publications are virtually identical. The original essay described two versions of Integration: Doctrinal
Reformulation and Systematic Synthesis. In RIAS, the subsection, Doctrinal Reformulation, was split into
two subsections, Natural Theology and Theology of Nature, each expanded slightly.
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sense, as reflection upon religious experience and/or belief. Consider some examples.
From Barbour’s writings, “Theology is systematic reflection about the beliefs of a
particular religious community” (Issues, 10); and later, “Theology is critical reflection on
the life and thought of the religious community” (RIAS, 267). Van Huyssteen writes: “In
theology, as a critical reflection on religious experience . . .”12 Thus, for some writers at
least, viewing theology as a form of reflection upon religious experience and/or belief
perhaps can serve as a bridge between these the religion-science and science-theology
dualities as well as between their respective academic subfields.
Although viewing theology in this way has many adherents, others, such as
Thomas Torrance, define theology in terms of the literal etymological meaning of theology as the study of God.13 In addition, some start from the premise that theology is, is
some sense, a science or “scientific.” These three views are not mutually exclusive,
however. Arthur Peacocke incorporates elements from the first two views to formulate
theology as “the reflective and intellectual analysis of the experience of God and . . .
principally the Christian forms of that experience.”14 In a variant on the first view, Alister
McGrath understands theology as “intellectual reflection on the content of the Christian

12. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, The Shaping of Rationality: Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology
and Science (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999), 201. (Hereafter cited as Shaping.)
13. “Theology is the unique science devoted to knowledge of God, differing form other sciences
by the uniqueness of its object which can be apprehended only on its own terms and from within the actual
situation it has created in our existence in making itself known.” Thomas Torrance, Theological Science
(London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 281.
14. Arthur Peacocke, Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming—Natural, Divine, and
Human (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 6.
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faith.”15 McGrath, like Torrance and Peacocke, take the methods of science to be deeply
relevant to the task of theology.
Despite these different characterizations of “theology,” I shall provisionally
employ in this inquiry the formulation of theology as reflection on religious experience
and belief as a possible means for bridging the religion-science and science-theology
relations. At minimum, this formulation is intended to acknowledge that, in the
investigation of either duality, the “missing” element (theology or religion) is usually, if
not nearly always, at issue as well. Hence, unless a specific binary is under scrutiny, I
shall continue to refer to the matter for thought in this inquiry as the religion-sciencetheology relation (aka RST relation) and this field of study as the religion-sciencetheology field (aka RST field).
The formulation of theology as reflection upon religious experience and belief is
not to be regarded in this inquiry as a definition, but rather as a question: namely, What is
the essential nature of theology? I shall engage this question by starting from this
proffered “formula” for theology and then interrogating it at various points in this
inquiry. For example, in Sections 2.3 (Phenomenology and Theology) and 2.4 (Theology,
Natural Science, and Objectification) below, we shall examine Heidegger’s engagement
with the question of whether theology is, in some sense, a science. Also, Section 3.4
below (Truth and Reflection) examines multiple meanings of “reflection.”
Finally, the contrasting views of Hefner and Welker regarding the study of
religion-and-science-and-theology briefly presented here bring into focus a central
15. Alistair McGrath, The Foundations of Dialogue in Science and Religion (Oxford: Blackwell,
1998), 32.

9

question for this entire inquiry: What are the most appropriate arenas and modes of
discourse for thinking the RST relation? Based upon the brief examination of their views
above, Welker apparently holds that such thinking is most meaningfully conducted within
academia and its conventions regarding discourse, while Hefner opts for engaging the
border between academic and religious communities in which different modes of
thinking may be incorporated.16 Also, Welker seems to conflate “discourse” and
“dialogue” in his defense of Theology rather than religion as the appropriate partner for
dialogue (as discourse) with Science.17
On my view, this question of appropriate arenas and modes of thinking the RST
relation—together with the question of the essential nature of theology and the
discourse/dialogue distinction (if any)—bear directly upon the questions that initially
motivated this inquiry: What is the nature of the RST relation? Can “dialogue”
meaningfully characterize this relation—at least under some circumstances? And can
theology legitimately claim a place in the public square?

1.2.2

Origins of an Academic Field?
Two fundamental—perhaps essential--signs of an emergent academic field are the

existence of a founding textbook and a founding journal devoted to the field of inquiry. If
16. Hefner does not neglect the public square as a third arena. In “Public Intellectual or
Disciplinary Journal?”—his final editorial as editor for Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science (hereafter
cited as Zygon)—Hefner traces the movement of Zygon between the “poles” of the public square and
academia since its inception in 1966. “The dissonance between public square and specialized academic
discipline is serious and important. The public sphere requires clarity, simplicity, and relevance; policy and
action are present immediacies—they cannot be delayed interminably until research projects are completed.
On the other hand, the complexities of specialization and research do make an irreplaceable contribution.”
Zygon 44, no. 2 (June 2009): 239.
17. I shall briefly take up the question of the dialogue/discourse difference in Section 5.1 below.
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this claim is granted, then the year 1966 arguably marks the beginning of the RST
academic field. In that year, Ian Barbour published Issues in Science and Religion, and
Zygon was launched under its first editor, Ralph Burhoe. Hefner, an editor of Zygon
during 1989-2009, observed in his retrospective on Zygon’s origins and purpose: “In
1966, there was no religion-and-science field, no enterprise designated as ‘religion-andscience’.”18
What were the issues, questions, and visions that motivated the founders and
predecessors that led to the establishment of what I am calling the RST field? Simply
stated, why and when did this academic field get underway? Of particular interest and
relevance to this inquiry are those concerns, questions, and hopes that are still pertinent,
and even compelling, today, while engaging these questions in their full scope is beyond
the purpose of this inquiry.19 This subsection briefly examines some of the motivational
origins of Issues and Zygon to provide a glimpse of the origins of the RST academic
field.
Issues is a strong candidate for designation as a founding textbook. Robert John
Russell, founder and director of the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences at the
Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, California, regards Issues as decisive in the initial
formulation and development of RST studies.

18. Hefner, “Public Intellectual or Disciplinary Journal?, 237.
19. On Heidegger’s view, such a project would be an historical reflection, because it would study
the past for the sake of the future. He contrasts this understanding of the purposes of history with
historiological consideration, which studies the past from the standpoint of the present. Section 3.2 refers
to this distinction in discussing Heidegger’s critique of the customary understanding of truth as the
correctness of the correspondence between assertions and their referents.
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In his groundbreaking 1966 publication, Issues in Science and Religion, Ian G.
Barbour laid out a series of well-crafted arguments involving issues in
epistemology . . . language . . . and methodology. Together these arguments
provide what I call the ‘bridge’ between science and religion; more than any other
scholar’s work, these arguments, in my opinion, have made possible the
developments of the past five decades.20

In his Introduction to Issues, Barbour acknowledges the lack of suitable textbooks for
study in this field: “A number of universities and seminaries have in the last decade
introduced courses in ‘Science and Religion’ . . . ; there is need for a comprehensive text
for such courses” (Issues, 11).
What propelled Barbour to devote more than five decades of his life to the RST
field? He recently described his “intellectual and spiritual journey” from birth to his
eightieth year (1923-2002),21 but, in my view, his writings in the RST field (and earlier)
illuminate more specifically the questions, issues, and vision that have guided his
contributions to this field. Space permits only a couple of examples. Barbour begins his
Introduction to Issues with these three questions: “Is the scientific method the only
reliable guide to truth? Is man only a complex biochemical mechanism? How can God
act if the world is law-abiding?” His largest intended audience for Issues “includes those
persons . . . who recognize the importance of scientific and religious ideas in the modern
world and are concerned about the relation between them” (Issues, 11-12). He closes the
Introduction by quoting the first sentence of the paragraph from Whitehead that appears
as the epitaph to this inquiry: “When we consider what religion is for mankind, and what
20. Robert John Russell, “Ian Barbour’s Methodological Breakthrough: Creating the ‘Bridge’
between Science and Theology,” in Fifty Years in Science and Religion: Ian G. Barbour and His Legacy,
ed. Robert John Russell (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 45.
21. Ian G. Barbour, “A Personal Odyssey,” in Russell, Fifty Years, 17-28.
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science is, it is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the
decision of this generation as to the relations between them.”
Several years earlier, he quoted this same sentence as the lead-in for his seminal
paper, “The Methods of Science and Religion.”22 Immediately following the quote, he
wrote: “Alfred North Whitehead’s words of thirty years ago find new urgency in the age
of nuclear fission and the Sputniks. What factors today hinder the co-operation of science
and religion on which the future course of Western civilization may depend?” Barbour
adopted, and adapted, Whitehead’s assessment of the fundamental importance of thinking
the RST relation for the sake of the future of history as the context for his life’s work.
Turning to Zygon, What were some of the concerns and hopes that contributed to
its founding? In its inaugural issue, the editors articulated the meaning of the journal’s
title and its fundamental purpose:
Zygon, the Greek term for anything which joins two bodies, especially the yoking
or harnessing of a team which must effectively pull together, is a symbol for this
journal whose aim is to reunite the split team, values and knowledge, where coordination is essential for a viable dynamics of human culture.
We respond to the growing fears that the widening chasm in twentiethcentury culture between values and knowledge, or good and truth, or religion and
science, is disruptive if not lethal for human destiny. In this split, the traditional
faiths and philosophies, which once informed men of what is of most sacred
concern for them, have lost their credibility and hence their power. Yet human
fulfilment or salvation in the age of science requires not less but more insight and
conviction concerning life’s basic values and moral requirements.23

22. Ian G. Barbour, “The Methods of Science and Religion,” in Science Ponders Religion, ed.
Harlow Shapley (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1960), 196.
23. Ralph W. Burhoe et al., [inaugural editorial], in Zygon 1, no. 1 (March 1966): 1 (emphasis
added).
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In what way might this aim of “salvation” be understood and realized? In the
same first issue of Zygon, the editors announced that this journal would be about the
doing of religion-and-science as well as the study of the doing of religion-and-science.
Writing about the roots of this journal, the editors sharpened and simplified the rather
lengthy statement of Zygon’s purpose stated above: “. . . to develop an integration of
religious systems with the contemporary scientific views of man and the world . . . .”
(ibid., 119).
The term “salvation” was evidently not chosen lightly by the Zygon editors.
Several years earlier, Burhoe published an essay, “Salvation in the Twentieth Century.”24
In response to “prophets of doom,” such as (in his view) Toynbee, Spengler, and Sorokin,
Burhoe contended “that our salvation today lies in religion” (Science Ponders Religion,
66; emphasis added). However, he qualified his claim by insisting that religion “must
also be scientific” (ibid.), and that the notion of “religion” is best understood
functionally—that is, in terms of religion’s social utility:
I submit that religions in whatever culture—and the anthropologists are hardly
able to find any culture without one—are the organs or institutions whose
functions it is to engender attitudes and behavior that tend to adapt man to the
conditions of his total environment in such a way as to optimize his prime values.
I submit further that these prime values will probably be found to be essentially a
continuation of the long-established values of all living creatures: the continuation
and advancement of life. (Burhoe, Science Ponders Religion, 67)
In the next few paragraphs, I shall draw from the editors’ summary of the three
roots of Zygon to illuminate some of the motivating concerns and expectations therein in
24. Ralph Burhoe, “Salvation in the Twentieth Century,” in Shapley, Science Ponders Religion,
65-86.
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regard to the status of the religion-science relation. One of the roots was the Committee
on Science and Values, established in 1950 by the American Academy for Arts and
Sciences at the urging of Burhoe, the executive officer of the Academy at the time. The
Committee’s charter document is consonant with the stated purpose of Zygon and the
views of its founding editor, Burhoe:
We believe that the sudden changing of man’s physical and mental climate
brought about by science and technology in the last century has rendered
inadequate ancient institutional structures and educational forms, and that the
survival of human society depends on a re-formation of man’s world view and
ethics, by grounding them in the revelations of modern science as well as on
tradition and intuition.25

A second root of Zygon was a series of summer conferences held on Star Island, a
few miles off the coast of New Hampshire, during the 1950s. In 1950, a group of
“freethinking theologians and clergymen” met there to launch a “Conference on the
Coming Great Church” to increase cooperation among religious groups and expand the
influence of religion in seeking world peace. In 1954, again at the suggestion of Burhoe,
more than 200 liberal theologians and clergy from the 1950 conference and scientists
from the Academy Committee met together to discuss possibilities for greater harmony
between religion, science, and theology under the theme, “Conference on Religion in the
Age of Science.” Burhoe summed up the conference consensus as follows:
While there were a number of both scientists and clergymen who held that
religious truth was hardly susceptible to being approached by scientific methods,
except perhaps in the negative sense of being prohibited by scientific beliefs,
there was a strong and seemingly growing recognition that today man can
increase the scope and validity of his understanding of his destiny and of his
25. Ralph W. Burhoe et al., “Some Roots of Zygon,” in Zygon 1, no. 1 (March 1966): 118.
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relationship to that “in which he lives and moves and has his being,” not only by
reading ancient texts, but also by building up the science of theology in harmony
with other science.26

A few months later, the Institute on Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS) was founded.
Among the three purposes of this “nondenominational, independent society” is the
following: “to formulate dynamic and positive relationships between the concepts
developed by science and the goals and hopes of humanity expressed through religion.”27
A third root was the interest shown by a number of schools of theology and liberal
programs at the denominational level in the activities of IRAS, especially the Star Island
summer conferences. “During the late 1950s, the Institute sought to stimulate various
theological schools to consider more systematically the potential role of the science in
reformulating man’s religious conceptions of his nature and destiny.”28
To sum up, I suggest that what we hear in these expressions of concerns and
hopes regarding the RST relation are, for the most part, eloquent and imaginative restatements of Whitehead’s claim, quoted on the first page of this entire inquiry, that
thinking (or perhaps better, re-thinking) the essential nature of the RST relation is both
vitally important and urgent. With comparable emphasis, I would say, we also hear an
imperative to ground—or otherwise orient, in some sense—religion and theology in the

26. Ralph W. Burhoe, “Religion in an Age of Science,” in Science 120 (1 October 1954): 522.
27. “Mission Statement,” Institute on Religion in an Age of Science, accessed September 3, 2012,
http://www.iras.org/Welcome.html.
28. Burhoe et al., Zygon, 1 (1966): 118.
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knowledge and methods of science. Bluntly speaking, the message seems to be that
religion and theology, need to “get with it” if religion and theology are to be, in some
sense, “effective” or “relevant” to our lives individually, and in community with others
and the earth itself. I say, “for the most part,” because Philip Hefner, for one, approaches
both the doing as well as the study of the doing of religion-and-science from “the stance
of religious experience.” That is, he seeks no (illusory) Archimedean point or synoptic
perch from which to survey dispassionately the field of religion-and-science.
Let these tensions continue to hover over and inform this inquiry.

1.2.3

Ian Barbour’s Fourfold Typology and Critical Realism Methodology
The purpose of this section is to explicate how Barbour thinks the RST relation

from his formulation of critical realism and, in particular, how he construes—and
defends—the possibility of meaningful “dialogue” within this relation. Specifically, I
shall show that Barbour’s fourfold typology—Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and
Integration—unfolds from his methodology of critical realism.29 In so doing, we shall see

29. Several thinkers in the RST field have developed typologies that describe possible modes, or
states, of relationality between religion and science, or between science and theology. One group offers
modified formulations of some or all of Barbour’s specific modalities but posits a “gradient” of increasing
interaction, such as Barbour’s framework. See, for example, David R. Griffin, God and Religion in the
Postmodern World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989) and John F. Haught, Science and
Religion: From Conflict to Conversation (New York: Paulist, 1995). A second group also formulates modal
typologies, but without an explicit or implied gradient of modalities, and often without explicit reference to
Barbour’s fourfold schema. For example, see the eightfold typology in Ted Peters, “Science and Theology:
Toward Consonance,” in Science and Theology: The New Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Boulder, CO:
Westview, 1998), 13-22. A third group has created nonmodal typologies by employing “dimension” or
“axis” as a primal notion. For example, Mikael Stenmark embeds a reformulated version of Barbour’s
modalities within four “dimensions”—social, teleological, epistemic, and theoretical; see Mikael Stenmark,
How to Relate Science and Religion: A Multidimensional Model (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2004). In a
more radical move, Christian Berg advocates replacing Barbour’s four modalities with the “dimensions” of
epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics; see Christian Berg, “Barbour’s Way(s) of Relating Science and
Theology,” in Russell, Fifty Years, 61-75.
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how Barbour engages the primary themes of Chapters 2 and 3 of this inquiry: namely,
phenomenology (in general terms, the role of philosophy in thinking the RST relation)
and truth. In Section 5.2 below, I shall engage Barbour’s views on technology and
ethics—the themes of Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. In Issues and throughout most of
his later writings, Barbour interprets science primarily in terms of the natural sciences
and religion in terms of the three Abrahamic faith traditions—Christianity, Judaism, and
Islam.
As a form of realism, critical realism affirms that a world of objects and their
interrelations exists independently of our minds. However, critical realism opposes naïve
realism, which holds that our access to that which is real is direct and immediate. In
contrast, critical realism asserts that our knowledge of these objects is always indirect and
incomplete, mediated through language and models. Against positivism, critical realism
contends that the real is greater than the merely perceptible. With respect to anti-realism,
(i) critical realism rejects idealism’s claim that our ideas about reality exhaust (or even
constitute) reality itself; and (ii) critical realism opposes instrumentalism, which reduces
our knowledge of the real to the merely useful or functional (162-74). Briefly stated,
Barbour describes critical realism “as a middle ground between classical realism and
instrumentalism.”30
Barbour nuanced explication of truth is based upon his critical realist orientation:
“. . . the meaning of truth is correspondence with reality. But because reality is
inaccessible to us, the criteria of truth must include all four of the [following] criteria . . .

30. Barbour, “Personal Odyssey,” in Russell, Fifty Years, 23.
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.” (RAS, 110): namely, agreement with data, coherence, scope, and fertility. These are
four criteria “for assessing theories in normal scientific research” (109). The first
criterion reflects the classical realist understanding of truth. By including the other three
criteria, Barbour intends to incorporate as well the coherence view of truth (“a set of
propositions is true if it is comprehensive and internally coherent”) and the pragmatic
view (“a proposition is true if it works in practice”) (109-10). In sum, he says: “Because
correspondence is taken as the definition of truth, this is a form of realism, but it is a
critical realism because a combination of criteria is used” (109). Barbour subsequently
employs this twofold formulation of truth in explicating the nature of truth-claims of
religion. In so doing, Barbour reinterprets the four criteria in ways appropriate to religion,
while acknowledging important—even fundamental—differences between religion and
science (110-13).
For Barbour, methodology has at least two distinct meanings. Taken broadly,
“methodology” refers to his formulation of critical realism,31 which encompasses
distinctive positions with respect to metaphysics, epistemology, and language, together
with the analysis of “methodology” in a narrower sense. The latter (“method-ology” in

31. Other contributors to the RST discourse have developed slightly different formulations of
critical realism. See, for example, Arthur Peacocke, Intimations of Reality: Critical Realism in Science and
Religion (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) and John Polkinghorne, One World: The
Interaction of Science and Theology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986). Polkinghorne has
described the differences and similarities in the formulations of critical realism by himself, Barbour, and
Peacocke in John Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour,
Arthur Peacocke, and John Polkinghorne (London: SPCK, 1996). For a critique of critical realism itself,
see Niels H. Gregersen, “Critical Realism and Other Realisms,” in Russell, Fifty Years, 77-95.
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the narrower sense) refers to Barbour’s extensive examination of similarities and
differences between the methods of science and those of religion.32
Describing the intertwining of methodology and typology in Issues will show it
exemplifies both the study of the doing of RST as well as the doing itself.33 Indeed, in
Barbour’s own words, Issues has these two complementary objectives: “to compare
alternative positions [regarding the RST relation] and to suggest a consistent constructive
position in relation to these alternatives” (Issues, 9; original emphases). To establish the
first half of the claim, I shall briefly trace in Issues Barbour’s explication of “conflict,”
“independence,” “dialogue,” and (implicitly) “integration” as possible modalities for the
religion-science relation. For the second half of the claim, I shall briefly analyze the key
role of critical realism in his explication—and defense—of a form of process theology
that exemplifies what he later calls “integration.”
Throughout Issues, Barbour’s analysis of the RST relation is thought
philosophically: “. . . a central concern of this volume is the relationship between
philosophy of religion and philosophy of science, that is, comparative questions of
epistemology, metaphysics, and language analysis in the two fields” (ibid., 11). For
Barbour, engaging philosophy in thinking the RST relation is essential, because the
everyday practices of religion and science are unreflective. In particular, critical realism
is explicated in epistemic and metaphysical terms:

32. Barbour analyzes the similarities and differences between religion and science in terms of their
methods rather than their content because of the widely-held “assumption that the scientific method is the
only road to knowledge” (Issues, 137).
33. This will also bolster the plausibility of regarding Issues as a founding textbook for the RST
field.
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Among the areas of classical philosophy that bear on religion (and on science),
epistemology deals with the nature of knowledge (methods of inquiry, criteria of
truth, the role of the knower, the status of theories)), and metaphysics deals with
the most general categories for interpreting the structure of reality (time,
causality, mind, matter, and so forth). (Issues, 11)
Let us now briefly examine Barbour’s four-position model for describing possible
relationships between religion and science (alternatively, theology and science).34 For the
purposes of this inquiry, the modalities of Dialogue and Integration are of special interest.
As we examine these modalities, keep in mind that Barbour viewed their employment in
thinking the RST relation flexibly.
Conflict. Scientific materialism and biblical literalism are Barbour’s canonical
examples of irreconcilable conflict between religion and science. On his view, epistemic
and metaphysical issues are at the center of both manifestations of Conflict.35 In his
Gifford lectures (1989-91), Barbour noted that this “inflation” of science to a philosophy
of “scientific materialism” continues today. Its tenets are epistemological (science is the
only reliable road to knowledge) and metaphysical (matter is [or matter and energy are]
the basic reality of the universe) (RIAS, 4-7).
In Barbour’s view, then, the conflict between science and religion posed by
scientific materialism is only apparent, as it is based upon a conflation of philosophical
claims with findings based upon scientific reasoning. Similarly, biblical literalism has
“overreached” its domain for centuries by making “scientific” claims about nature and
34. As pointed out earlier, Barbour employs the same four-position model in examining both
binary relations.
35. In this section (and hereafter, as appropriate) I shall follow Barbour’s practice (in RIAS) of
capitalizing each of the modalities in his fourfold typology: thus, Conflict, Independence, Dialogue, and
Integration.
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the world. Although Barbour acknowledges the historical importance of the Conflict
modality, he treats Conflict, in effect, as a foil for delineating the other three modalities in
more detail.
Independence. In this modality, religion and science separate into nonoverlapping
compartments, “motivated . . . not simply by the desire to avoid unnecessary conflicts,
but also by the desire to be faithful to the distinctive character of each area of life and
thought” (10). In Issues, Barbour traces the rise of three 20th century “movements” that
serve to highlight differences between the methods of religion and science: neoorthodoxy, existentialism, and linguistic analysis. Within each movement, conflict
between religion and science is avoided because the domains do not overlap:
In neo-orthodoxy, it is the uniqueness of revelation that distinguishes theology
from all human discovery. In existentialism, the dichotomy between personal
existence and impersonal objects is the ground of the contrast. For linguistic
analysis, the difference in the functions of religious and scientific language is the
basis of the distinction. (Issues, 116)
In effect, the “two language” view of linguistic analysis gives rise to a “two-world” view
of reality, which Barbour finds unacceptable. “I advocate a critical realism holding that
both communities make cognitive claims about realities beyond the human world. We
cannot remain content with a plurality of unrelated languages if they are languages about
the same world” (RAS, 89).
Dialogue. This modality requires “indirect interactions between science and
religion [or science and theology] involving boundary questions and methods [i.e.,
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methodological parallels]” (RIAS, 16).36 Barbour’s detailed defense of cognitive claims in
religious language relies on critical realism: “[W]e seek in religion, as in science, a
critical realism which preserves what is valid in both positivism and linguistic analysis,
without being restricted to ‘summaries of sense-data,’ on the one hand, or ‘useful
fictions’ on the other.”37
Barbour defends the possibility of cognitive claims in religious language by
examining similarities (as well as differences) in the criteria for evaluating religious
beliefs and scientific theories stated above. In his view, religion and science share the
common goal of the “intelligible ordering of experience”; the methods of both are
grounded in the interweaving of experience and interpretation. Barbour delineates three
common criteria of intelligibility across science and religion: (1) relation to “data,” (2)
coherence, and (3) comprehensiveness, although the interpretation of these criteria is
specific to each field (253).
Barbour turns to metaphysics to bolster his case for the legitimacy of a modality
of Dialogue between religion and science. Both of them, he says, are necessarily linked to
metaphysics in a significant sense. For Barbour, a set of religious beliefs constitutes a
“world view” because such beliefs not only function in the domain of worship and
personal experience but also make claims about nature, God, and humanity. Such a
collection of beliefs may therefore be viewed as metaphysical in the sense that they

36. Except for the replacement of “religion” with “theology,” exactly the same phrase appears in
Barbour’s earlier essay, “Ways of Relating Science and Theology,” 33 (see n. 10). I therefore shall regard
hereafter the two expressions as equivalent characterizations of Barbour’s modality of Dialogue.
37. Issues, 248, original emphasis.
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include assertions about the “fundamental character of reality” (261). Thus, for Barbour,
religious beliefs inescapably make use of metaphysical categories and hence share a
kinship with scientific theories.
Integration. This modality requires a move beyond demonstrating “indirect
interaction” between religion and science (sufficient for Dialogue) to “direct
relationships” that meet at least one of two criteria: namely, “when scientific theories
influence religious beliefs, or when they both contribute to the formulation of a coherent
world view or a systematic metaphysics” (RIAS, 16).38 In particular, this modality entails
integration “between the content of theology and the content of science” (23, emphasis
added).39
Barbour revisits the three “movements” discussed under Independence—neoorthodoxy, existentialism, and linguistic analysis—and examines other “classical views”
(e.g., neo-Thomism) with regard to the relation between God and nature. (Issues, Chapter
13, Sections I and II). Roughly speaking, neo-orthodoxy, existentialism, and linguistic
analysis ignore nature as nature. Natural theology, such as neo-Thomism, can at best
establish the plausibility of the existence of God but can say nothing about God’s
relationship to the world (ibid.). He then turns to process philosophy, as developed by
Whitehead and refined by Charles Hartshorne, to develop his own theology of nature as a
contemporary example of an inclusive metaphysical system that incorporates essential

38. Barbour’s characterization of Integration for the science-theology relation is identical; see
Barbour, “Ways of Relating Science and Theology,” 33.
39. Barbour’s criteria for Integration, and his inclusion of boundary questions in his criteria for
Dialogue, seem consistent with Welker’s statement of “the great potentials of the Science and Theology
discourse” (Welker, “Science and Theology,” 558); also quoted in Subsection 1.2.1 above.
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elements of science and religion, thus satisfying the second criterion for the modality of
integration (ibid., Section III).
I omit details here, except to note Barbour’s indebtedness to critical realism in his
adaptation of concepts from process thought: “. . . Whitehead does affirm that God makes
a difference in the world, not just in our attitudes toward the world. A critical realism
acknowledges the symbolic character of all languages, but insists that they refer to a
single world” (463).
To summarize: Issues prefigures the modalities in Barbour’s well-known fourfold
typology of the RST relation more than two decades prior to its formal publication. The
metaphysical and epistemological assumptions of critical realism are essential in
Barbour’s arguments for establishing Dialogue and Integration as legitimate modalities.
Although Independence is a helpful “first approximation” to thinking the RST relation,
its insufficiency is glaring in light of the imperative to think the relation in terms of the
“one world” we all live in. The possibility of Integration emerges from his commitment
to a robust theology of nature—rooted in communities of faith and supported by certain
resources of process thought. For more than four decades, Barbour has continued to
develop and refine these basic insights found in Issues.40

40. Some other writers contend that non-typological approaches are needed for thinking the RST
relation, in light of increasing pluralisms in religion, the philosophy of science, and cognition in general.
See, for example, Niels H. Gregersen and J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, “Theology and Science in a Pluralist
World: An Introduction,” in Rethinking Theology and Science: Six Models for the Current Dialogue, eds.
Niels H. Gregersen and J. Wentzel van Huysstteen (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 3-6. Barbour
defends the use of typologies in thinking the RST relation against the charge that they are too static and too
simple in his article, “On Typologies for Relating Science and Religion,” in Zygon: Journal of Religion and
Science 37, no. 2 (June 2002): 345-59.
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This section sets the stage for thinking the RST relation with Heidegger. First, it
provides a rationale for engaging the RST relation instead of either the religion-science or
science-theology binary (or both). It does so by employing (and subsequently critiquing)
the customary formulation of theology as the reflection of religious experience and belief.
Second, reviewing key elements of Ian Barbour’s fourfold typology (applicable to either
binary) and its basis in critical realism illustrates two themes that are central to this
inquiry—the role of philosophy and the question of truth. And third, examining the
ostensible origins of the RST academic field in Barbour’s work and the founding of
Zygon supports my claim that thinking the RST relation is of crucial importance.

1.3

Methodology
Any attempt to think the RST relation with Heidegger—or to think, with him, any

other question or matter—must acknowledge from the start that Heidegger’s contribution
(if any) will be made out of thinking the question of Being. Briefly stated, the
“methodology” that I have tried to employ in this inquiry is to become cognizant of the
principles, procedures, and practices that Heidegger has used in thinking the question of
Being and to employ, or otherwise imaginatively adapt, them to the purposes of this
inquiry.
Any discussion of methodology in Heidegger’s work is tricky, for he regarded
method itself as deeply problematic. He understood “method” as not only the path by
which science gains knowledge, but method as the heart of science itself. “Method,
especially in today’s modern scientific thought, is not a mere instrument serving the
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sciences; rather, it has pressed the sciences into its own service.”41 I shall discuss this
later in Section 4.4 (Technology, Science, and Thinking), in which Heidegger’s claim
that “science does not think”—and his explication of the nature of thinking itself—are
examined. Despite this caveat concerning “method,” Heidegger did employ a
methodology—i.e., phenomenology—but in a sense very different from the method(s) of
the sciences.
Following a brief explication of Heidegger’s formulation of the question of Being,
I shall explicate several ways in which Heidegger’s engagement with this question has
decisively shaped the principles, procedures, and practices that have guided this inquiry.
In turn, these elements of my methodology are reflected in the chapter-by-chapter outline
in Section 1.5 below.
In Being and Time,42 Heidegger contends that the question of Being has been
forgotten, or covered over, in the history of philosophy since Plato and Aristotle. On his
view, metaphysics—or more precisely, ontology—has focused instead upon the question
of beings as such and in their entirety (i.e., beings as beings). Heidegger seeks instead the
meaning of Being itself—also expressed as “that which determines entities as entities”
(BT, 6).43 As he sees it, “[t]he task of ontology is to explain Being itself and to make the

41. Martin Heidegger, “The Nature of Language,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D.
Hertz (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 74. (On the Way to Language is hereafter cited as OWL.)
42. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York:
Harper & Row, 1962). (Hereafter cited as BT.) All pages cited from Being and Time throughout this
dissertation use the standard pagination from Sein und Zeit—that is, the page numbers that appear in the
margins of Being and Time.
43. Heidegger distinguishes absolutely between “Being” (das Sein) and “being” (das Seiende), as
the latter (with lower case “b”) is equivalent to “entity” (i.e., anything that is). This absolute distinction is
referred to as the ontological difference. Some translators and other interlocutors prefer to employ “being”
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Being of entities stand out in full relief” (27). Roughly speaking, phenomenology is the
method employed by Heidegger to investigate the question of Being.44
First, Heidegger necessarily approaches the question of Being indirectly—in the
sense of interrogating something other than Being itself in order to comprehend the
meaning, or sense (Sinn), of Being. This indirect approach is necessary, as Being does not
have the character of an entity (i.e., being). Thus, it is meaningless to ask, What is
Being?, as “Being” cannot be the predicate of an assertion. Heidegger’s indirect approach
is to interrogate that entity “which each of us is himself45 and which includes inquiring as
one of the possibilities of its Being”—namely, Dasein (7). He expresses this rubric, or
pattern, of analysis compactly as: das Gefragte—that which is asked about (i.e., Being);
das Erfragte—that which is to be found out by the asking (i.e., the meaning of Being);
and das Befragte—that which is interrogated (i.e., Dasein) (5).46
In this inquiry, it will also be necessary to approach the question of the essence, or
nature, of the RST relation indirectly for the most part, because Heidegger wrote very
little specifically on this topic. In the language of the G-E-B pattern, we could describe
our inquiry as follows: the Gefragte is the RST relation, and the Erfragten (plural) are,
in the sense of “Being.” In this inquiry, I shall usually defer to the translator or other interlocutor involved.
The context in which “being” appears usually is sufficient to clarify its intended meaning. In some cases, I
have written “being itself” to address possible ambiguities.
44. Heidegger provides an extensive explication of “phenomenology” in Section 7 of Being and
Time: “The Phenomenological Method of Investigation” (BT, 27-38).
45. The gender-exclusive language is from Macquarrie and Robinson’s translation of Heidegger’s
original German line, which does not contain such gendering: “das wir selbst je sind” (GA2, 7).
46. The term “Dasein” is intended by Heidegger to express its Being. Dasein is distinguished from
all other beings in that Being is an issue for Dasein, and this fact constitutes Dasein (BT, 12). Moreover,
Dasein “always understands itself in terms of its existence . . .” (ibid.). For this reason, Heidegger’s
investigation of Being by interrogating Dasein is often referred to as an existential analytic of Dasein (13).
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first, the essence of the relation itself, and second, whether, in some sense, “dialogue”
might possibly obtain within the relation. The primary Befragten may be read off the
titles of Chapters 2-5: phenomenology, truth, technology, and ethics—as interpreted by
Heidegger. The G-E-B rubric also operates within some chapters. For example, in
Chapter 4 (Technology and the RST Relation), the Gefragte is modern technology, the
Erfragte is its essence, and the Befragten are the technology-art relation (Section 4.1), the
technology-poetry relation (Section 4.2), and the science-fourfold relation as mediated by
Heidegger’s analysis of the “thing” (Section 4.3).
In The Basic Problems of Phenomenology,47 Heidegger employs the G-E-B
pattern in a distinctive way that informs the entire structure of my inquiry. In BPP,
Heidegger asserts that the essence, or nature, of phenomenology itself can be approached
by examining in detail four basic problems.48 Moreover, he claims that these problems
are the four basic ontological problems (BPP, 225), and that they “grow out of the inner
systematic coherence of the general problem of being” (19). In the language of the G-E-B
rubric, the Gefragte is phenomenology itself, the Erfragte is its essence, and the Befragten
are the four basic problems.
In a roughly analogous fashion, I posit that four questions are fundamental in the
RST discourse; these serve as guiding questions for the following chapters: Chapter 2
(Phenomenology and the RST Relation): What is the proper role of philosophy in
47. Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982). (Hereafter cited as BPP.)
48. “[F]irst, the problem of the ontological difference, the distinction between being and beings;
secondly, the problem of the basic articulation of being, the essential content of a being and its mode of
being; thirdly, the problem of the possible modifications of being and of the unity of the concept of being in
its ambiguity; fourthly, the problem of the truth-character of being” (BPP, 225; original italics).
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thinking the RST relation? (An important related question will be taken up in Sections
2.3 and 2.4 below: namely, is theology a “science” or otherwise “scientific” in some
sense?) Chapter 3 (Truth and the RST Relation): In what sense(s)—comparable or not—
are the claims of religion, science, and theology “true”? Chapter 4 (Technology and the
RST Relation): What is the relation of technology to the RST triad? Chapter 5 (Ethics
and the RST Relation): Is thinking the RST relation compelling for our time? That is,
does such thinking truly matter for our dwelling (ethos) and destiny on planet earth?
From this perspective, the Gefragte and the Erfragten remain as before (i.e., the RST
relation and its essence), but the Befragten are the four basic questions just listed.49
Second, Heidegger frequently engages his primary question of Being in relation to
other fundamental questions, some of which can be read directly from the Chapter
headings—for example, the question of truth (Chapter 3) and the question of technology
(Chapter 4). Other basic questions cross cut, or traverse, the questions implicit in the
chapter headings. For example, the question of truth is in the foreground throughout
Basic Questions of Philosophy.50 Yet Heidegger tells us that this question is inseparable
from the question of Being (BQP, 41) and from the question of “man”—i.e., the question
of what it means to be human. (ibid., 20). In What Is Called Thinking?,51 the questions of

49. However, I do not claim, as Heidegger does, that these four questions are the basic questions
of the RST relation, nor that they “constitute an intrinsic unit,” as he says regarding the four basic problems
of phenomenology (BPP, 225).
50. Martin Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic,” trans.
Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). (Hereafter cited as
BQP.)
51. Martin Heidegger, What Is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper & Row,
1968.) (Hereafter cited as WCT.)
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thinking, man, and destiny (the last in the form of the question of nihilism) predominate
in Part I, while the question of Being “joins,” so to speak, the question of thinking in the
foreground in Part II.
In any of Heidegger’s works, I contend that the question of Being is always at
issue—explicitly or implicitly. Other basic questions come into play in relation to the
question of Being and in relation to each other. For example, in The Principle of Reason,
the questionable interpretation of man as animal rationale is directly linked to the
question of the hegemony of calculative thinking.52 Furthermore, not only are the
fundamental questions linked to the question of Being and to each other, I suggest that
this family of questions is essentially a single question—the question of Being, a question
that Heidegger continually engages, explicitly or not, in its many guises.
Third, for Heidegger, the merely correct is not wrong but is “on the way to truth.”
Heidegger often begins his inquiries by starting with the customary understanding of
something with the intention of thinking it more essentially, more originarily. One
example that comes to light in this inquiry is the traditional notion of truth as the
correctness of an assertion (more precisely, the correspondence of an assertion with its
object or referent). (See Sections 3.1 and 3.2.) Another is the traditional notion of
causality in terms of four “causes” (more precisely, four senses of “cause”). (See Sections
4.1 on the essence of modern technology and Section 4.3 on the nature of the thing.) I
have applied this principle myself throughout this inquiry by starting with the widespread
characterization of theology as reflection on religious experience and/or belief.
52. Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1991), 129. (Hereafter cited as POR.)
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Fourth, Heidegger’s relentless questioning, putting question after question to
himself and to his readers, permeates his works. Already up to this point in the
Introduction to this inquiry, page after page contains questions as questions, as well as
references to the questions of Being, thinking, technology, etc. For Heidegger,
questioning is never to “know” more but rather is always in the service of thinking the
question of Being. At the close of his 1955 lecture, “The Question Concerning
Technology,” he writes: “For questioning is the piety of thought” (QCT, 35).53 In a later
lecture, he explicates the meaning of piety and brings to light the relation between
thinking and listening:
‘Piety’ is meant here in the ancient sense: obedient, or submissive, and in this case
submitting to what thinking has to think about. . . .The lecture ending with that
sentence was already in the ambiance of the realization that the true stance of
thinking cannot be to put questions, but must be to listen to that which our
questioning vouchsafes—and all questioning begins to be a questioning only in
virtue of pursuing its quest for essential being. 54
Heidegger sums it up: “The authentic attitude of thinking is not a putting of questions—
rather, it is a listening to the grant, the promise of what is to be put in question” (OWL,
71).
Finally, keeping in mind Heidegger’s understanding of essence will be important
throughout this inquiry. For example, in the chapters ahead we shall examine Heidegger’s
explications of the essence of phenomenology, religion, science, truth, and modern
53. Martin Heidegger, “The Question Concerning Technology,” in The Question Concerning
Technology, and other Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). Hereafter, The
Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays is cited as QCT. In order to differentiate between this
collection of essays and the specific essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” that is included in this
collection, the latter is denoted hereafter by “the QCT essay” or “the QCT lecture.”
54. Heidegger, “Nature of Language,” in OWL, 72.
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technology. Briefly stated, the essence of an entity or being is not something timeless and
ahistorical, but rather that which persistently endures over a period of time (QCT, 29-31).
Furthermore, the essence of something is not limited to its “whatness,” as Plato held.
Section 3.2 examines Heidegger’s notion of “essence” in light of his critique of the
traditional understanding of truth as the correctness of an assertion (Section 3.2) and his
explication of the essence of modern technology (Section 4.1).

1.4

Significance and Contribution
The question or matter of the significance of this inquiry has two parts: first, the

significance of thinking the RST relation at all; and second, the significance (if any) of
this particular inquiry.
In response to the first question, I suggest that my brief investigation in Sections
1.2.1 and 1.2.2 above attest to the continued relevance of thinking the RST relation—not
only for academic reasons, but for the sake of the future. In Section 1.2.1, I quote
theologian Philip Hefner who expresses it thusly:
We do not simply observe religion-and-science or study its components; the
grappling with meaning vis-à-vis that which is most important to us requires our
full engagement, because it is the meaning of our lives that is at stake, not just the
mapping of an academic terrain.”55

Forty years earlier, Whitehead declared that religion and science are the two most
powerful forces shaping human history. He felt that it was vitally important that there be
some sort of rapprochement between them. His words have clearly inspired Ian Barbour

55. Hefner, “Religion-and-Science,” 566.
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to devote more than five decades to doing what Hefner calls religion-and-science, but
also studying the doing of religion-and-science. In Section 1.2.2, the editors of Zygon
articulated the purpose of their new journal in terms of responding to the “growing fears
that the widening chasm in twentieth century culture between values and knowledge, . . .
is disruptive, if not lethal, for human destiny” (Zygon 1 [1966]: 1). I have tried to
structure and carry out this inquiry from this overarching context. (That said, I do not
agree with those who seem to assume from the beginning that religion and/or theology
are “out of step” in some way.) Moreover, judging from the growing literature on the
religion-science and science-theology relations and the lack of consensus on their proper
construal, the topic is widely taken to be of enduring importance.
With regard to the second question, research into Heidegger’s examination of the
individual elements of the relation—and the relation itself—via his method of
phenomenological analysis may shed light on whether the lack of consensus in thinking
the RST relation is an essential feature of these relations or whether the essence of these
relations itself remains to be more fruitfully thought through.
In addition, based upon my review of the many texts and publications available in
the RST literature, few of the writers in the field engage Heidegger explicitly in
conducting their own analyses in the doing of RST and the study of such doing, as Philip
Hefner might put it. These include, for example, such authors as: Albert Borgmann,
Frederick Ferré, Alister McGrath, and Carl Mitcham.56 (Selected works from their
writings on the RST relation, including those that refer to Heidegger, are listed in the
56. I am grateful to Dr. Ian Barbour for bringing to my attention the work of Borgmann and Ferré,
especially their analyses of the theology-technology relation. (E-mail message, January 18, 2010.)
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Bibliography.) While it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to critique the limited
employment of Heidegger’s thinking in their own work, the purpose of this inquiry is to
bring Heidegger’s thinking explicitly to bear what I consider to be fundamental, enduring
issues in the RST relation and then to articulate my own views. Suffice it to say that none
of their treatments of Heidegger with regard to the RST relation engage his thought with
the scope intended in this inquiry.

1.5

Chapter Outline
The body of this work is structured as a series of five interwoven “threads,” each

pertinent to thinking the RST relation, and each thought out of Heidegger’s engagement
with the question of Being. The first thread is a set of four questions that I take to be
fundamental in thinking the RST relation (and that arguably are reflected in much of the
RST literature). These questions are directly reflected in the titles of Chapters 2-5. The
other four threads—comportment (to things), reflection, thinking, and destiny—“crosscut,” or traverse, the stated themes of these four chapters and their underlying questions.
(These transversal themes are successively introduced in Chapters 2-5, respectively.) In
particular, these four cross-cutting threads serve to interrogate the common formulation
of theology as reflection on religious experience and belief. I display the chapter outline
and these threads as follows:
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Chapter 2: Phenomenology and the RST Relation


What is the role of philosophy in the RST relation?



(Transversal thread: comportment to things) What is objectification?



Is theology “objectifying,” in some sense? That is, does it possess
characteristics of a science?

Chapter 3: Truth and the RST Relation


What is truth for each element in the RST relation, and for the relation
itself?



(Transversal thread: reflection) What is “reflection”?



In what sense is theology “reflective”?

Chapter 4: Technology and the RST Relation


What is the standing of technology with regard to the RST relation?



(Transversal thread: thinking) What is (called) thinking?



What sort of thinking characterizes theology: calculative thinking,
meditative thinking, neither, or both?

Chapter 5: Ethics and the RST Relation


What is the significance for thinking the RST relation with regard to our
dwelling (ethos) on planet earth?



(Transversal thread : destiny) What is destiny?



Does theology have a role in shaping our destiny?

The overall structure of this inquiry is also shaped by Heidegger’s retrospective
description of his life-long engagement with the question of being as “three successive
36

formulations” of the “question of being as being”: the meaning, or sense, of being; the
truth of being, and the place, or location, of being.57 Roughly speaking, these three
formulations of the question of being serve as the “arc” of this entire inquiry. The
meaning, or sense, of being undergirds Heidegger’s phenomenological analyses of
religion, science, and theology in Chapter 2; the truth of being is the leitmotiv of Chapter
3 and an underlying theme in Chapter 4; and the place of being, resonant with “dwelling”
(ethos), is the opening context for Chapter 5.
In light of this synoptic view of the entire work, I now briefly describe the focus
of each chapter and the Epilogue. The Appendix contains a one-page schema of the entire
work.
Chapter 2 sequentially examines Heidegger’s explication of religion, science, and
theology through the lens of phenomenology. Each is interpreted as one of Dasein’s
modes of Being-in-the-world. The possibility—and implications—of thinking theology
as a science is addressed. The different meanings of objectification in terms of “object”
as Gegenstand and Okjekt are elucidated and employed to clarify similarities and
differences between science and theology. On Heidegger’s view, if theology were a
science, it would be the science of faith. And if this were the case, philosophy (as
ontology) would have a role in clarifying the basic concepts that underlie theology.
Evidence indicates, however, that Heidegger did not hold that theology is, in fact, a
science. Throughout this chapter, “religion” is taken as Christian (factical) life
experience (aka Christianness), grounded in faith, and “theology” as Christian theology.
57. Martin Heidegger, “Seminar in Le Thor 1969,” in Four Seminars, trans. Andrew Mitchell and
François Raffoul (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 46-47.
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Heidegger’s explication of the phenomenology of religious life is prefaced by articulating
the meaning, or sense, of being in the “analogical moments” of content, relationality, and
enactment.
Chapter 3 presents Heidegger’s critique of the customary understanding of truth
as the “correctness” of the correspondence between assertions and their referents. He
recovers the pre-Socratic understanding of truth as disclosure and traces its transmutation
to truth as correctness (Aristotle), thence to truth as certainty (Descartes). At issue is
whether or not the question of the essence of truth is best engaged as a “problem” of
logic. Heidegger’s claim that truth and untruth are inextricably intertwined is also
presented. In the third section, theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen’s characterization of
theology in terms of reason-seeking and giving is examined in light of Heidegger’s
critique of Leibniz’s grand principle of reason: nihil est sine ratione.58 The final section
presents Heidegger’s distinction between the two senses of reflection as Reflexion (based
upon representational, idea-forming thinking) and Besinnung (mindfulness). These last
two sections raise questions about the essential nature of theology: namely, Is reasonseeking and giving sufficient to characterize theology? And, in what sense(s) of reflection
is might theology be understood as “reflection on religious experience and belief” with
regard to thinking the RST relation?
Chapter 4 examines the essences of modern technology and modern science and
their interrelation, together with Heidegger’s explication of the relationships of art,
poetry, and the fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and divinities, to technology and to the

58. Literally, “nothing is without reason,” paraphrased as “everything has a reason.”
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holy/divine. The first two sections examine Heidegger’s analysis of the essence of
technology and his claim that a “saving power” grows in the midst of the extreme danger
posed by this essence. Heidegger explicates the possibility that art and poetry offer paths
for hope and constructive response in the face of the growing hegemony of the essence of
modern technology. Heidegger’s explication of “thingness” in relation to the fourfold
points to a mode of relating to entities other than by objectification in either of its senses.
The final section presents Heidegger’s analysis of the essential nature of thinking.
Representational, idea-forming thinking (aka “calculative thinking”)—characteristic of
science and reflection as Reflexion—is contrasted with meditative, reflective thinking in
the sense of mindfulness (Besinnung). Questions for theology: Which form(s) of
thinking, if any, meaningfully apply to theology? What can theology learn from poetry’s
task of giving expression to wholeness in the midst of unwholeness?
Chapter 5 engages Heidegger explication of “ethics” in the sense of dwelling or
abode (ethos), in relation to destiny. Here, Heidegger’s understanding of “destiny” as the
“sending of Being” (Geschick)—as well as its customary understanding as our fate, in
some sense—are both in play. His analysis of the crucial roles of poetry and thinking—
separately and together—in service of dwelling is explicated. Ian Barbour’s analysis of
technology, including the central role of “values” in developing effective responses to its
dangers, is contrasted with Heidegger’s critique of the notion of “values.” Nietzsche’s
epigram for nihilism, “God is dead,” and its implications for thinking the essence of
religion, science, and theology are examined. In closing, the question of destiny—and the
urgency and importance of thinking the RST relation—is considered in light of
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Heidegger’s formulation of Nietzsche’s question, “Is the man of today in his
metaphysical nature prepared to assume dominion over the earth as a whole?” (WCT,
65).59
In the Epilogue, I return to the original motivating questions for this inquiry:
What is the essence of the RST relation? Is “dialogue,” in some sense, possible in the
RST triad? And does theology have a legitimate place in the public square in an age
dominated by scientific, calculative thinking? In response, I re-examine the proffered
formula of theology as reflection on religious experience and belief in light of the
underlying questions and transversal themes addressed in the intervening four chapters.
This context is expanded in view of the unquestionable and growing impact of human
activity across the earth. In my view, this entails incorporating within theology both
senses of comportment to things, reflection, and thinking—including poeticizing. And
finally, the forums for such theologizing can—and must—include the public square as
well as the academy and religious communities.

59. Unless otherwise noted, “man” and “mankind” are translations of der Mensch, which also
connotes more broadly “human being” and “people,” in all portions of Heidegger’s works cited in this
dissertation. Unless otherwise noted, I interpret as well the use of “man” and “mankind” by others cited
herein in the broad sense of der Mensch.

40

Chapter 2: Phenomenology and the RST Relation

This chapter examines Heidegger’s explication of “phenomenology” and its
employment in understanding the essential nature of religion, science, theology, and their
interrelations. In so doing, I shall begin to engage one of the basic questions in the RST
discourse and this inquiry: namely, What is the appropriate role of philosophy in thinking
the RST relation? In Being and Time, Heidegger avers that phenomenology is the method
of philosophy, taken as ontology—the study of Being itself. On his view, phenomenology
is not merely a branch, or field, in philosophy—along with ethics, epistemology, etc.—
but the only path to follow to think Being itself.60
The first three sections of this chapter focus upon Heidegger’s analyses of
religion, science, and theology, respectively, through the lens of phenomenology. As we
shall see, however, all three members of the RST relation are unavoidably “in play” in
each section. The first section (2.1 The Phenomenology of Religion) provides a formal,
but preliminary, characterization of the phenomenological method and employs it to: (i)
interpret specific “religious phenomena” in several of Paul’s letters in the New
Testament, and (ii) characterize the life experience of early Christians. The next section

60. “Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines among others.
These terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object and its way of treating that object.
Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology . . .” (BT, 38). Heidegger explicates “The Preliminary
Conception of Phenomenology” in BT, 34-39. A reminder: In this chapter and throughout the remainder of
this inquiry, page numbers in BT refer to the standard pagination of Sein und Zeit. These “standard” pages
appear in the margins of Being and Time.
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(2.2 Phenomenology and Science) focuses upon Heidegger’s explication of the essence of
science in terms of the existential analytic of Dasein as presented in Being and Time. On
Heidegger’s view, “science” (Wissenschaft) is a specific mode of Dasein as Being-in-theWorld—a view very different from regarding science as “the totality established through
an interconnection of true propositions” (BT, 11). In the following section (2.3
Phenomenology and Theology), Heidegger investigates what might be learned by
regarding theology and phenomenology as “sciences.” In so doing, he characterizes
theology as the “science of faith” and argues that philosophy can assist theology in
clarifying its fundamental concepts by articulating the ontological bases for them. The
final section (2.4 Theology, Natural Science, and Objectification) takes up the question of
whether theology is a “non-objectifying thinking and speaking” and provisionally
examines the notion of “objectification” itself—a recurring theme in this inquiry.

2.1

The Phenomenology of Religion
What does Heidegger mean by “phenomenology,” and in what way(s) does it

illuminate the nature, or essence, of religion? I shall engage these guiding questions by
drawing upon Heidegger’s lecture course of 1920-21, titled “Introduction to the
Phenomenology of Religion.”61 This lecture course consists of two parts. Part I examines
essential differences between philosophy and science and provides a formal definition of
phenomenology in terms of a threefold understanding of the sense (Sinn), or meaning, of

61. Heidegger’s notes, and notes from his students for this lecture course have been compiled and
published in The Phenomenology of Religious Life, trans. Matthew Fritsch and Jennifer Anna GosettiFerencei (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 3-111. The Phenomenology of Religious Life is
hereafter cited as PRL.
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“experience.” Heidegger names these three “directions” of sense (Sinnesrichtungen) of
experience as the content-sense, relational-sense, and enactment-sense of experience. In
Part II, Heidegger employs this threefold understanding of experience to interpret key
events and claims in several of Paul’s letters in the New Testament and, more broadly, to
explicate characteristics of early Christian life. In contrast to this three-fold meaning of
Christian life experience, Heidegger contends that the horizon of science is limited to the
content-sense of experience: that is, what is experienced.
Before proffering a formal definition of “phenomenology,” Heidegger draws
several sharp distinctions between philosophy and science and then explicates his
fundamental notion of factical life experience. On his view, each scientific discipline is
founded upon a specific and delimited “material complex,” out of which its concepts are
formed. Moreover, the greater the familiarity with the complex, the greater the exactness
with which its concepts may be formulated. Philosophy, however, does not have access to
any such complex. Hence its concepts are necessarily “vacillating, vague, manifold, and
fluctuating” (PRL, 3). Heidegger also contends that science cannot determine its own
essence, but that the constant reappraisal of its basic notions and its very essence is
constitutive of philosophy itself (6-7).
In light of the absence of any material complex within which to secure its
concepts, philosophy (as phenomenology) must turn elsewhere to begin philosophizing.
For Heidegger, factical life experience is the “point of departure” and the goal of
philosophy (11). Let us examine Heidegger’s interpretation of this key term, starting with
“experience.” On his view, every experience entails a twofold meaning: (i) the activity of
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experiencing, and (ii) that which is experienced by means of this activity (7). Moreover,
he says, regarding these two expressions as inseparable is essential for factical life
experience. By “life experience,” Heidegger means “the active and passive pose of the
human being toward the world” (8). Heidegger further delineates “world” as surrounding
world (i.e., all that we encounter, including “ideal objectivities”); communal world (i.e.,
other human beings in specific characterizations—e.g., student, relative, etc.); and selfworld. The term “world” is not an object but instead points to “that in which we can live.”
By applying the adjective “factical” to “life experience,” Heidegger intends to
articulate a particular character or manner of the pose (Stellung), or stance, toward the
world. I suggest that factical life experience can be expressed compactly as relational
indifference toward the worlds in which we live—the self-world, the communal world,
and the surrounding world.62
The peculiarity of factical life experience consists in the fact that ‘how I stand
with regard to things,’ the manner of experiencing, is not co-experienced. . . .
Factical life experience puts all its weight on its content; the how of factical life
experience at most merges into its content. . . . factical life experience manifests
an indifference with regard to the manner of experiencing. (PRL, 9)
Heidegger’s notion of factical life experience is further clarified by his formal
characterizations of “phenomenon” and “phenomenology” in terms of the three directions
of sense in experience. The two-fold meaning of experience unfolds into three basic
ways, or directions, of inquiring after the experience: (i) What was experienced? (a
content question). (i) How was the experience experienced? (a relational question) and

62. Heidegger provides a comprehensive “formula”: “Factical life experience is ‘the attitudinal,
falling, relationally indifferent, self-sufficient concern for significance’” (PRL, 11).
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(iii) How was the relational meaning of the experience acted upon and fulfilled? (a
question of enactment) (43). Then phenomenon is “the totality of sense in these three
directions,” and phenomenology is the “explication of this totality of sense” (43).63
In terms of the threefold sense of experience, factical life experience is “onedimensional,” so to speak, as it is dominated by the direction of content-sense. Factical
life experience reduces the twofold nature of experience to the “onefold” of what is
experienced and ignores how the experiencing itself unfolds. Moreover, it turns to science
for its basic orientation, as it “constantly strives for an articulation in science and
ultimately for a ‘scientific culture’” (11).
In Part Two, Heidegger employs the three directions of sense to explicate the
meaning of early Christian factical life experience (aka, “primordial Christian
religiosity”). On his view, primordial Christian religiosity is not only in factical life
experience, but is factical life experience itself (57).64 On the face of it, this hypothetical
claim is paradoxical. On the one hand, as I shall show below, he claims that early
Christian factical life experience exhibits the characteristics of all three directions of
“sense.” On the other hand, we have just cited passages that emphasize the relational
indifference and content-heavy character of factical life experience itself. Heidegger
writes: “We attempt to understand this [apparent paradox] from out of the apostolic
63. Heidegger names this threefold, yet unitary, sense of phenomenological explication, formal
indication (PRL, 38). It is intended to guide such explication without theoretical preconceptions
(characteristic of formalization) or approaches based upon classification (characteristic of generalization)
(ibid., 39-44). For a deeper examination of Heidegger’s notion of formal indication, see Leslie MacAvoy,
“Formal Indication and the Hermeneutics of Facticity,” in Philosophy Today 54 (2010): 84-90,
http://search.proquest.com/docview/762702248?accountid=14608.
64.This is a more compelling claim that his earlier statement: “Primordial Christian religiosity is
in primordial Christian life experience and is itself such” (PRL, 55; emphasis added).
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proclamation of Paul” (93, original emphasis). Paul’s proclamation is that Jesus is the
Messiah (83).
Acceptance of the apostolic proclamation by the early Christian communities,
such as the Thessalonians, is a “having-become,” says Heidegger (65f). “Havingbecome” entails mundane as well as “spiritual,” so to speak, consequences. “The havingbecome is understood such that with the acceptance, the one who accepts treads upon an
effective connection with God. . . . That which is accepted concerns the how of selfconduct in factical life” (66). Acceptance of the proclamation is transformational—an
“absolute turning-around, more precisely about a turning-toward God and a turningaway from idol-images” (ibid.). Furthermore, understood as the acceptance of the
apostolic proclamation, the “having-become” is not a once-and-for-all experience, but
rather is “incessantly co-experienced” (ibid.). In sum, “having-become” is the relationalsense of Christian factical life experience, as it expresses how the experience of hearing
the apostolic proclamation was experienced—namely, transformationally. In turn,
“having become” gives rise to the enactment-sense of this experience as well:
Christian factical life experience is historically determined by its emergence with
the proclamation that hits the people in a moment, and then is unceasingly also
alive in the enactment of life. Further, this life experience determines, for its part,
the relations which are found in it. (PRL, 83)
The paradox still at issue is illuminated by Paul’s response to the urgent question
of many—perhaps most—early Christians: When will the parousia65 take place? On

65. Heidegger traces the meaning of parousia from its classical roots (meaning “arrival”) through
Judaism to its Christian meaning as “the appearing again of the already appeared Messiah” (PRL, 71).
Equivalently, he says, the Christian meaning of parousia may be expressed as “the second coming of Christ
at the end of time.”
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Heidegger’s reading of Paul’s letters, Paul ignores the content-sense of the question but
provides an enactment-sense response instead. Heidegger summarizes the heart of Paul’s
reply: “What is decisive is how I comport [verhalte] myself to it in actual life. From that
results the meaning of the ‘when?,’ time and the moment” (70, emphasis added; see also
51). By “comportment,” Heidegger means the enactment-sense of early Christian life
experience—i.e., how the transformative experience of being “hit” with the apostolic
proclamation is lived out in one’s surrounding, communal, and self-worlds (84).66
Heidegger turns to Paul’s first letter to the Corinthians to explicate in more detail
what such comportment entails. “Let each one of you remain in the condition in which
you were called.”67 Heidegger gives examples. If a Christian is a slave, he or she should
anticipate remaining a slave. If Christian men are married, they “should be such that
those who have a wife, should have her in such a way, that they do not have her, etc.”
(85, original emphasis).68
This example illuminates and affirms the tension in the paradoxical claim that
early Christian factical like experience “is factical life experience itself” (57). On the one

66. “Comportment” is one of the translations of das Verhalten; others include “attitude,”
“manner,” “conduct,” “bearing,” and “demeanor.” The translations of the infinitive, verhalten, are more
specific: “to restrain, contain, hold, control, curb.” Online Dictionary English-German, s.v. “Verhalten,”
accessed October 26, 2012, http://www.dict.cc/?s=Verhalten. In this inquiry, I shall use “comportment” in
its more general sense. (See chap. 4, n. 161, regarding the translation of die Haltung as “comportment.”)
67. 1 Cor. 7:20 (New Revised Standard Version). Heidegger’s version: “One should remain in the
calling in which one is” (PRL, 84).
68. Heidegger translates ώς μή (1 Cor. 7:29) as “that . . . do not” and critiques the insertion of the
conditional “if” in its customary translation “as if not” or some close variation (PRL, 84-86). Examples of
such translations are “as if . . . none” (New International Version) and “as though . . . none” (NRSV)
(emphases added). By so doing, he guards against implying that either relation, slavery or marriage, is to be
avoided or preferred. In support of Heidegger’s move, ώς μή literally means “that (or as) not,” which does
not imply a conditional (Dennis Haugh, personal communication).
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hand, married men who have become Christians should stay married, Paul says. As
Heidegger puts it, “[T]he Christian does not step out of the world” (85). On the other
hand, Heidegger states that their marriage relationships, like “all surrounding-world
relations,” “must pass through the complex of enactment having-become, so that this
complex is then co-present, but the relations themselves, and that to which they refer, are
in no way touched” (86). Given the polysemic understanding of “experience,” we can
affirm that early Christian factical life experience is factical life experience itself.
To sum up, early Christian factical life experience is grounded in the “having
become” as the transformational acceptance of the apostolic proclamation, “Jesus is the
Messiah.” This relational sense of Christian factical life experience gives rise to enacting,
or living out, that transforming experience in ways that, in turn, transform the manner of
one’s relationships to all the worlds of life experience—surrounding, communal, and
self—without altering their content and the relations therein. Christian factical life
experience is factical life experience in the fullest meaning of “experience.” It is beyond
human power to effect this enactment, Heidegger says. God is the source of this Christian
facticity—“the phenomenon of the effects of grace” (87). One’s comportment to this
facticity is decisive.
What about theology? In terms of Christian theology, Heidegger says that it is
grounded in the enactment of Christian factical life experience. Specifically, it is
grounded in the knowledge that arises from the “having become”:
Knowledge of one’s own having-become is the starting point and the origin of
theology. In the explication of this knowledge and its conceptual form of
expression the sense of a theological conceptual formation arises. (PRL, 66)
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Heidegger interprets Paul’s explications of comportment to both faith and law (Phil.
Chapter 3) as a form of theology, but not as a system of theology. On Heidegger’s view,
Paul is articulating the “consciousness of faith, in the sense of making comprehensible
the posture of faith for the individual himself” (51).
Heidegger sharply distinguishes his phenomenological explication of theology,
thought from out of early Christian life experience, from Troeltsch’s philosophy of
religion. On Heidegger’s view, Troeltsch attempts a scientific approach to discern the
essence of religion (19).69 This entails regarding religion as an object (Objekt) for
scientific analysis. “Religion is for him an external object and can as such be integrated
into different material complexes (as appropriate to different philosophical ‘systems’)”
(20). In contrast to Troeltsch’s objectification of religion, Heidegger regards “faith in the
existence of God” as the primal phenomenon of religion. The question of
“objectification” for religion, science, and theology runs through this entire inquiry.
I close this section with two observations with regard to thinking the RST
relation. First, on Heidegger’s view, religion and science can be distinguished in terms of
the span, or range, of the directions of sense in experience that each engages: roughly
speaking, three for religion, one for science. As for theology, perhaps we could say
“three” in light of Heidegger’s phenomenological articulation of theology as grounded in
the “having-become” and “one” for Troeltsch’s scientific study of the essence of religion.
This doesn’t quite wash, however, as Troeltsch’s work is philosophy of religion—not
theology. Nonetheless, Troeltsch’s analysis of religion raises the question of whether
69. Heidegger takes issue with attempts to explicate the “essence” of religion. “Everything that is
said of the—for reason—indissoluble residue that supposedly remains in all religions, is merely an
aesthetic play with things that are not understood” (PRL, 55).

49

theology is, in some sense, a science—and if not, whether it could, or even should, be.
We shall take up these questions in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
Second, Heidegger’s characterization of Christian theology as grounded upon the
“having become” has implications for thinking anew the “formula” of theology as
reflection on religious experience and belief. In particular, the conventional formula is
silent about the place of faith. In terms of Christian factical life experience, the relationalsense of religious experience (i.e., the “having become”) is grounded upon the faith-filled
acceptance of the apostolic proclamation. Thus, Christian faith and Christian (factical
life) experience are inseparable. Still to be clarified: What is the relation between
Christian faith and belief? And what is the meaning, or sense (in all three directions) of
the phenomenon of “reflection”?

2.2

Phenomenology and Science
The primary task of this section is to examine Heidegger’s explication of the

nature, or essence, of science in phenomenological terms as it is presented in Being and
Time.70 My guiding questions are: What makes science possible? That is, thought
phenomenologically, what are the conditions necessary for doing science? What is the
phenomenological understanding of the nature of scientific activity? How does it differ
from conventional understandings, and how does the latter flow from the former? To
address these questions, I shall focus on the distinctive manner in which science engages,
or otherwise relates, to the entities that it analyzes. In the following two sections of this
70. The question of the essential nature of science will also be investigated in other sections that
reference other writings by Heidegger.
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chapter, I shall compare and contrast the manner of science and the manner of theology in
such engaging and relating.
I take as a starting point Heidegger’s claim that science is a mode of Being-in-theWorld (BT, 357). According to Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is Dasein’s basic state or
structure (53).71 Roughly speaking, this means that, as human beings, we always “show
up” already embedded in a world of entities (aka beings), other Dasein, and relations
among them before “science” or any other concept is—or can be—formulated and
appropriated intelligibly. Just as Heidegger approaches the meaning, or sense, of Being
itself by interrogating Dasein as Being-in-the-world, so he interrogates this basic state by
examining the “world” of everyday Dasein and the entities within it. This examination
consists of “an ontological Interpretation of those entities within-the-environment which
we encounter as closest to us” (66).72 Such entities, he says, are those that we deal with or
that otherwise concern us.73 Heidegger calls such entities equipment—understood as
“essentially something ‘in-order-to’” (68). That is, equipment is purposeful.
Ontologically speaking, equipment is a presencing of Being (as the Being of an entity)
that Heidegger calls readiness-to-hand (69).

71. This follows from his development of the existential analytic of Dasein, which was briefly
described in the Methodology section (1.3).
72. More precisely, his method seeks “the worldhood of the environment . . .” (BT, 66). For
Heidegger, “world,” denotes, in this context, “that ‘wherein’ a factical Dasein as such can be said to ‘live’”
(65). “Environment” is “that world of everyday Dasein which is closest to it” (66). The “worldhood of the
world” is “the Being of that ontical condition which makes it possible for entities within-the-world to be
discovered at all” (88).
73. For Heidegger, “concern” (Besorgen) designates “the Being of a possible way of Being-in-theWorld” (BT, 57). According to Macquarrie and Robinson, it is meant in the sense of concerning ourselves
with activities or purchases (57, n. 1). This mode, like other modes, can also manifest itself in a deficient
manner, such as renouncing and neglecting (57).
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To illustrate, Heidegger explicates this mode of the presencing of Being of a
hammer and contrasts it with a second mode. It might seem obvious that readiness-tohand would characterize the presencing of Being of a hammer, since a hammer as such
clearly fits the conventional understanding of “equipment” as something ready to be used
by a carpenter, say. According to Heidegger, however, we cannot tell the mode in which
the Being of something presences just by looking at it. “No matter how sharply we just
look at the ‘outward appearance’ of Things in whatever form this takes, we cannot
discover anything ready-to-hand” (69; original emphasis). However, “the less we just
stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more
primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered
as that which it is—as equipment” (ibid.). In contrast, suppose we focus on the heaviness
of the hammer, say, as a property of some sort, viewing the hammer “not as a tool, but as
a corporeal Thing subject to the law of gravity” (361). We would then be looking at the
hammer, he says, as something present-at-hand. What the hammer is has not changed,
but the mode of the presencing of Being of the hammer “has changed over” from
readiness-to-hand to presence-at-hand (361).
The contrast between readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand may be expressed
by relating them to the three directions of sense that together comprise “phenomenon” as
discussed in Section 2.1. On one hand, the experience of hammering just described
clearly includes the relational-sense and enactment-sense of the phenomenon of the
hammer. On the other hand, by focusing on the heaviness of the hammer in isolation, its
Being presences as presence-at-hand, limiting its meaning to content-sense only. In other
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words, readiness-to-hand encompasses the how as well as the what of the hammer as
phenomenon, while presence-at-hand limits the extent of its sense, or meaning, to the
what of the hammer, now as mere entity.
Heidegger explicates in detail the manner by which this changeover of the mode
of the presencing of Being of entities within-the-world of Dasein can take place. Briefly
stated, the circumspective concern of the readiness-to-hand is modified to the theoretical
discovery of the presence-at-hand (357-61). Both modes in which Being presences
involve sight or seeing, but in very different ways. Circumspection (Umsicht) means
“looking around,” or “looking in order to get something done” (69, n. 2)—a manner of
sight appropriate for the concernful involvement that characterizes readiness-to-hand. In
contrast, the theoretical has its own form of looking as observation, in which the “inorder-to” is absent (69). On the one hand, the modification from the practical to the
theoretical ignores, or even eliminates, the purposiveness of the readiness-to-hand. On the
other hand, the shift to the theoretical releases the entities in Dasein’s environment from
their confinement, due to circumspective concern, to possibly become an “area of
subject-matter for a science . . .” (362). By the changeover, the hammer’s mode of the
presencing of Being is no longer that of a phenomenon (in the three directions of its
meaning) but has become the presencing of Being as merely an entity whose meaning has
become reduced to its whatness.
The shift from the practical to the theoretical is on the path to science, so to speak,
but more is needed. Heidegger selects mathematical physics in order to illuminate
additional features of the theoretical. For this natural science and others, the
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mathematical projection of Nature is key (ibid.). Such projection has both a
determinative and restricting effect. On the one hand, the projection provides for the
explicit quantification of such fundamental concepts as force, location, and motion; on
the other hand, the projection delimits the horizon within which entities taken as its
theme can be discovered (ibid.). The shift from circumspective concern to theoretical
discovery thus entails a trade-off: namely, securing a measure of the what, or content, of
the phenomenon, now merely an entity, while excluding the how of relationality and
enactment that flesh out the meaning, or sense, of the phenomenon itself.
Briefly stated, phenomena become Objects (Objekte)74 under mathematical
projection. Considered comprehensively as thematizing, such projection determines the
understanding of the Being of its entities and identifies the region of its theoretically
discovered entities. Thematizing is objectivizing; it “awaits solely the discoveredness of
the present-at-hand” (363).
Heidegger’s explication of the changeover from the ready-to-hand (i.e., the
practical) to presence-at-hand (i.e., the theoretical) substantiates his claim that science,
thought phenomenologically, is a mode of Dasein’s fundamental state as Being-in-theworld:
When the basic concepts of that understanding of Being by which we are guided
have been worked out, the clues of its methods, the structure of its way of
conceiving things, the possibility of truth and certainty which belongs to it, the
ways in which things get grounded or proved, the mode in which it is binding for
us, and the way it is communicated—all these will be Determined. The totality of

74. Consider these etymological connections: “Projection” (Entwurf) basically denotes “throwing
off” or “throwing away.” (BT, 145, n. 1). “Object” (Objekt) has the literal meaning of “something thrown
against” (363, n. 1).
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these items constitutes the full existential conception of science. (BT, 362-63;
emphasis added)75`
Heidegger sharply distinguishes this existential conception of science from “. . . the
‘logical’ conception which understands science with regard to its results and defines it as
‘something established on an interconnection of true propositions—that is, propositions
counted as valid” (357).
To sum up, two points appear to be germane to our inquiry into the nature of the
RST relation—in particular, to the thread of comportment to things. First, presence-athand and ready-to-hand are different modes of the presencing of Being of entities. The
sharp distinctions between them arise from the different modes of Dasein’s Being-in-theworld—roughly speaking, science mode and non-science mode, respectively. As the
example of the hammer illustrates, the presencing of Being may manifest in either mode,
and the modes may “coexist”: “The ready-to-hand can become the ‘Object’ of a science
without having to lose its character as equipment” (361). Thus, entities in Dasein’s
environment do not possess inherent characteristics that can be used to sort them into
stable, disjoint categories of phenomena (in which all three directions of sense are
operative) and mere entities (in which sense or meaning is reduced to whatness).
Second, ready-to-hand is a primary mode for Heidegger in at least two important
senses. Heidegger’s explication of science as the mathematical projection of nature is
derived from the changeover from ready-to-hand to presence-at-hand. So, in a sense, the
latter is derivative of the former. Also, the ready-to-hand can be viewed, in some sense,
75. Heidegger distinguishes this existential conception of science from what he calls “the ‘logical’
conception which understands science with regard to its results and defines it as ‘something established on
an interconnection of true propositions—that is, propositions counted as valid’” (BT, 357).
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as the “default” option among the two modes of the presencing of Being. In writing about
the relation of Dasein to involvement with entities in its environment, he states: “Dasein
always assigns itself from a ‘for the sake of which’ to the ‘with which’ of an
involvement; that is to say, to the extent that it is, it always lets entities be encountered as
ready-to-hand” (86; emphasis added). In addition, the potential reach of the mode of
readiness-to-hand appears to be almost without limit. It might seem that equipment
applies to only a small fraction of what Heidegger calls “Things of Nature,” such as
woodworking tools, golfing gear, surgical instruments, and so forth. However, Heidegger
seems to say that the range of the readiness-to-hand apparently can extend as far as the
range of our concern and dealings—even to Nature, appropriately understood:
Any work with which one concerns oneself is ready-to-hand not only in the
domestic world of the workshop but also in the public world. Along with this
public world, the environing Nature . . . is discovered and is accessible to
everyone. (BT, 71)

Could it be inferred from this claim that Dasein, in its basic mode of Being-in-theWorld, can impute, or co-determine, in some sense, the mode of the presencing of Being
of entities in Dasein’s environment—simply by dealing with or concerning oneself with
them? For example, if I concern myself with, say, preserving a threatened or endangered
species, then does the Being of such a plant or animal—individually or collectively—
necessarily presence as ready-to-hand? In other words, is the ready-to-hand mode of the
presencing of Being of a threatened or endangered organism ”triggered,” in some sense,
simply by my dealings with the organism and the matter of its threatened or endangered
status? It seems so, as Heidegger writes:
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To the extent that any entity shows itself to concern—that is, to the extent that it is
discovered in its Being—it is already something ready-to-hand environmentally;
it just is not ’proximally’ a ‘world-stuff’ that is merely present-at-hand. (BT, 85)

Before closing this section, I wish to indicate how Being and Time explicitly sets
the stage for the next two sections that bring theology into the foreground of our inquiry.
Prefiguring Thomas Kuhn’s explanation 35 years later of the dynamic process by which
the fundamental assumptions of normal science are called into question and eventually
replaced,76 Heidegger states that major changes occur in the sciences when their basic
concepts are challenged. Taking theology to be a “science,” in some sense, he succinctly
states his understanding of the crisis facing theology and signals the approach he will
soon take to respond to it:
The real movement of the sciences takes places when their basic concepts
undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level
which a science has reached is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in
its basic concepts. . . . Theology is seeking a more primordial interpretation of
man’s Being toward God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining
within it. It is slowly beginning to understanding once more Luther’s insight that
the ‘foundation’ on which its system of dogma rests has not arisen from an
inquiry in which faith is primary, and that conceptually this ‘foundation’ is not
only inadequate for the problematic of theology, but conceals and distorts it. (BT,
9-10; original emphasis)

2.3

Phenomenology and Theology
The purpose of this section is to examine Heidegger’s explication of the

relationship between phenomenology and theology by a close reading of his work,

76. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970). First published in 1962 by University of Chicago Press.
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“Phenomenology and Theology.”77 A few months after delivering this lecture for the
second time in 1928, Heidegger expressed its purpose succinctly in a private letter: “. . .
to see what theology can—and cannot—learn from phenomenology.”78
As explicitly stated in the PAT lecture, Heidegger’s thesis is that “. . . theology is
a positive science, and as such, therefore, is absolutely different from philosophy” (P, 41,
original emphasis). The gloss of phenomenology/philosophy is addressed in the Preface,
in which Heidegger refers the reader to portions of the Introduction to Being and Time
that discuss “the notion of phenomenology (as well as its relation to the positive sciences)
that guides the presentation here” (39). Briefly put,
Ontology and phenomenology are not two distinct philosophical disciplines
among others. These terms characterize philosophy itself with regard to its object
and its way of treating that object. Philosophy is universal phenomenological
ontology . . . . (BT, 38)
Following Heidegger, I shall use the term “philosophy” for “phenomenology” in
discussing the PAT lecture in this section.
Heidegger begins his analysis of the theology-philosophy relation with a formal
definition of “science” (Wissenshaft) as “the founding disclosure, for the sheer sake of
77. Martin Heidegger, “Phenomenology and Theology,” trans. James G. Hart and John C.
Maraldo, in Martin Heidegger, Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, 39-62. (Pathmarks is hereafter cited as P.)
This work consists of three parts—a lecture, an Appendix, and a Preface. The Preface states that the lecture
portion of this work is based upon a reworking of the second delivery of the lecture in February 1928; the
lecture was first given in March 1927. Hereafter, I shall refer to this lecture as “the 1927/28 lecture” or “the
PAT lecture.” The Appendix (Anhang) is described in Heidegger’s Preface as a “letter” for a theological
discussion at Drew University in April 1964. In the following section, I shall provide additional
background about the discussion and a close reading of this letter (hereafter, “the 1964 letter,” “the 1964
Appendix,” “the PAT letter,” or “the PAT Appendix”).
78. “. . . was kann ein Theologie von der Phänomenologie lernen u. was nicht.” Martin Heidegger
to Elisabeth Blochmann, 8 August 1928, in Martin Heidegger — Elisabeth Blochmann. Briefwechsel
1918–1969, 2nd ed., ed. Joachim W. Storck (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsches Literatur-Archiv, 1990), 24
(my translation, with assistance from Stephanie Carlson).
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disclosure, of a self-contained region of beings, or of being” (P, 41). This
phenomenological definition of science readily leads to its partitioning into philosophy
(as the ontological science of Being—i.e., ontology), and the positive sciences (as the
ontic sciences of beings). For Heidegger, the latter includes theology as well as modern
sciences. Thus “. . . theology, as a positive science, is in principle closer to chemistry and
mathematics than to philosophy” (ibid.).
On the face of it, treating philosophy as a science would seem to contradict the
sharp contrasts between science and philosophy that Heidegger explicated only a few
years earlier in “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion”: namely, that scientific
concepts are formed out of a material complex, while philosophy does not have access to
any such complex (PRL, 3).
Indeed, Heidegger does say that he sees the question of the relationship between theology
and phenomenology as a “question about the relationship of two sciences”—but not as a
matter of “comparing the factical circumstances of two historically given sciences” (P,
40). He concludes:
Thus what is needed as a basis for a fundamental discussion of the problem is an
ideal construction of the ideas behind the two sciences. One can decide their
possible relationship to one another from the possibilities they both have as
sciences. (P, 40; emphasis added)

That is, Heidegger is not claiming that philosophy and theology are sciences—either in
their historical manifestations or even “ideally.” Instead, he is suggesting that something
might be learned regarding their possible relationship by “bracketing” any claims as to

59

whether either of them is actually, or even possibly, a science, in some sense.79 In other
words, Heidegger’s analysis of the possible relationship between philosophy and
theology proceeds as if theology and philosophy are sciences—but without committing
one way or another as to whether this is actually the case or not.80
Returning to Heidegger’s explication in the PAT lecture, he implies that all other
positive sciences—which include mathematics, economics, and those disciplines
typically associated with modern science, such as chemistry, physics, and biology—are
also absolutely different from philosophy. It follows that modern Western science and
theology are both “absolutely different” from philosophy. Hence we have a limited,
preliminary characterization of the (modern) science-theology relation, subject to the
hypothetical claim briefly stated: namely, theology and the modern sciences are positive
sciences and share the characteristic of their “absolute difference” with philosophy.
Before attempting to characterize further the theology-philosophy relation,
Heidegger defends in detail the claim that theology is a positive science. A positive
science is positive by virtue of having a positum—i.e., “a given being that in a certain
manner is always already disclosed prior to scientific disclosure” (P, 41). Roughly
speaking, a positum for a positive science is a region of beings (i.e., entities) that
determines the form and extent of that science’s ontic inquiry. In harmony with the
phenomenological slant to his formal definition of science, Heidegger links the positive

79. This “bracketing” can be described as formal indication—a term explicated in “Introduction to
the Phenomenology of Religion” (PRL, 38-45) and employed later in this lecture, as we shall see. Note also
that Heidegger characterizes his definition of science as “formal.”
80. I shall engage the question of whether, in fact, Heidegger considered theology to be a science
in the closing paragraphs of this section. Until then, this hypothetical assumption is tacitly in effect.
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character of any ontic science to the question of Being itself: “. . . this scientific
comportment toward whatever is given (nature, history, economy, space, number) is also
already illuminated and guided by an understanding of being—even if it be
nonconceptual” (42). Since the subject matter of ontology is being itself—i.e., not an
entity, or region thereof—this ontological science is barred by definition from having a
positum. Therefore the presence, or absence, of a positum absolutely distinguishes the
positive, ontic sciences (including theology) from the single ontological science of
philosophy—namely, ontology.
What makes theology a positive science for Heidegger? In particular, what is
theology’s positum? And in what way(s), if any, is theology different from (and possibly
unique among) the other ontic sciences? Throughout the remainder of this lecture,
Heidegger confines himself to Christian theology, although he acknowledges that
“Christian theology is not the only theology” (ibid.).81 (Hereinafter in this section,
“theology” shall therefore refer to Christian theology.) Compactly stated, Heidegger
responds to the first two questions by claiming that the positum of theology is
Christianness (Christlichkeit) (43), and that theology is the science of faith (45). On the
face of it, then, it may seem as though faith is another positum of theology in addition to
Christianness, or that the two are synonymous. In what follows, I shall attempt to clarify
this apparent conundrum, and I shall argue that the uniqueness of theology among the
ontic sciences follows from a “reciprocal” relation between faith and theology.

81. Heidegger offers no substantive justification for this move. Following the quote, Heidegger
instead explains that he must first clarify “the idea of theology” before he can address the question of
whether theology is a (positive) science. But then his ensuing clarification explicitly incorporates Christian
themes.
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As the positum of theology, Christianness denotes, by definition, the being which
is given to theology for further disclosure, after its primal disclosure. But what does
“Christianness” mean?82 Heidegger writes: “For the ‘Christian’ faith, that being which is
primarily revealed to faith, and only to it, and which, as revelation, first gives rise to
faith, is Christ, the crucified God” (44). Thus, faith and revelation have a reciprocal
relationship in disclosing the positum of theology, since faith “owes its existence,” so to
speak, to revelation and is nevertheless the only means by which revelation can appear
and be received as revelation.
Now, disclosure can be understood in two complementary ways: namely, as what
is disclosed, and as how that which is disclosed is disclosed (i.e., the process by which the
disclosure is effected or, equivalently, its mode of existence). With that distinction in
mind, I contend that the what of Christianness, as the positum of theology, is “Christ, the
crucified God,” and that the how of this positum is faith, including its equivalence as
rebirth.83 Such a reading is supported by these statements by Heidegger:
The totality of this being [i.e., the Crucified] that is disclosed by faith . . .
constitutes the character of the positum that theology finds before it. . . . theology
is constituted in thematizing faith and that which is disclosed through faith, that
which is “revealed.” (P, 45)

82. In the Preface, Heidegger refers to theologian Franz Overbeck, who “established the worlddenying expectation of the end as the basic characteristic of what is primordially Christian.” .See Franz
Overbeck, On the Christianity of Theology, trans. John Elbert Wilson (San Jose, CA: Pickwick, 2002). This
is a translation of Über die Christlichkeit unserer heutigen Theologie (On the Christianity of Our Today’s
Theology), 2nd. ed. Leipzig: C. G. Naumann, 1903. First ed. Leipzig: E. W. Frisch, 1873.
83. In other words, “Christ, the crucified God” is the content-sense of Christianness, and “faith” is
the relational-sense of Christianness. Cf. the discussion in Section 2.1 in which the phenomenological
meaning, or sense, of early Christian life experience is expressed in three “directions” of sense as “the
apostolic proclamation” (content-sense), “having become” (relational-sense), and “comportment to this
having become” (enactment-sense).
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Briefly stated, Christianness is co-constituted by faith and by that which is disclosed
primarily by faith (and only to it)—namely, Christ, the crucified God.
Next, he moves to “radically revise” the basic theological concept of faith and to
thereby justify his claim that “theology is the science of faith”—but in a way that remains
consonant with affirming that Christ, the crucified God, as revealed solely to faith, coconstitutes theology’s positum. His summary claim: “Formally considered, then, faith as
the existing relation to the Crucified is a mode of historical Dasein, of human existence,
of historically being in a history that discloses itself only in and for faith” (46). Space
permits only a sketch of his argument. Just as Heidegger approaches his analysis of Being
in Being and Time through interrogating the modes of existence of Dasein, so here he
explicates “faith” as a particular mode of existence of Dasein.
That which is primarily disclosed (i.e., Christ, the crucified God) is revealed in
faith to “individual human beings factically existing historically” (44). That is, this
revelation is imparted to persons in the midst of everyday living in such a way that lets
the faithful take part in this revelation event. Such “part-taking” is a reorientation of
one’s existence “in and through the mercy of God grasped in faith” (ibid.). This
reorientation, or rebirth, is the existentiell meaning of faith.84 For Heidegger, then, faith is
not belief “in some coherent order of propositions” or “a modified type of knowing”
(ibid.) but rather “is the believing-understanding mode of existing in the history revealed,
i.e., occurring, with the Crucified” (45, original emphasis).

84. In other words, the life of faith, as rebirth, occurs in the midst of ongoing ordinary life. Rebirth
is daily existence, lived out of “part-taking” in the revelation event. Re-birth is the fulfillment of the faith
relation to the apostolic proclamation. Rebirth is the enactment-sense of Christianness.
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Just as the faith-revelation relation is reciprocal, analogously so is the theologyfaith relation. This reciprocal relationship between faith and theology is the basis for
Heidegger’s claim that theology is the science of faith. “Theology . . . is the science of
faith, not only insofar as it makes faith and that which is believed its object, but because
it itself arises out of faith” (46). Theology is unique among the ontic sciences insofar as
what it thematizes is also is origin. Physics, for example, is “absolutely different” from
theology in that it does not arise from nature but objectifies nature from a vantage point
outside of nature. Whereas the sole purpose of theology is “to help cultivate faith” (ibid.),
physics qua physics has no such corresponding relation to nature.
Heidegger further illuminates the scientific character of theology by reformulating
the purposes of the disciplines of historical, systematic, and practical theology and that of
theology as a whole. First, the imparting of the revelation of “Christ, the crucified God”
to, and its appropriation by, the faithful is historical in the sense of happening or
occurring (geschichtlichen) rather than as past event (historische) (ibid.). This “Christian
occurrence in its Christianness and historicity” is “the primary object” of theology (48).
As for systematic theology, its task is “[t]o grasp the substantive content and the specific
mode of being of the Christian occurrence, and to grasp it solely as it is testified to in
faith and for faith” (47). Theology is also “‘innately’ homiletical” (and is therefore a
practical science) because it is “the science of the action of God on human beings who act
in faith” (48). These three theological disciplines are unified in their plurality by their
founding in the revelation of “Christ, the crucified God” as disclosed solely to faith,
which itself is understood as the mode of concrete Christian existence.
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Heidegger’s reinscriptions of theology and its disciplines from its positum provide
the basis for his claim that “theology is a fully autonomous ontic science” (50). His
reformulations ward off attempts to regard theology as a form of the history, philosophy,
or psychology of religion applied to Christianity. He does not deny that “theology
represents a special case of the philosophy and history of religion,” but insists that
theology, “itself founded primarily by faith,” need not “borrow from other sciences in
order to augment and secure its proofs” (49).
Next, let us turn to Heidegger’s analysis of the relation of philosophy to
theology—and to faith. Compactly stated, “. . . faith does not need philosophy, [but] the
science of faith [i.e., theology] as a positive science does” (50). I unpack these claims and
argue for their relevance in thinking the RST relation. First, faith and philosophy are
“mortal enemies,” as their relationship is “a basic (existential) confrontation of two
possibilities of existence”—faithfulness vs. autonomous thought (53, n. 4). Otherwise
said, “. . . what is revealed in faith can never be founded by a way of rational knowing as
exercised by autonomously functioning reason . . .” (51). Yet Heidegger surprisingly does
not rule out the possibility of genuine dialogue between philosophy and theology, as the
science of faith:
This existentiell opposition between faithfulness and the free appropriation
of one’s whole Dasein is not first brought about by the sciences of
theology and philosophy but is prior to them. Furthermore, it is precisely
this opposition that must bear the possibility of a community of the
sciences of theology and philosophy, if indeed they are to communicate in
a genuine way, free from illusions and weak attempts at mediation. (P, 53)
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Second, as already stated in BT, all positive sciences need philosophy to clarify
the ontological character of the region in which their basic concepts are operative; as a
positive science, theology is no exception. This clarification is especially important when
the nature of these basic concepts is under re-examination. For each nontheological
science such as physics, say, this clarification secures for these basic concepts “their
original foundation, the demonstration of all their inner possibilities, and hence their
higher truth” (52). Heidegger’s claim for philosophy’s clarifying role with respect to
theology is much more modest, however. As stated earlier, philosophy cannot found the
positum of theology, because what is disclosed by faith is beyond the reach of
autonomous thought. Nevertheless, philosophy has a “co-directing” role or function (aka
formal indication) which points to the ontological concepts (e.g., guilt) that underlie
theological concepts (e.g., sin) without influencing the content of the theological claims
made therein. Heidegger argues that this weaker form of correction “does not serve to
bind but, on the contrary, to release and point to the specific, i.e., credal, source of the
disclosure of theological concepts” (ibid.).
In sum, philosophy (as ontology) has a strong directive function vis-à-vis the
nontheological positive sciences, as it founds the basic concepts of these sciences by
disclosing the ontological character of the region in which these concepts are operative.
Due to the autonomy of faith from philosophy, however, philosophy’s role with respect
to theology is much weaker and merely formal, in the sense of pointing to the ontological
concepts that undergird theological concepts, but in a nonfoundational manner.
Nonetheless, an asymmetry in the theology-philosophy relation is evident. Heidegger
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contends that philosophy is not required to play this co-directing role for theology;
instead, he says, theology should “demand” the assistance of philosophy to clarify its
own concepts (53).85 However, this asymmetry also maintains the legitimacy—and
necessity—of employing theological concepts to grasp the “inconceivability” of faith.
Indeed, faith would otherwise remain “mute,” and theology would have abdicated its
responsibility as a positive science to thematize its positum, faithful existence (50). In
this way, Heidegger thinks against those who would isolate faith from all contact with
conceptual thought.
In this lecture, claims regarding the RST relation are mediated through the
primary analysis of the philosophy-theology relation and the hypothetical assumption that
both are sciences, interpreted phenomenologically. In light of these given conditions, we
can say the following: First, science (taken now as the nontheological positive sciences)
and theology as science (taken here as Christian theology, centered in faith) are related in
the sense that they share two basic characteristics: (i) both are positive sciences, and (ii)
both are absolutely different from philosophy (i.e., ontology). Second, theology is a fully
autonomous ontic science, insofar as it has no need of other ontic sciences to help
legitimize its claims. And third, theology is unique among the ontic sciences in that its
positum is co-constituted by faith, which cannot be objectified, since faith is an
appropriation of revelation.
Under such conditions, does “dialogue,” in some sense, obtain between theology
and science in the RST relation? Recall that Barbour’s criteria for Dialogue requires
85. We shall see in the following section, however, that Heidegger later abandons urging theology
to turn to philosophy to clarify its basic concepts.
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“indirect interactions between science and religion [or science and theology] involving
boundary questions and methods [i.e., methodological parallels]” (RIAS, 16).86 As the
previous paragraph attests, Science and Theology do interact indirectly, as their
relationships are mediated through philosophy, understood as phenomenological
ontology. Moreover, these interactions involve boundary questions in the form of the
ontological status of their respective regional ontologies. However, methodologically
speaking, I would say at this point that differences outweigh similarities. For example, as
noted earlier, theology is unique among the positive ontic sciences in that philosophy
does not determine the positum for theology. This positum is co-constituted by faith,
which is beyond the scope of autonomous thought. A major task for this entire inquiry is
to examine whether similarities in other dimensions of the science-theology relationship
might outweigh this fundamental difference as we continue to think the RST relation with
Heidegger. In sum, I conclude that the question of genuine Dialogue remains open at this
point of the inquiry.

2.4

Theology, Natural Science, and Objectification
Thirty-seven years after delivering the first lecture on “Phenomenology and

Theology” to the theological faculty at Tübingen, Heidegger wrote a “letter” to another
group of theologians, as they prepared for a discussion at Drew University on the topic:
“The Problem of a Nonobjectifying Thinking and Speaking in Today’s Theology.” At
issue for the conferees was whether or not—or to what extent—is objectifying language
86. See Section 1.2.1 for an explanation of the appropriateness of applying Barbour’s fourfold
typology to the science-theology relation as well as to the religion-science relation.
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unavoidable, otherwise possible, or even impossible for theology. As Robert Funk’s
overview article and the discussion papers themselves indicate, the six presenters
(including Heidegger, in absentia) covered a wide spectrum of positions.87
The purpose of this section is to explicate Heidegger’s reformulation of the
problem statement for this Second Consultation on Hermeneutics and his claim that
theological discourse is necessarily nonobjectifying. In so doing, I shall begin to examine
the multiple meanings of object and its cognates from Heidegger’s employment of Objekt
in the 1964 letter and Gegenstand in the 1927/28 lecture. His letter also addresses two of
the guiding questions of this chapter—the nature of the philosophy-theology relation and
the nature of the theology-science relation.
What prompted this formulation of the question posed by the Second Consultation
organizers? Heidegger presumed that it stemmed from “the widespread, uncritically
accepted opinion that all thinking, as representing, and all speaking, as vocalization, are
already ‘objectifying’ [objektivierend]” (P, 56). Given this interpretation, the task would
then seem to be one of establishing that nonobjectifying (nichtobjektivierenden) thinking
and speaking is possible in contemporary theology. As we shall see, Heidegger defends
an even stronger claim.

87. The “letter” was read as the opening keynote address for the Second Consultation on
Hermeneutics: Theological Discourse and the Proclamation of the Gospel held at Drew University, April 911, 1964. (Heidegger was unable to attend, at the direction of his physician.) This information, together
with a summary, background, and commentary on the Consultation itself, is contained in Robert W. Funk,
“Colloquium on Hermeneutics,” in Theology Today 21, no. 3 (October 1964): 287-306, doi: 10.1177
/004057366402100305. Funk, Associate Professor of New Testament at Drew, was a moderator for one of
the Consultation’s sessions. This Colloquium was conceived as a sequel to the First Consultation at Drew
two years earlier, in which Heidegger’s thought was prominently discussed. The six papers presented at the
Consultation are compiled in Drew University, Consultation on Hermeneutics, 2nd: Theology and the
Proclamation of the Gospel (Madison, NJ: Drew University, 1964).
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As indicated by the following quotation from near the beginning of the letter,
Heidegger continues to maintain several basic themes of the PAT lecture, while at the
same time signaling a possible widening of the divide between philosophy and theology:
. . . the requisite of its [i.e., theology’s] major task [is] not to borrow the
categories of its thinking and the form of its speech from philosophy or the
sciences, but to think and speak out of faith for faith with fidelity to its subject
matter. If this faith by the power of its own conviction concerns the human being
as human being in his very nature, then genuine theological thinking and speaking
have no need of any special preparation in order to reach people and find a
hearing among them. (P, 55; emphasis added)
Thus, faith remains at the center of Heidegger’s view of Christian theology; theology is
still thought by him to be fully independent of the nontheological sciences; and theology
still has a rightful place in the “public square.” On the face of it, however, the italicized
portion above seems to point away from Heidegger’s claim in 1927/28 that philosophy
has a “co-directive” role in clarifying the ontological region out of which theological
concepts arise—albeit in a formally indicative manner (P, 52-53; cf. Section 2.3 above).
However, we must keep in mind that, in the PAT lecture, Heidegger is explicating the
philosophy-theology relation as if both are sciences as defined phenomenologically in
terms of disclosure. In this letter, however, there is no such presupposition. The 1964
letter leaves the “co-directing” issue unaddressed.
The continuities and the semblance of a discontinuity between the lecture and the
letter just noted are consistent with notes taken during Heidegger’s conversation with a
small group of “directors of study groups and colleagues” at the Protestant Academy at
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Hofgeismar in 1953.88 Recorder Hermann Noack characterized the discussions as
“occasioned by his [Professor Heidegger’s] philosophical writings and which were
focused on the relationship between thinking and faith or between philosophy and
theology” (Noack, 59). I focus here on the apparent discontinuity, in which Heidegger
declares, in effect, a complete separation between philosophy and theology. According to
Noack, Heidegger “literally said”:
Within thinking nothing can be achieved which would be a preparation or a
confirmation for that which occurs in faith and in grace. Were I so addressed by
faith I would have to close up my shop . . . Philosophy engages in a kind of
thinking of which man is capable on his own. This stops when he is addressed by
revelation. (Noack, 64)

Heidegger then spoke directly about the theology-philosophy relation. Noack writes:
Theologians, Heidegger continued, have simply too little trust in their own
standpoint and have too much to do with philosophy. . . . Because revelation itself
determines the manner of manifestness and because theology does not have to
prove or interpret ‘Being’, theology does not have to defend itself before
philosophy. (ibid.)
Somewhat later, Noack noted that “Heidegger denied that philosophy has any
significance for theology” (65; emphasis added). Had the “absolute difference” between
philosophy (as ontology) and theology (as an ontic science) in 1927/28 become an
“absolute chasm” in 1953? Not quite. Noack notes Heidegger’s remark that “. . . this does
not mean that we must all simply withdraw into our mutual positions! There are historical
88. “Appendix: Conversation with Martin Heidegger, Recorded by Hermann Noack,” in The Piety
of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger, trans. James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1976), 59-71. (Hereafter cited as “Noack.”) According to the translators,
Professor Noack stated in a letter to them that he had sent a copy of his notes to Heidegger and the others
present before publishing them, and that “Professor Heidegger did not find anything in the text or in
Professor Noack’s concluding summary with which he chose to take exception” (Heidegger, Piety of
Thinking, 182).
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encounters which entail passing closely by one another without indifference” (ibid.). In
sum, Heidegger’s endorsement of the centrality of faith and the possibility of “dialogue,”
in some sense, between philosophy and theology continue to shine through Heidegger’s
thinking.
Thus, any claim of an actual discontinuity of viewpoints in the 1927/28 lecture
(i.e., philosophy has a “co-directing” role with respect to theology to help clarify the
ontological basis for its concepts) and this 1953 consultation (i.e., philosophy has no
significance for theology) appears to be groundless. As stated before, the PAT lecture is
an exploration of the possibilities of the theology-philosophy relation as if both members
were sciences—while formally suspending the question of their actual nature, or essence.
On the other hand, as is the case with the 1964 letter, the 1953 discussion makes no such
formally indicative assumptions.
I turn now to another important contrast between the 1927/28 lecture and the 1964
letter—the striking difference between the meaning of “object” and its cognates in these
two works. The focus of the PAT letter is to examine “what is intended by objectifying
thinking and speaking” (P, 54; original emphasis). He concludes that:
Thinking and speaking objectify [sein objektivierend], i.e., posit as an object
[Objekt] something given, in the field of natural-scientific and technical
representation. Here they are of necessity objectifying [objektivierend], because
scientific-technological knowing must establish its theme in advance as a
calculable, causally explicable Gegenstand, i.e., as an object [Objekt] as Kant
defined the word.89 Outside this field thinking and speaking are by no means
objectifying [objektivierend]. (P, 60; GA9, 75-76; emphasis added)

89. Heidegger briefly described Kant’s position earlier: “For Kant object [Objekt] means what
exists as standing over against [Gegenstand] the experience of the natural sciences” (P, 58).
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Throughout the PAT letter, “object” and its cognates are translates of Objekt and its
cognates. However, in the much earlier PAT lecture, “object” and its cognates are
translates of Gegenstand (literally, “that which stands over against”) and its cognates. For
example, immediately following the formal definition of science in the PAT lecture,
Heidegger writes:
Every region of objects [Gegenstandgebiet], according to its subject matter and
the mode of being of its objects [Gegenstände], has its own mode of possible
disclosure . . . . Their characteristic feature lies in the fact that the objectification
[Vergegenständlichung] of whatever it is that they thematize is oriented directly
toward beings, . . . (P, 41; GA9, 48)

Roughly speaking, then, beings thematized by positive sciences are Gegenstände; beings
thematized by the natural sciences are Objekte. Thus, all such thematized Objekte are
Gegenstände, but not conversely.90
It would be totally incorrect, however, to infer that all entities are, factically
speaking, either Objekte or Gegenstände. In the first place, as the discussion is Section
2.2 indicates, these terms are not inherent characteristics of entities that can serve to
“sort” the class of all entities (if such a notion is even meaningful) into two subclasses.
Rather, they are different possible modes of presencing of the Being of any given entity;
and second, for some entities, the presencing of their Being is neither as Objekt nor as
Gegenstand (P, 62). The blooming rose and the redness of the rose may serve as
examples—depending upon our comportment as Dasein to them.
Our everyday experience of things, in the wider sense of the word, is neither
objectifying nor a placing over against [wieder objektivierend noch eine
90. Note that, in the above passage that begins “Thinking and speaking . . . ,” Heidegger provides
criteria to distinguish between Objekt and Gegenstand: namely, the former is a “calculable, causally
explicable Gegenstand” (P, 60).
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Vergegenständlichung]. When, for example, we sit in the garden and take delight
in the blossoming rose, we do not make an object [Objekt] of the rose, nor do we
even make it something standing over against us [zu einem Gegenstand] in the
sense of something represented thematically. When in tacit saying (Sagen) we are
enthralled with the lucid red of the rose and muse on the redness of the rose, then
this redness [of the rose] is neither an object nor a thing nor something standing
over against us like the blossoming rose. [Wenn . . . , dann ist dieses Rotsein
weder ein Objekt, noch ein Ding, noch ein Gegenstand wie die blühende Rose.]
There is accordingly a thinking and saying that in no manner objectifies
[objektiviert] or places things over us [vergegenständlicht]. (P, 58; GA9, 73;
underlined emphasis added).91

Heidegger comes to this nuanced view of different modes of presencing of entities
primarily from his understanding of language as “speculative-hermeneutical”—in sharp
contrast to the “technical-scientistic view of language,” exemplified by the thinking of
Rudolf Carnap. According to Heidegger, thinking such as Carnap’s seeks to “subjugate
all thinking and speaking, including that of philosophy, . . . , to secure them as an
instrument of science” (56). The danger, as Heidegger sees it, is not the use of
objectifying language per se, but the threat that this mode of thinking and saying “will
spread to all forms of life” (60).
In contrast, Heidegger contends that
Language, in what is most proper to it, is a saying of that which reveals itself to
human beings in manifold ways and which addresses itself to human beings
91. Hart and Maraldo detect “ambiguities” in this passage “when Heidegger first says we do not
make a Gegenstand of the rose, then opposes the blossoming rose as a Gegenstand to the redness of the
rose” (Piety of Thinking, 175, n. 6). As I see it, their interpretation of this passage amounts to declaring a
contradiction in Heidegger’s thinking—not merely “ambiguities.” I offer an alternative interpretation of the
passage that obviates either claim. My interpretation entails regarding the underlined portions in the
passage above as specifying our comportment to the entities in question. First, when our comportment to
the blooming rose is one of everyday experience (and not of thematic representation), then the blooming
rose is not objectified in either sense. Second, when our comportment is focused upon the redness of the
blossoming rose, instead of upon the blooming rose itself, the blooming rose has “shifted,” so to speak,
from the foreground to the background of our comportment and is now plausibly objectified as “something
standing over against us” (Gegenstand). The larger point to be made is that our comportment to entities
“co-determines,” in a sense, the mode of the presencing of their Being. (See Section 2.2 above.)
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insofar as they do not, under the dominion of objectifying [objektivierenden]
thinking, confine themselves to the latter and close themselves off from what
shows itself. (P, 60; GA9, 76)

Here, Heidegger is emphasizing the interconnectedness, phenomenologically understood,
of thinking, speaking, and that which is thereby revealed. “Objectification” in the sense
of Objekt severs this interconnection. This is the heart of his critique of scientistictechnical thinking.
Heidegger concludes his analysis of objectifying thinking and saying by
proposing a more precise formulation of the theme for the theological discussion at Drew
as “‘the problem of a nontechnological, non-natural-scientific thinking and speaking in
today’s theology’” (61; emphasis added). (The italicized words replace the single word,
“nonobjectifying,” in the original problem statement for the Consultation.) “From this
more commensurate reformulation, it is very clear that the problem as stated is not a
genuine problem insofar as it is geared to a presupposition whose nonsense is evident to
anyone” (ibid.).
To recap, Heidegger holds that theology does not engage in objectifying thinking
and speaking—if by “objectifying” we mean the thinking and forms of speech that
characterize the natural sciences. To those who might hold that today’s theology does
exhibit in practice such thinking and saying (at least from time to time), he has stated, in
effect, another qualification for his claim. At the beginning of his letter, he stresses that a
requirement of theology’s major task is “not to borrow the categories of its thinking and
the form of its speech from philosophy or the sciences, but to think and speak out of faith
for faith with fidelity to its subject matter” (P, 55; emphasis added).To say this more
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simply, Heidegger’s claim is that theological thinking and speaking are not
objectifying—if “objectifying” is taken in the sense of “object” as Objekt. However, as I
read it, he has left unaddressed the question of whether or not theology is objectifying in
the sense of “object” as Gegenstand.
Otherwise said, Heidegger has ruled out theology as a natural science
(Naturwissenschaft), which objectifies in the sense of Objekt, but has left in abeyance
whether theology can still be a science (Wissenschaft), which objectifies in the sense of
Gegenstand. The question still lingers, even as Heidegger closes the letter by reaffirming
the legitimacy of theological thinking and speaking in the public square:
The positive task for theology is for theology to place in discussion, within its
own realm of the Christian faith and out of the proper nature of that faith, what
theology has to think and how it has to speak. This task also includes the question
whether theology can still be a science—because presumably it should not be a
science at all. (P, 61; emphasis added)

As we have emphasized more than once, Heidegger does not take a stand in the
PAT lecture as to whether or not theology is, factically speaking, a science
(Wissenschaft). However, in the same letter of August 1928 in which he described the
purpose of the PAT lecture (given in the first paragraph of this section), he unequivocally
stated his privately-held position on this question:
I am personally convinced that theology is no science—but I am today not yet in a
position to actually show this and indeed so that thereby the great function of
theology as a history of ideas is comprehended as positive.92

92. “Zwar bin ich persönlich überzeugt, daβ Th[eologie] keine Wissenschaft ist—aber ich bin
heute noch nicht im Stande, das wirklich zu zeigen u. zwar so, daβ dabei die groβe geistesgeschichtliche
Funktion der Theologie positiv begriffen ist.” Martin Heidegger to Elisabeth Blochmann, HeideggerBlochmann Briefwechsel, 25 (my translation, with assistance from Stephanie Carlson).
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Thus, the public 1964 letter and the private 1928 letter together support the claim that, on
Heidegger’s view, theology is not a science—natural or otherwise. In other words, he
held that theology is totally non-objectifying— i.e., nonobjectifying with regard to
“object” taken either as Objekt or Gegenstand.
Finally, I read the 1964 letter as tacitly signaling to theologians the manner in
which theology might enact its interrelationality with religion. That is, is it possible that
the manner by and through which theology is totally nonobjectifying might resemble the
“mannering” of the blooming rose, the redness of the blooming rose, and poetry in any
significant way or ways? I shall take up this second question with regard to poetry in
Sections 4.2 and 5.1 that follow.

2.5

Chapter Summary
Let us return to three guiding questions of this chapter: Is philosophy necessary in

thinking the RST relation? Is theology, in some sense, a “science”? And more generally,
what can be said about the essential nature of the RST relation itself?
With regard to the first question, our preliminary response must be “yes,” given
our intention to think the RST relation with Heidegger. This inquiry accepts that our
thinking will be done in light of the question of Being—not beings as such and in their
entirety. As Heidegger sees it, thinking the question of Being is the true task of ontology.
In this Chapter, we have attempted to think the RST relation through the lens of
phenomenology. The nature of thinking, however, remains unthought. We shall take this
up in Section 4.4 below.
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With regard to the other two guiding questions, let us consider the three dualities
within the RST relation and the beginning thread of comportment to things in light of the
method of phenomenology and Heidegger’s works engaged so far.
Religion and science. In this chapter, religion and science are interpreted as
modes of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Religion is interpreted as Christian factical life
experience (aka, Christianness), grounded faithfully in the apostolic proclamation, “Jesus
is the Messiah” (equivalently, “Christ, the crucified God”). Science is interpreted in terms
of “disclosure.” In terms of their meaning, or sense, religion is “three-directional”
(content-, relational-, and enactment-senses), while science is “uni-directional” (contentsense dominant). Science is limited to addressing the whatness of the phenomenon (aka,
experience) at issue, while religion engages as well the manner, or the how, of the
experience in its relationality and enactment.
Religion and theology. As Christian factical life experience, religion is the ground
of theology: “Knowledge of one’s own having-become is the starting point and the origin
of theology” (PRL, 66). Provisionally taking theology to be a science and interpreting
religion as faith-filled Christianness, the religion-theology relation is reciprocal:
“Theology . . . is the science of faith, not only insofar as it make faith and that which is
believed its object, but because it itself arises out of faith” (P, 46). Moreover, on these
assumptions, theology needs philosophy to clarify its basic concepts, for otherwise faith
would be “mute.” However, unlike all the nontheological positive sciences, theology does
not need philosophy to ground its basic concepts, as theological concepts are grounded in
faith. Taking theology as the science of faith creates an opening for re-thinking its
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widespread formulation as reflection on religious experience and belief. However, the
essence of “reflection” is as yet unthought. (See Section 3.4 below.)
Science, theology, and Objectification. In the PAT lecture, theology shares with
the other positive sciences the defining attribute of having a positum, yet they differ in a
fundamental way. Philosophy (as ontology) has a strong directive function vis-à-vis the
nontheological positive sciences, as it founds the basic concepts of these sciences by
disclosing the ontological character of the region in which these concepts are operative.
Due to the autonomy of faith from philosophy, however, philosophy’s role with respect
to theology is much weaker and merely formal, in pointing to and clarifying the
ontological concepts that undergird theological concepts, but in a nonfoundational
manner.
Is theology actually a science, in Heidegger’s view? Roughly speaking, he says
“no,” if science objectifies in the sense of Okjekt; he is silent in public if science
objectifies in the sense of Gegenstand. (In private, however, he says “no” in the second
case as well.) Examples of non-objectifying modes of the presencing of Being are given
in the PAT Appendix: the blooming rose, the redness of the blooming rose, and poetry. I
suggest that these are implicit, but public, “invitations” by Heidegger for theology to
explore in clarifying its own essential nature. (See Sections 3.3, 4.2, and 5.1 below.)
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Chapter 3: Truth and the RST Relation

Heidegger regarded the question of truth as compelling, urgent, and fundamental.
In the late 1930s, he described this question as “the most questionable of our previous
history and the most worthy of questioning of our future history.”93 He also challenged
the conventional view that truth is an intellectual abstraction, a topic reserved for logical
analysis:
The essence of truth is not a mere concept, carried about in the head. On the contrary,
truth is alive; in the momentary form of its essence it is the power that determines
everything true and untrue; it is what is sought after, what is fought for, what is suffered
for. (BQP, 41)

For Heidegger, the question of truth is inseparable from the question of Being. In
his view, the goal of philosophy and the seeking of that goal are the same. And both the
goal of philosophy and the seeking of that goal entail the question of truth and the
question of Being. “To posit the very seeking as a goal means to anchor the beginning
and the end of all reflection in the question of the truth—not of this or that being or even
of all beings, but of Being itself” (BQP, 6-7). Thus for Heidegger, to seek the essence of
truth is to seek the truth of Being.
This chapter will examine some of Heidegger’s engagements with the question of
truth in view of the RST relation. The first section (3.1 Truth, Untruth, and Dasein)
93. Heidegger, Basic Questions of Philosophy (BQP), 23. This work is based upon his lecture
course of the same title during winter semester 1937-38 at the University of Freiburg.
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focuses primarily upon Heidegger’s explication of truth as disclosedness and the
intertwining of truth and untruth in light of the existential analytic of Dasein presented in
Being and Time. In the second section (3.2 The Essence of Truth and the Truth of Being),
I examine Heidegger’s treatment of these claims ten years later in Basic Questions of
Philosophy without tethering them to the existential analytic of Dasein. In this work, he
raises the question of whether the “intertwining of opposites” that he discerned with
respect to truth and untruth in Being and Time is, in some sense, constitutive of Being
itself. I shall give special attention to implications for thinking the RST relation in view
Heidegger’s claim that Plato’s explication of idea has been “disastrous” for Western
thought. In the third section (3.3 Truth, Rationality, and Reason), I shall examine
theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen’s thesis that theology and science share common
resources of rationality, rooted in biological evolution, which can provide a basis for
meaningful and fruitful dialogue. I shall argue that Heidegger and van Huyssteen agree
that “intelligibility” plays a critical role in coming to terms with understanding and
rationality, respectively, but that their views differ profoundly with respect to the
ubiquitous practice of seeking and giving of reasons.
In the final section (3.4 Truth and Reflection), I shall examine anew the widelyused definition of theology as “reflection on religious experience and belief” (introduced
in Chapter 1) in light of Heidegger’s distinction between two modes of reflection:
Reflexion and Besinnung. Each of these terms is commonly translated as “reflection.” My
guiding questions are: In light of Heidegger’s explication of truth, which understanding
of “reflection” is more fruitful for thinking the essence of theology in general and
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thinking the RST relation specifically? Or, are both senses of “reflection” important—and
possibly necessary—in these matters?

3.1

Truth, Untruth, and Dasein
In Being and Time, Heidegger explicates the relation of truth and Being via the

existential analytic of Dasein. In what follows, I shall examine Heidegger’s recovery of
the early Greek understanding of truth as disclosedness and his critique of the customary
formulation of truth as agreement (or correspondence) between assertions or judgments
and their referents. Next, I shall explicate his “primordial appropriation” of this early
Greek understanding of truth in terms of the existential analytic of Dasein. Specifically, I
shall examine his claim of the inescapable intertwining of truth and untruth in connection
with his treatment of authenticity/inauthenticity, fallenness, and temporality as
fundamental modes of Dasein. And finally, I shall examine Heidegger’s inversion of the
Kantian view that privileges knowledge over understanding and its implications for
thinking the essence of truth.
Truth as disclosedness. Heidegger’s defense of the “truth as disclosedness” thesis
against traditional interpretations of truth hinges on three arguments. First, “truth as
disclosedness” may be derived etymologically from the Greek. The Greek word for truth,
aletheia, is compounded from the prefix a- (a privative, meaning “not”) and a stem that
means “to be concealed” (BT, 33, n. 1; 222). Second, Heidegger cites several references
from Aristotle and the pre-Socratics that support this formulation of truth (213). And

82

third, traditional characterizations of truth can be derived from Heidegger’s interpretation
of truth as disclosedness.
Heidegger bases his third argument upon an etymological analysis of logos,
coupled with the fundamental ontology of Dasein. He argues that the customary
understanding of truth fails to acknowledge the ontological relationship between “an
ideal entity [i.e., a judgment] and something that is Real and present-at-hand” (216). The
result is a separation into two different levels, or ways, of Being that renders any rigorous
notion of “agreement” impossible. In sum, he contends that such misconceptions arise
because of the derivative character of the phenomenon of agreement.
In brief, here is Heidegger’s explanation of how truth as disclosedness becomes
truth as agreement with its referent. First, logos and legein (“to talk” or “to hold
discourse”) share the same etymological root (25, n. 3). As discourse, logos is talking,
speech, assertion—ways “to make manifest what one is ‘talking about’ in one’s
discourse” (32). More precisely, logos “lets what the discourse is about” be seen: i.e.,
logos “discloses” or uncovers what the discourse is about. Assertion points to the “how”
of that which is uncovered. “What is expressed becomes . . . something ready-to-hand
within-the-world which can be taken up and spoken again” (224). The entities referenced
in the assertion are either ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. “[T]he relation itself now
acquires the character of presence-at-hand by getting switched over to a relationship
between things which are present-at-hand” (ibid.). That is, the comportment of Dasein
toward these entities becomes one of scientific detachment and analysis. In sum: “Truth
as disclosedness and as a Being-towards uncovered entities . . . has become truth as
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agreement between things which are present-at-hand within-the-world” (225). The
ontological has become ontic.
In Being and Time, truth as disclosure is, more precisely, disclosure as and in
Dasein. Truth and Dasein are inextricably linked. Dasein’s basic state as Being-in-theworld and, in particular, Being alongside entities-in-the-world, imply that (i) “truth” in
the primary sense is Dasein’s comportment as “Being-uncovering (uncovering)”, and (ii)
“truth” in the secondary sense is entities as “Beings-uncovered (uncoveredness)” (220).
Disclosure of a phenomenon is necessarily a disclosure in Dasein, namely, in the there
(the Da) that Dasein is given to be (sein).94 Thus, the occurrence of truth rests upon the
existence of Dasein; no Dasein means no disclosure, and hence no possibility of truth in
Heidegger’s framework (226). In sum, “The Being of truth is connected primordially
with Dasein. . . . Being and truth ‘are’ equiprimordially” (230).
From his analysis of the worldhood of the world and of Dasein’s mode of Beingin-the-world, Heidegger identifies the constituents of disclosedness as state-of-mind,
understanding, and discourse. These three constituents are equiprimordial ways of Beingthere, existential structures for its maintenance. “State-of-mind” is revealed ontically in
our moods, but ontologically is expressed in modes (such as fear, anxiety, etc.) that
disclose our submission to the world and encounter with what matters to us (136-39).
“Understanding” points ontically to comprehension, manageability, etc., but points
ontologically to possibility—to Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being (143). “Discourse” is the

94. I thank Frank Seeburger for this clarification.
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ontological foundation of language, interpretation, and assertion, which is integral to
understanding (160-61).
Truth and untruth. The relationship between truth and untruth in Heidegger’s
thought can be initially grasped as a relationship of opposites, but fundamentally is one of
complementary intertwining--a “yin-yang” relationship, so to speak. Both levels involve
the interplay between disclosure and disguise (i.e., covering up). In what follows, I
examine Heidegger’s analysis of the truth/untruth duality in relation to
authenticity/inauthenticity, fallenness, and temporality as basic modes of Dasein. But
first, two general observations.
Heidegger’s treatment of the logos illustrates a mapping of true/false onto
disclosure/covering up, but with a twist. Since the logos functions merely as lettingsomething-be-seen, it can be either true or false (33). The “Being-true” of the logos is the
discoveredness of that which has been hidden via disclosure; the “Being-false” of the
logos is also still disclosure—but one in which something like a distortion occurs that
covers over or conceals the very thing the discourse is about, rather than letting it be seen
just as it shows itself from itself. Thus truth and falsity are both results of disclosure, but
in different senses.95
The relationship between truth and untruth in Heidegger’s thought is intimately
connected with Dasein: “Dasein is equiprimordially both in the truth and in untruth”
(223). Consider the first half of this claim. Dasein is that being “in” and “as” which the

95. For Heidegger, the primordially true is noien—taken in the sense of “perception,” sheer
“apprehending,” rather than of rational thought or mentation, as it comes to be predominantly taken in the
philosophical tradition—as it merely discloses and never covers up (BT, 33). Logos does not have this
characteristic. I thank Frank Seeburger for this clarification.
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Being of entities, including other Dasein, disclose themselves. Thus, the ontological
character of Dasein is truth—truth as disclosedness, in the sense of truth as that which
makes it possible for any beings, whether Dasein itself or other beings, to disclose
themselves. Otherwise said, Dasein is the “clearing” within which such disclosure is
possible (133). In this sense, then, Dasein is always “in the truth.”
To establish the second half of his claim, Heidegger draws upon his notions of
authenticity vs. inauthenticity and fallenness. Heidegger introduces the
authentic/inauthentic binary early in Being and Time. The distinction between these two
modes of the Being of Dasein is grounded in two fundamental characteristics of Dasein:
its “essence” (which lies in its existence), and its “mineness” (Jemeinigkeit). The former
points to the range of possibilities for Dasein to be; Dasein “comports itself towards its
Being as its ownmost possibility” (42). The latter acknowledges Dasein’s inescapable
mode of Being as, so to speak, “Being-as-having-to-decide-over-itself.” That is, “Dasein
has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is in each case mine [je
meines]” (ibid.). The inescapability of Dasein’s having to decide over the “how” of its
own Being-itself is reflected, for one example, in the familiar statement, “Not to decide is
to decide.” Authenticity for Dasein is to “‘choose’ itself to win itself”; inauthenticity is to
“lose itself and never win itself” (ibid.). Authentic Dasein chooses to choose itself, to
make itself “mine,” whereas inauthentic Dasein fails to choose itself in such a manner,
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choosing instead not to choose, without ever even seeing or saying that is has so
chosen.96
Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, is necessarily immersed in the “everydayness” of
the world. Heidegger characterizes this ontological state of Dasein’s Being as one of
falling and thrownness. “Falling” points to the Dasein’s inordinate fascination with its
on-going relationships as Being-in-the-world, to the domination of prevailing public
opinion, and to a mode of tranquilized, groundless floating. “Thrownness” reflects the
turbulence and ceaseless movement of Dasein within “the groundlessness of nullity of
inauthentic everydayness” (178). The inauthenticity of everyday Dasein is factical for
Heidegger; “fallenness” does not imply deviation from some earlier pristine condition of
wholeness nor any moralistic judgments regarding Dasein’s “corruptibility.” Yet
authenticity is a possible mode of Being for Dasein within such everydayness—not as a
“floating above” such fallenness, but as “a modified way in which such everydayness is
seized upon” (179).
How, then, is Dasein “in untruth”? In Heidegger’s analysis, the falling
thrownness of everyday Dasein is reflected in its everyday, inauthentic modes of
discourse, state of mind, and understanding, idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity. Each of
these modes of Being of Dasein serves to cover up that which is hidden—but in ways
analogous to that of the “Being false” of the logos discussed earlier.
Idle talk discloses to Dasein a Being towards its world, towards Others,
and towards itself—a Being in which these are understood, but in a mode
of groundless floating. Curiosity discloses everything and anything, yet in
96. The authentic self and the inauthentic self are not two different selves but, rather, two different
ways of being one and the same self, the self Dasein is given to be—or has to be. I thank Frank Seeburger
for this clarification.
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such a way that Being-In is everywhere and nowhere. Ambiguity hides
nothing from Dasein’s understanding, but only in order that Being-in-theworld should be suppressed in this uprooted ‘everywhere and nowhere’.
(BT, 177; emphasis added)
In sum, insofar as Dasein’s mode of Being as discourse always tends toward taking such
a “fallen” form—that of idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity—Dasein is inescapably “in
untruth.”
Division Two of Being and Time deepens Heidegger’s analysis of the
authentic/inauthentic dualism, falling, the everydayness of Dasein as Being-in-the-world,
and truth/untruth by reformulating them through the lenses of temporality and death.
Given the indubitable inauthenticity of everyday Dasein, these lenses sharpen the rather
general characterizations of authenticity found in Division One.
The inevitability of death is a given for all human beings. Heidegger posits Dasein
as “Being-towards-death” in the sense that Dasein lives each moment with this facticity,
yet without certainty of the ontic time of its occurrence. Given such, Heidegger locates
authenticity in resoluteness—a mode of Dasein’s disclosedness that is “ready for
anxiety” and that self-projects upon its ownmost Being-guilty. “In resoluteness we have
now arrived at that truth of Dasein which is most primordial because it is authentic” (297;
emphasis added). “Resoluteness” means intentionally accepting the call of conscience to
be who I am. Authentic Dasein is everyday Dasein as Being-in-resoluteness.
On Heidegger’s view, Dasein is not “in” time; rather, Dasein is time in the sense
of temporality, or more precisely, in the sense of Dasein as a mode of temporalizing
temporality. Moreover, Dasein embodies this tri-partite dimensionality of temporality—
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not sequentially or linearly, but integrally. Heidegger fleshes out the three-fold
conceptualization of temporality via two of the components of disclosedness, plus falling.
“Understanding” is futural, in the sense of opening up a horizon of possibilities via
projection; “state-of-mind” is primarily past-oriented, expressed via moods that reflect
my thrownness; and “falling” (especially as manifested as curiosity) is temporalized, via
Dasein’s fascination with Being-in-the-world, as the present. The third component of
disclosedness—discourse—cuts across all three temporal dimensions as the selfarticulation of Dasein, expressed as silence as well as “talk.”97
Understanding and Interpretation. In Being and Time, Heidegger explicates the
relation between knowledge and truth from out of the existential analytic of Dasein as
Being-in-the-world. Heidegger inverts the customary primacy of knowledge over
understanding. For Heidegger, “understanding” is not merely one sort of cognizing
among others (such as “explaining”), but rather is a fundamental mode of Dasein’s
Being-in-the-world (143). As such, “understanding” is grounded in possibility, “the most
primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically”
(ibid.). Compactly stated, Dasein is “Being-possible”—always more than any factual
inventory of its qualities or characteristics. It is not that Dasein has possibilities, but that
it is its possibilities. “Understanding” has the existential structure of projection, and so is
always pressing forth into possibilities. This projection is a “throwing” (Entwurf) of
Dasein into its possibilities without grasping them in a systematic and reflective manner.

97.The three elements of disclosedness plus “falling” are the constituents of “care” as Dasein’s
primordial totality (BT, 335).
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As one of three equiprimordial elements of disclosedness, understanding discloses
Dasein’s possibilities to “Become what you are” (145).
In turn, interpretation is the development of the understanding in the sense of
“working- out of possibilities [of/for Dasein] projected in understanding” (148).
Interpretation does not depend upon knowledge or information about what is understood;
rather, it is the articulation of that which lies before us as something—for example, as a
table, as a bridge, etc. Interpretation precedes assertion or characterization of that which
has come into sight. “The ‘as’ makes up the structure of the explicitness of something
that is understood” (149). Guided by his explication of equipment as the “ready-to-hand,”
Heidegger grounds the “as” structure of interpretation upon the “fore-structure” of
understanding: fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. That is, understanding
entails the having in advance of a totality of involvements; the sighting-in-advance—a
“first-cut,” so to speak—of that totality; and a preliminary grasping or conceptualizing of
that totality (150). Thus, understanding and interpretation operate hand-in-hand; neither
has primacy over the other. Indeed, Heidegger says, they operate within a “virtuous
circle,” so to speak: “Any interpretation which is to contribute to understanding, must
already have understood what is to be interpreted” (152).
Truth and knowledge. Recall the primary and secondary senses in which
Heidegger has primordially appropriated the tradition: namely, “truth” as “Beinguncovering” and as “Being-uncovered,” respectively (220, also cited above). “Beinguncovering” (aka “Being-true”) is a mode of Being for Dasein. “Understanding” is also
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such a mode. (143) and so is “knowing” (62). Entities, or beings, are “that which has
been uncovered” (20).
Conventionally understood, “knowledge” is what is true (216). This can be
affirmed, if we take “truth” in the secondary sense of “Being-uncovered.” Knowledge,
roughly speaking, is that which gets demonstrated or uncovered. This is consistent with
the earlier claim in this section that “knowledge” is a derivative of “understanding.” In
more detail:
When does truth become phenomenologically explicit in knowledge itself? It does
so when such knowing demonstrates itself as true. By demonstrating itself it is
assured of its truth. . . . What gets demonstrated is the Being-uncovering of the
assertion. In carrying out such a demonstration, the knowing remains related
solely to the entity itself. . . This uncoveredness is confirmed when that which is
put forward in the assertion (namely the entity itself) shows itself as that very
same thing. . . . Thus truth has by no means the structure of an agreement between
knowing and the object in the sense of a likening of one entity (the subject) to
another (the Object). (BT, 217-18; original emphasis)
I have concentrated in this section on highlighting Heidegger’s formulation of
truth as disclosedness (aletheia) and how the traditional conception of truth as agreement
of an assertion with its object is derivative of this primordial formulation. Heidegger
establishes these claims from the existential analytic of Dasein. I have also highlighted
his arguments for the inseparable intertwining of truth and untruth In the next section, I
shall draw upon Heidegger’s later work that retains the two in their inextricable
interweaving, but does not repeat the analysis explicitly linking them to the existential
analytic of Dasein.
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3.2

The Essence of Truth and the Truth of Being
The primary purpose of this section is to explicate Heidegger’s critique of the

customary formulation of the essence of truth as the correctness of an assertion in favor
of a more originary explication of truth from the standpoint of the question of the truth of
Being. Here, his explication of truth is no longer dependent upon the existential analytic
of Dasein. I shall focus upon three questions with an eye toward their relevance in
thinking the RST relation: First, why is the statement that “truth is the correctness of an
assertion” problematic in itself, as well as derivative from the pre-Socratic understanding
of truth as unconcealedness? Second, how are we to understand Heidegger’s claim that
“to seek the essence of truth is to seek the truth of Being”? And third, what is the
connection between the truth-Being relation and the question of what it means to be
human?
In Basic Questions of Philosophy, Heidegger takes the question of truth—
understood as the truth of Being—as his basic question. Once again, he begins his inquiry
by interrogating the customary view of truth, compactly expressed as “the correctness of
an assertion” (BQP, 9). Traditionally, he says, the question of truth, expressed in this
form, has been regarded as a problem or question of logic. Correspondence, he says, is
customarily taken as the standard of correctness. For example, “Truth is correctness, or in
the more usual formula: truth is the correspondence of knowledge (representation,
thought, judgment, assertion) with the object” (16); and “. . . truth is the correctness of a
representation, the correspondence of an assertion (a proposition) with a thing” (22).
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Heidegger problematizes the customary understanding of truth in several ways.
First, what does correspondence mean? How are we to understand a correspondence
between a being or entity (such as an object or thing) and a string of words referencing
such? In discussing Aristotle’s understanding of correspondence as the assimilation of
the assertion to the thing via Aristotle’s example, “The stone is hard,” Heidegger asks: “.
. . how is the representation [i.e., the proposition itself] supposed to assimilate itself to
the stone? The representation is not supposed to, and cannot, become stone-like . . .” (15).
Second, he points out that the centuries-old debate between realism and idealism lies
completely within the orbit of this customary understanding of truth. That is, both
positions start from the premise that “truth is the correctness of a representation . . .” The
basic difference between them lies in the extent, or “reach,” of such representations. For
realism, representations “reach the things themselves,” whereas for idealism,
representations “relate only to the represented” (17). Thus the essence of truth must lie at
a deeper level. And third, Heidegger argues that the question of the essence of truth
cannot be divorced from the question of the essence of what it means to be human. For
Heidegger, conceiving of truth as the correctness of an assertion is equivalent to thinking
“man” as the animal rationale, the animal “endowed with reason” (20). Thus, his critique
of the customary understanding of truth necessitates a rethinking of the essence of being
human—an issue that I shall address more fully in the final chapter of this inquiry.
Despite these flaws in the customary understanding of truth as the correctness of
an assertion, Heidegger intends to show that this understanding “already in some way
contains, even if not originally, the essence of truth” (42). He proceeds to do so by
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examining in detail Aristotle’s multi-faceted understanding of essence. To comprehend
the essence of truth, we must first ask, what do we mean by “essence” itself? That is,
what is the essentiality (i.e., the truth) of the essence? Thus, Heidegger inverts the
question of the essence of truth to the question of the truth (essentiality) of the essence.
Heidegger justifies his engagement with Aristotle’s thought in several ways. First,
Aristotle was the first to posit the customary understanding of truth (ibid.). Second,
examples such as “The stone is hard,” merely provide occurrences of correctness but do
not suffice to provide a ground, or foundation, for this understanding of truth (43). By
engaging Aristotle’s explication of essence, Heidegger seeks to discern the origin and
founding of the formulation of truth as the correctness of an assertion. And third, while
Heidegger’s inquiry is pertinent because of the dominance of the traditional
understanding of truth in contemporary thought, he fundamentally aims for “awakening
the question of truth for the future as a–or perhaps the—basic question of philosophy”
(41). That is, Heidegger frames his analysis of Aristotle’s thought as a historical
reflection oriented toward the future rather than a historiographical consideration that
“turns the past into an object” (32-40).
Aristotle thought the essentiality of the essence in several different ways (53-58).
Among them, Heidegger selects whatness for special analysis. “The essence is the ti
einai—the whatness [Wasssein] of a being. . . . What something is is its essence” (56). At
this point, Heidegger turns to Plato’s fateful characterization of whatness and describes it
as “an answer which became henceforth perhaps the most consequential, influential, and
disastrous philosophical definition in Western thinking: the essence is what something is,
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and we encounter it as that which we constantly have in sight in all our comportment to
the thing” (58, emphasis added). In what follows, I shall examine why Heidegger thinks
that Plato’s characterization of whatness as constant presence is disastrous and its
implications for thinking the RST relation. Plato’s characterization follows:
. . . what the thing is, the constantly present, must be sighted in advance and
indeed necessarily so. “To see,” is in Greek idein; what is in sight, precisely as
sighted, is idea. . . . The “what it is,” the whatness, is the idea; and conversely, the
“idea” is the whatness, and the latter is the essence. More precisely, and more in
the Greek vein, the idea is the look something offers, the aspect it has and, as it
were, shows of itself, the eidos. (BQP, 56)

In sum, the essence of something for Plato is idea—the look, or aspect, that it shows in its
constant presencing, yet always sighted in advance.
For example, consider “house-ness”—i.e., the idea of a house. Heidegger writes:
When we enter a house and live in it, we constantly have “house” in sight, i.e.,
house-ness. If this were not seen, we could never experience and enter stairs, hall,
room, attic, or cellar. But this house-ness, which stands in view, is not thereby
considered and observed the way the individual window is, toward which we
walk in order to close it. House-ness is not even observed incidentally. It is not
observed at all; yet it is in sight, and precisely in an eminent way: it is sighted in
advance. (BQP, 58-59)
We see the window in the house but we do not—and cannot—see “house-ness.”
Nonetheless, the essence of the house is always in sight and always sighted in advance;
however, this essence is never noticed or observed. Yet each individual thing that we see
is decisively shaped by what is sighted in advance.98

98. This strikes me as comparable to Thomas Kuhn’s fundamental distinction between normal
science and science in a crisis state (see Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 77-91). Under the
former, scientists go about their everyday tasks of exploration and explanation within the operating
paradigms of their specific disciplines. From Kuhn’s standpoint, Heidegger’s claim that “science does not
think” is perfectly understandable—if thinking includes examination of the presuppositions under which

95

But whence does Plato’s interpretations of whatness as idea—and idea as
constant presence—come? And why is this characterization deemed disastrous? In
response to the first question, Heidegger states:
The reason the Greeks understand essence as whatness is that they in general
understand the Being of beings (ousia) as what is constant and in its constancy is
always present, and as present always shows itself, and as self-showing offers its
look—in short, as look, as idea. (BQP, 61)

Here, Heidegger links the truth (essentiality) of essence to the question of Being, as
understood by the Platonic Greeks. Essence as whatness, he says, flows from the
beingness of beings (ousia), understood as constant presence, i.e., as idea. Heidegger,
however, contends that the pre-Socratics held to a more originary notion of Being,
expressed as being as such. For them, this expression was understood as physis,
fundamentally characterized by emergence (86). That is, beings as such emerge from
concealment into unconcealedness. Thus the truth, or essence, of beings as such was
characterized as unconcealedness, expressed as aletheia in Greek. Briefly stated, for the
pre-Socratic Greeks, unconcealedness (aletheia) is the truth of beings as such (physis);
equivalently, unconcealedness (aletheia) was understood by them as the truth (essence) of
Being as the beingness of beings (ousia). Aletheia (unconcealedness), then, is the bridge
for the equivalence of the essence of truth and the truth of Being, as understood by the
pre-Socratic Greeks. On this view, truth belongs to beings—not to assertions about them.
Plato and Aristotle reformulated this primordial formulation of truth as unconcealedness
to truth as the correctness of an assertion (97-8). Thus, both formulations of truth have
scientific inquiries are made. That is, normal science employs “paradigm” as “idea” in Plato’s sense as the
view in advance, the “look” that something offers.
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been in play since Aristotle. Plato’s fateful contribution is the conflation of
unconcealedness and constant presence as idea.
Heidegger explicates the connections between these two formulations of truth in a
twofold movement. First, he traces the origin of the traditional understanding of truth
back to the early Greek understanding of truth as unconcealedness. Then he briefly traces
the trajectory from its understanding as aletheia to truth as the correctness of an assertion.
In so doing, he illuminates the consequences for our understanding of what it means to be
human and defends his claim that Plato’s conflation of essence and constant presence as
idea has been disastrous.
Heidegger begins by asking: Is there a foundation, or grounding, for such claims
involving essences—and in particular, the essence of the truth taken customarily (and by
Aristotle) as correctness of an assertion or judgment? He tells us that Aristotle did not
provide any foundation in his extant writings for this claim; he simply declared it to be so
(64). Indeed, Heidegger argues that founding any essence upon factual knowledge is
impossible, for the purported essence would have to be posited to generate the factual
knowledge employed to establish it:
Every time we attempt to prove an essential determination through single, or even
all, actual and possible facts, there results the remarkable statement of affairs that
we have already presupposed the legitimacy of the essential determination, indeed
must presuppose it, just on order to grasp and produce the facts that are supposed
to serve as proof.99 (BQP, 71)

99. Note that Heidegger does not appeal to the argument of infinite regress—a form of argument
that lies within the orbit of causality.
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How, then, is the essence of truth to be grasped? Returning to his conviction that
“truth as correctness of an assertion” is “on the way” to understanding the essence of
truth, Heidegger re-examines more closely Plato’s explication of the essence of whatness
as constant presence—i.e., idea. He provides a detailed argument to hold that the seeing
in advance that characterizes idea is a grasping of the essence in the sense that it is a
productive seeing and a bringing forth from concealment into the light, i.e., into
unconcealedness (74-87). In this sense, truth as unconcealedness is a founding of truth as
the correctness of an assertion.
What accounts, then, for this transmutation of truth as the determinant of beings
as such to truth as the correctness of an assertion? Heidegger offers two accounts. The
first employs his understanding of the Greek notion of techne. On his view, techne means
“to grasp beings as emerging out of themselves in the way they show themselves, in their
outward look, eidos, idea, and, in accord with this, to care for beings themselves and to
let them grow . . .” (155). Techne “maintains the holding sway of physis (emergence) in
unconcealedness (aletheia)” (153). Otherwise said, techne acknowledges beings in their
unconcealedness without calculation and utilitarian motives. Heidegger contends,
however, that, over time, the grasping of beings in the noninstrumental manner of techne
inevitably leads, in effect, to the conflation of beings with their representations (i.e., their
ideas):
While the grasping of beings, the acknowledgment of them in their
unconcealedness, unfolds into techne, inevitably and increasingly the aspects of
beings, the ‘ideas,’ which are brought into view in such grasping, become the only
standard. The grasping becomes a sort of know-how with regards to the ideas, and
that requires a constant assimilation to them. . . . Beings become, to exaggerate
somewhat, objects of representations conforming to them. Now aletheia itself is
98

also interrogated, but henceforth from the point of view of techne, and aletheia
becomes the correctness of representations and procedures. (BQP, 156)
Heidegger’s deconstruction of the history of the essence of truth illuminates the
history of the transmutation of the essence of humankind and of reason itself. On his
view, humankind was once the perceiver and preserver of beings in their beingness, but
for centuries has been conceived instead as the animal rationale (121). Reason (logos)
was once “the taking together and gathering of beings in view of the one which they are
as beings,” but has become reason that “assumes for itself the planning, constructing, and
making of the world” (122). He continues: “Beings are no longer physis in the Greek
sense [i.e, of emergence] but ‘nature,’ i.e., that which is captured in the planning and
projects of calculation and placed in the chains of anticipatory reckonings.”
Heidegger’s second account of these transmutations of the essences of truth,
humankind, and reason is based upon his interrogation of unconcealedness as the truth of
beings as such. His interrogation of aletheia prompts the question of why the early
Greeks did not conduct such an investigation. Heidegger argues as follows. First, the
founding of any essence—including the essence of truth—must arise from the necessity
of the question of the essence itself (104ff). Second, for the early Greeks, the question of
the essence of truth was necessary, because their destiny and task “was to begin thinking
itself and to establish it on its ground” (112). Third, they did so by interrogating and
grounding aletheia as the unconcealedness of beings, but did not interrogate “the essence
of aletheia, of unconcealedness as such” (105; emphasis added). They did not interrogate
aletheia as such, since that was not their destiny and task. Heidegger takes up this task out
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of the necessity of doing so in light of the abandonment of Being, heralded by Nietzsche
and Hölderlin:
What if this withdrawal itself belonged to the essence of Being? What if . . .
Being in its essence is self-concealing? What if the openness were first and
foremost the clearing in the midst of beings, in which clearing the selfconcealment of Being would be manifest? (BQP, 163)

Thus the pre-Socratic notion of the essence of truth as unconcealedness—equivalently,
the truth of beings as such—is giving way to understanding the truth of Being itself as
self-concealing unconcealedness, an inseparable concurrence of disclosing and
withdrawing. This emerging understanding of the essence (truth) of Being reaffirms the
claim in Being and Time that truth and untruth are similarly intertwined.
An inversion of sorts is taking place. The first sentence of the Introduction of
Being and Time reads: “The question has today been forgotten” (BT, 2). That is, we, as
Dasein, have forgotten the question of Being. Heidegger now writes in a more ominous
key:
The forgottenness of Being dominates, i.e., it determines our relation to beings, so
that even beings, that they are and what they are, remain a matter of indifference.
It is almost as if beings have been abandoned by Being, and we are heedless of it,
. . . (BQP, 159)

For Heidegger, the withdrawal of Being possibly heralds our abandonment by Being. It is
as though Being itself has “turned the tables” on us.
Thus far in this section, we have sketched Heidegger’s telling of the transmutation
of the meaning of truth as disclosedness to truth as the correctness of the assertion, which
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eventually comes to rely upon representational thinking. In a later essay,100 he traces the
further transmutation of the meaning of truth to the certainty of representational thinking
and locates its beginning at the start of what is commonly called the modern period
(EOP, 22). That is to say, representational thinking becomes the means by which truth,
certainty, and reality itself are interlinked. Quoting a passage from Descartes’
Meditations, Heidegger states:
Something true is that which man of himself clearly and distinctly brings before
himself and confronts as what is thus brought before him (re-presented) in order
to guarantee what is represented in such a confrontation. The assurance of such
representation is certainty. What is true in the sense of being certain is what is
real. (EOP, 25)

Hence, knowledge is confined to that which can be produced (by man) with certainty
(26). Certainty is not something added to knowledge; rather certainty constitutes
knowledge (20).
On Heidegger’s view, understanding truth as certainty has its roots in the
ubiquitous, frenetic search for the certainty of personal salvation as mediated by the
“cultural Christianity” of the Middle Ages. “Before all, the creator god, and with him the
institution of the offering and management of his gifts of grace (the church), is in sole
possession of the sole and eternal truth” (21). By faith, medieval mankind sought the
certainty of salvation. But even if that faith were lost, “modern culture is [still] Christian”
(24), he says, in the sense that certainty is the essence of truth—whether certainty is

100. Martin Heidegger, “Metaphysics as a History of Being,” in The End of Philosophy, trans.
Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 1-54. (The End of Philosophy is hereafter cited as
EOP.)
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realized through faith or by following Descartes’ dictum to accept as true only those
“things which I perceive very clearly and very distinctly.”101

3.3

Truth, Rationality, and Reason
In this section and the next, I shall examine the possible relationship—even if it is

that of mutual exclusion—between Heidegger’s reflection on truth and theologian J.
Wentzel van Huyssteen’s two-part thesis that the question of the nature or character of
rationality is decisive for thinking the RST relation and, in turn, that the nature or
character of the RST relation itself is decisive for thinking the nature or character of
theological reflection in general. In The Shaping of Rationality, he writes:
. . . the problem of rationality thus emerges as at the heart of the current dialogue
between theology and the sciences. . . . The current theology and science
dialogue, then, will turn out to be at the heart of the debate on the interdisciplinary
nature and location of theological reflection . . . (Shaping, 7)

Van Huyssteen frames his investigation of rationality by developing what he calls
a postfoundationalist model of rationality, which draws heavily from postmodern
epistemology and the philosophy of science. On his view, theologians can legitimately
participate in interdisciplinary public discourse with their truth claims because
theological statements can be considered to be rationally credible. Van Huyssteen’s
postfoundationalist model emphasizes the seeking and giving of the best reasons possible
for one’s claims or beliefs about the way things are, one’s actions, and one’s values. In
contrast, I shall highlight key elements from Heidegger’s critique of Leibniz’ Principle of

101. René Descartes, Meditatio III, quoted in EOP, 25, n. 4..
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Reason, compactly (but not strictly) stated as nihil est sine ratione (nothing is without
reason).
Van Huyssteen’s postfoundationalist model of rationality is centered on the
universal human quest for intelligibility—the drive to “make sense” of the world around
us and our relationship to it. He contends that religion as well as science manifests this
quest. “As many scientists and theologians today will acknowledge, the quest of
intelligibility or optimal understanding will be incomplete if it does not include within
itself the religious quest for ultimate meaning, purpose, and significance” (Shaping, 7). In
Duet or Duel?, van Huyssteen locates the origin of this quest in evolutionary biology and
its subsequent interplay with cultural evolution.102 In this work, he draws heavily upon
the work of evolutionary biologist Franz Wuketits, but challenges Wuketits’ naturalistic
explanation of the origin of religious and metaphysical beliefs. Appealing to the
implications of Wuketits’ own analysis, he writes:
If metaphysical beliefs, on this naturalistic view at least, do not tell us anything
about ‘first causes’ or ‘last purposes’ (God), but rather about our own propensity
for such beliefs, why then did these evolve on such a massive scale in the history
of our species? And why should we distrust our phylogenetic memories only on
this point? (Duet or Duel?, 155)

In sum, van Huyssteen contends that the notion of intelligibility extends beyond
naturalistic explanations to include religious and metaphysical beliefs as well. This is a

102. Van Huyssteen refers to the investigation of the implications for philosophical epistemology
of the interrelationships between biological and cultural forces shaping human evolution as evolutionary
epistemology (Duet or Duel?, 134). Cf. Philip Hefner’s claim that the religion-science relation is grounded
in the beginnings of human history and the primordial search for both order and meaning (Hefner,
“Religion-and-Science,” 563). Also see Subsection 1.2.1 below.
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key step toward his broader claim that theological statements can be considered
“rational.”
Based upon this evolutionary account of intelligibility, intelligence—and its close
relation, rationality—emerge together as primary survival strategies. By virtue of their
common evolutionary heritage in the quest for intelligibility, van Huyssteen contends that
theology—understood as “critical reflection upon religious experience” (Shaping ,
201)—and science together share in “the rich resources of rationality.” More specifically,
van Huyssteen contends that the common thread in rationality across theology, science,
and the demands of daily living is providing the best available reasons for our beliefs,
actions, and values:
In both theology and the sciences, then, rationality and the quest for intelligibility
pivot on the deployment of good reasons: believing, doing, judging, and choosing
the right things for the right reasons. Being rational is therefore not just a matter
of having some reasons for what one believes in and argues for, but having the
best or strongest reasons available to support the comparative rationality of one’s
beliefs within a concrete sociohistorical context. (Shaping, 129)
In what follows, I shall examine key elements of van Huyssteen’s postfoundationalist
model of rationality and his case for theological rationality.
First, the deployment of rationality is always contextual and local, yet need not
remain isolated within its own domain. This reflects van Huyssteen’s characterization of
his postfoundationalist model of rationality as “splitting the difference” between
supporting universalist epistemological claims of modernity and extreme relativist views
of knowledge, reason, and truth in postmodern thought.
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Second, rationality is multi-dimensional and includes noncognitive as well as
cognitive elements. Van Huyssteen cites the work of Nicholas Rescher, who posits three
primary dimensions of rationality: the cognitive, the pragmatic, and the evaluative (ibid.,
128). As Rescher explains, these dimensions reflect three domains in which human
choices and decisions are required: belief (What claims regarding “states of affairs”
should I believe or accept?), action (What “overt deeds” should I perform?), and
evaluation (What ends and goals should I “prefer or prize”?).103 The common
denominator across these domains of thought and action is the requirement to seek out
and act upon the strongest reasons available to a person in making choices. Moreover, on
van Huyssteen’s view, rationality entails “aligning one’s beliefs, actions, and evaluations
with the best available reasons within specific contexts” (Shaping, 134). Thus, in some
sense, reasons for our beliefs, actions, and value judgments must be congruent or
consistent—at least at the local or contextual level. In sum, postfoundationalist rationality
depends upon the seeking and giving of the best available reasons for our beliefs, actions,
and values in order to align them in all areas of human life and thought within specific
contexts.
On van Huyssteen’s view, value judgments are integral to rationality. Drawing
upon the work of Harold Brown and Bruce Wavel, van Huyssteen points to the
undeniable role of values and value judgments in science: “In science the acceptance and
rejection of hypotheses, and finally also theory choice, are indeed based on evaluation
and deliberation. This places the making of certain kinds of value judgments at the heart
103. Nicholas Rescher, Rationality: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and the Rationale of
Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 5.

105

of the scientific method itself” (141). Since science itself is unquestionably taken as the
primary exemplar of rationality, it follows that values and value judgments are
indispensable elements of rationality. Van Huyssteen then moves to declare that the
employment of values and value judgments in theology is also rational:
Because of the breakdown of the stark opposition between scientific and other
forms of rationality in a postfoundationalism, it can now also be argued that there
is no essential difference between the epistemic function of values and value
judgments in science and their function in other modes of rational inquiry like the
humanities, ethics, and theology. If the use of value judgments in science is
therefore rational, so is the use of value judgments in the humanities, ethics, and
in theology (Shaping, 142-43; emphasis added).

Third, consonant with the thinking of Harold Brown and others, van Huyssteen
argues for locating rationality primarily in rational persons. Rational beliefs are
“derivative” in the sense that they are “arrived at” by rational individuals (145). On this
postfoundationalist view of rationality, the absence of universally applicable norms and
rules requires responsible judgment, exercised by the rational person, or agent, in
discernment and sensitivity to the context and particulars of the matter at hand. This view
entails one caveat and one consequence of great significance. A rational person
necessarily engages in appropriate (roughly speaking, a “good faith”) dialogue with the
epistemic community (or communities) that is (are) pertinent to the matter at hand.
However, the rational agent has the final say. Consequently, on this view, consensus is
not—and cannot be—a requirement for rationality.
Fourth, our beliefs are embedded in “evolving, developing traditions” in science,
art, theology and other domains. Van Huyssteen cites the work of philosopher of science
Larry Laudan, who has proposed a criterion of “progressive problem-solving” to
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adjudicate among competing theories and research traditions in science.104 Van
Huyssteen employs this criterion to express the heart of postfoundationalist rationality:
[W]e make what we believe to be a responsible judgment in favor of a theory, a
viewpoint, or a research tradition, of which we are convinced—with good
reasons—that is has the highest problem-solving ability for a specific problem
within a specific context. (Shaping, 172)

In turn, he combines problem-solving with rational agency to recast the quest for
intelligibility:
In our attempts to cope with our world on different levels, the universal intent of
this quest for intelligibility is definitively expressed in our ability to solve
problems through an ongoing process of personal judgment and intersubjective
accountability. (Shaping, 174)

And fifth, actions, beliefs, and value judgments can be rational without
necessarily being true. Thinking with Rescher, van Huyssteen argues for “a weaker but
vital” connection between rationality and truth. “[W]e proceed rationally in attempting to
‘discover’ truth, and we take those conclusions that are rationally acceptable as our best
estimates of the truth” (158). However, having better estimates of the truth does not
imply having better approximations of the truth. That is, having better reasons for our
beliefs, actions, and value judgments does not imply moving closer to the truth. In effect,
on this view, truth serves a functional role as a kind of ideal, or imaginary, point which at
best serves to orient our fallible efforts to discover or craft reasons for optimal
understanding but forever lies beyond our reach.

104. Larry Lauden, Progress and Its Problems: Toward a Theory of Scientific Growth (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1977).
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However, van Huyssteen does not take up the converse claim that beliefs, actions,
and value judgments can be true, in some sense, without being rational, in the sense of
seeking and giving of the best reasons available to one. Thinking, with Heidegger, I
address this matter in what follows.
Circumscribing rationality within a framework of reason-seeking and giving can
be traced back to the Greeks, as attested by Heidegger’s various critiques of the
traditional understanding of truth briefly described in sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this inquiry.
In The Principle of Reason, Heidegger explicates Leibniz’ comprehensive and decisive
reformulation of the principle of reason as “the fundamental principle of rendering
sufficient reasons” (POR, 33). Operating within the long shadow cast by Descartes’
cogito, the reformulated principle of reason not only governs cognition but its reach
extends to all that is, in Leibniz’ system. Heidegger contends that the reformulated,
“strict,” or “grand” principle of reason characterizes modern science, the modern era
itself, and the still prevalent understanding of humankind in terms of the animal
rationale. Moreover, on his view, the increasing hegemony of the reformulated principle
of reason calls into question the destiny of the earth and human existence (129). By
“inverting” the customary hearing of the principle of reason and by engaging poetry,
Heidegger points to a path ahead for resisting the suffocating dominance of reasonseeking and giving. I proceed to unpack these claims.
For Leibniz, the principle of reason is one of the supreme fundamental principles
of reason—possibly the most supreme one—because it founds all principles as principles
(118). That is, it provides the basis, or ground, for principles, including such fundamental
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principles as the principle of identity and the principle of non-contradiction (8). Yet,
paradoxically, the principle of reason itself does not satisfy the very claim that the
principle makes: namely (in an equivalent form), everything has a reason. For, if an
underlying reason for the principle of reason were given, such a reason would have to
have itself an underlying reason and so on, leading to an infinite regress (11-12). Leibniz
resolves this conundrum by regarding the principle of reason as an axiom, understood by
him as a principle “held by everyone as being obvious . . .” Heidegger signals his
intention of critiquing the “grand” principle of reason by way of early Greek thinking by
recovering the meaning of the Greek verb axiom as “I find something worthy” (15).
Thought in a Greek way with respect to the relation of being human to what is, this
declaration, according to Heidegger, means “to bring something to shine forth in that
countenance in which it finds its repose, and to preserve it therein” (16).
On Heidegger’s view, Leibniz’ genius was to bring to the forefront the precise
role, or function, of reason within the principle of reason that had been operating without
clarity for centuries. Namely, the principle of reason is a principle of rendering reasons,
in which reason demands that reasons be rendered, in the sense of “giving back.” But
given back to whom? As Leibniz was operating under the long shadow of Descartes’
subject-object binary, the principle of rendering reason was understood (and still is
widely understood in modern thought) as a demand to give reasons back in
representational form to the cognizing subject:
After Descartes, followed by Leibniz and all of modern thinking, humans are
experienced as an I that relates to the world such that it renders this world to itself
in the form of connections correctly established between its representations--that
means judgments--and thus sets itself over against this world as to an object.
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Judgments and statements are correct, that means true, only if the reason for the
connection of subject and predicate is rendered, given back to the representing I.
(POR, 119)

As this excerpt indicates, Leibniz is operating within the traditional understanding
of truth as the correctness of assertions—expressed here grammatically as the agreement
between the subject and predicate of a judgment or proposition. By coupling this
understanding of truth with Descartes’ subject-object binary and reason as the rendering
of reasons, the knowable, the objectifiable, and “the real” are all conflated. Reason
demands that that which purports to be real be brought before the skeptical, cognizing
subject. To be real, any thing which lies before the subject must be re-represented and
brought before (vorgestellt) the subject, and brought to a stand there as an object
(Gegenstand). Thus the “grand” principle of reason is not only a principle of cognition
via representation (Vorstellung); it is also a principle of the objects of cognition, and
hence a principle of all that exists in a world for those who operate within the Cartesian
subject-object binary (27).105
Heidegger brings to attention the growing pervasiveness in the present age of the
reformulated principle of reason in all areas of life. On his view, the demand to render
reasons—the hallmark of science—is now ubiquitous. The danger is that
. . . the unique unleashing of the demand to render reasons threatens everything of
humans’ being-at-home and robs them of the root of their subsistence, the roots
from out of which every great human age, every world-opening spirit, every
molding of the human form has thus far grown. (POR, 30)
105. As Heidegger notes later in this essay, the subject-object binary is itself disappearing in the
final stages of modernity. He speaks of a world “where what is objective [Gegenständliche] must yield to a
status [Ständigen] of a different sort. . . . Modernity is not at an end. It only begins its completion in
directing itself to the complete availability of everything that is and can be” (POR, 34). I discuss this theme
in Chapter 4 of this inquiry.
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Heidegger challenges the hegemony of the principle of reason by turning to
poetry and to an alternate hearing of the tonality of the principle of reason. He begins by
explicating an equivalent form of the strict principle of reason as: nothing is without a
why (35). He contends that the rose—a symbol of plants and all growing things—lies
outside, but also within, the orbit of the why and the reach of the demand to render
reasons (35-36):
The rose is without why, it blooms because it blooms,
It pays no attention to itself, asks not whether it is seen.
The incessant “why” is trumped by the “because” which stops the ceaseless striving for a
complete reckoning. The rose lies outside the why because it is “without the seeking,
peering-round rendering of the grounds on the basis of which it blooms” (38). On the
other hand, when the rose becomes an object of our analysis and knowledge, it is within
the orbit of reason and the why.106
Next, Heidegger observes that the principle of reason tells us nothing directly
about the essence of reason (39ff). He then invites us to hear two tonalities in the
principle of reason: first, the customary hearing as nothing is without reason, and, second,
nothing is without reason. He contends that, in the second tonality, a response can be
heard to the question of the essence of reason. On his view, the verb is always connotes
being in the sense of the being of beings, whereas reason is the English translate of
106. This “double-seeing” of the rose is echoed by Heidegger’s claim that the scientist is capable
of reflective thinking as well as the calculative thinking characteristic of science. See “Science and
Reflection” in QCT, 181-82. This poetic couplet also resonates with Heidegger’s example of the blooming
rose to illustrate non-objectifying “thinking and saying” in the Appendix to his lecture, “Phenomenology
and Theology.” (See Section 2.4 above.) The couplet is also quoted in section 3.4 below.
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Grund (ratio, in Latin), which connotes the double meaning of ground and reason.
Mindful that only beings exist and not Being itself—equivalently, the Being of beings—
the second tonality can be expressed as: being and ground/reason: the same. Otherwise
expressed, being and ground/reason “belong together” (104-5, 125).
Heidegger supports the hearing of this second tonality by tracing the etymological
roots of weil—the German equivalent of “because.” In earlier times, its cognate,
desweilen (whereas) meant “during”; another cognate, weilen (to while) means “to tarry,”
“to remain still,” or “to pause and keep to oneself” (127). “Whiling” also names being
and ground. On the one hand, “whiling” connotes an old meaning of sein (being). On the
other hand: “The while . . . names the simple, plain presence that is without why—the
presence upon which everything depends . . .”—that is, ground (ibid.).
Heard in this second tonality, the “why” disappears from the principle of reason
as Leibniz formulated it. In this second tonality, “The word of being says: being—itself
ground/reason—remains without a ground/reason, which now means, without why”
(126). Thus, the second tonality grounds the first tonality. The demand of rendering
reasons has rested thus far upon the appeal to “Western humanity” of the word of being
as “the word of ground/reason” (128). But that appeal is unheard in the cacophony of the
current age.
The second tonality illuminates the moves by van Huyssteen and others beyond
foundationalism. “. . . every foundation—even and especially self-founded ones—remain
inappropriate to being as ground/reason. Every founding and even every appearance of
foundability has inevitably degraded being to some sort of a being” (111).
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Finally, on Heidegger’s view, the tonality in which we hear the principle of
reason decisively challenges our basic understanding of who we are as human beings. But
also, the second tonality itself is problematic as we face the future. He asks: “Does the . .
. determination that humans are the animal rationale exhaust the essence of humanity?
Does the last word that can be said about being run thus: being means ground/reason?”
(129, italics added). Heidegger has already responded many times to these rhetorical
questions with an unequivocal “No,” as, for example, our engagements with Being and
Time and Basic Questions of Philosophy have indicated. On his view, the fate of the earth
and human existence hinge upon seeking other paths for non-calculative thinking (129).

3.4

Truth and Reflection
In this section, I shall examine Heidegger’s explication of the relation of

reflection in relation to truth and bring his insights to bear upon the themes of truth,
untruth, and rationality as discussed in the first three sections of this chapter. Heidegger’s
analysis distinguishes sharply between Reflexion and Besinnung, which are both rendered
in English as “reflection.” I shall take as our guiding question the following: If theology
is taken to be “reflection upon religious experience and belief” or some close variant,
which sense of “reflection” is appropriate for the theological enterprise itself and for its
meaningful engagement in the RST relation? Or, are both senses important—and perhaps
necessary?
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What accounts, then, for this transmutation of truth (i.e., aletheia as
unconcealment) as the determinant of beings as such to truth as the correctness of an
assertion?
As we have seen in Section 3.2 above, Heidegger has traced the transmutation of
truth as the determinant of beings as such to truth as the correctness of an assertion. On
Heidegger’s view, representational thinking is a hallmark of the latter formulation of
truth, in which “[b]eings become . . . objects of representations conforming to them”
(BQP, 156) In “Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics,”107 Heidegger explicates
Reflexion as a basic characteristic of representational, conceptual, objectifying thought:
Reflexion is bending-back, and as such it is the explicitly accomplished
presentation of what is present; explicitly, that is, in such a way that what is
present is represented to the representer. . . . reflexion strives for the identical, and
for this reason reflexion is a fundamental characteristic of concept formation.
(EOP, 60-61)
Repraesentatio is grounded in reflexio in accordance with its essence. Hence the
essence of objectivity as such first becomes evident where the essence of thinking
is recognized and explicitly enacted as “I think something,” that is, as reflexion.
(EOP, 62)
Heidegger devoted an entire work to the topic of “reflection” in the sense of
Besinnung: namely, Volume 66 of the Gesamtausgabe. The translators of this volume
render the title as Mindfulness108 and offer this introductory commentary on the basic
distinction between Besinnung and Reflexion:
. . . Besinnung is nothing but an inquiry into the self-disclosure of being . . It
differs from reflection [i.e., Reflexion] in that, as Besinnung, this inquiry is not
107. Martin Heidegger, “Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics,” in EOP, 55-74.
108. Martin Heidegger, Mindfulness, trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary (New York:
Continuum, 2006).
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entirely and exhaustively in human discretion. What distinguishes this inquiry as
Besinnung is that it is basically determined and shaped by the truth of being.
(Mindfulness, xxiii-xxiv)
In his lecture, “Science and Reflection,”109 Heidegger describes “reflection” in the sense
of Besinnung as follows:
To follow a direction that is the way that something has, of itself, already taken is
called, in our language, sinnan, sinnen (to sense). To venture after sense or
meaning (Sinn) is the essence of reflecting (Besinnung). This means more than the
mere making conscious of something. We do not yet have reflection when we
have only consciousness. Reflection [Besinnung] is more. It is calm, selfpossessed surrender [Gelassenheit] to that which is worthy of questioning. (QCT,
180; GA7, 63; my insertions are in square brackets)

Roughly speaking, then, Reflexion objectifies that which it encounters, whereas
Besinnung is guided by the truth of Being—understood (since Basic Questions of
Philosophy) as self-concealing disclosure. Moreover, Reflexion is “in control,” so to
speak, of the enterprise. Its mode of comportment is objectifying, and its mode of
thinking is calculative. In contrast, Besinning, guided by the truth of Being, is not merely
a human enterprise; and, what is more, it is fundamentally responsive, rather than
dominating, controlling, or even “directing.”110 What is worthy of questioning today is
the marginalizing—and even outright dismissal—of ways of thinking other than the
representational, calculative modes of thought that characterize science.
In “Science and Reflection,” Heidegger differentiates Besinnung from science and
what he calls “intellectual cultivation.” Such cultivation, he says, functions by means of
rules, models, and forms—all under a guiding image and informed by reason. In this
109. Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” in QCT, 155-82.
110. I thank Frank Seeburger for these clarifications.
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work, he explicates modern science as the theory of the real (QCT, 157). He conducts a
detailed, etymologically-based analysis111 of the root meanings of “theory” and “real”
and their subsequent transformations in the present. On his view, the essence of the real
and theory are characterized in terms of presencing. This differs markedly from their
current meanings as “that which has followed from a consequence” (i.e., the real, 161)
and that which is based upon observation, understood as “an entrapping and securing
refining of the real” (i.e., theory, 167). Consequently, instead of presencing as “selfexhibiting,” the real now presences as object via modern scientific representation.
However, “objectness” is only one way in which what presences reveals itself: “. .
. in principle the objectness in which at any given time nature, man, history, language,
exhibit themselves always itself remains only one kind of presencing, in which indeed
that which presences can appear, but never absolutely must appear” (176). Thus thinking
“in the fashion of science” cannot be the only mode of thinking. Other ways of seeking
sense or meaning (Sinn) are essential; reflection (Besinnung) is necessary.
Our two guiding questions can now be restated in threefold form as: (1) With
which sense of reflection does van Huyssteen’s construal of theology as reason-seeking
and giving most strongly resonate? (2) In what sense of reflection is theology best
formulated as reflection upon religious experience and belief? And (3) which sense of
reflection as applied to theology is most fruitful for thinking the RST relation?

111. Heidegger defends this approach as follows: “The mere identifying of old and often obsolete
meanings of terms, the snatching up of these meanings with the aim of using them in some new way, leads
to nothing if not arbitrariness. What counts, rather, is for us, in reliance of the early meaning of a word and
its changes, to catch sight of the realm pertaining to the matter in question into which the word speaks.
What counts is to ponder that essential realm as the one in which the matter named through the word
moves” (QCT, 159).
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With respect to the first question, I have already suggested that van Huyssteen’s
model of rationality seems to favor Reflexion over Besinnung. Furthermore, he writes:
The cognitive dimension of religion . . .is indeed the dimension of religion most
interesting for and relevant to the sciences. . . . this dimension of religion presents
itself to us forcibly in theological reflection and as such remains the aspect of
religion most relevant for an interdisciplinary conversation with other reasoning
strategies. (Shaping, 181)

As I see it, centering the theological enterprise upon reason-seeking and giving—despite
the inclusion of noncognitive dimensions of rationality—privileges coherence and the
norms of academic discourse. It does so at the expense of marginalizing—and even
covering over—the inexplicable, the contradictory, and the numinal dimensions of
religious experience and belief. Consider the subtitle of The Shaping of Rationality:
namely, Toward Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science. By its subtitle, the book
frames—better, enframes—theology within academic discourse. In such discourse, can
there be noncalculative theological thinking beyond the why? If not, in what other forums
and settings can such thinking be expressed?
As for the second and third questions, I “tipped my hand” in my preceding
discussion of the rose that is both within and beyond the why. I am suggesting that the
incorporation of both senses of reflection is essential for a rethinking of the essence of
theology in general and particularly so in thinking the RST relation. This claim is central
to my entire inquiry and can only be addressed here in a preliminary way. As a
beginning, consider the following as a starting point:
In one of the last paragraphs of his lecture, “Science and Reflection,” Heidegger
writes:
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Even if the sciences, precisely in following their way and using their means, can
never press forward to the essence of science, still every researcher and teacher of
the sciences, every man pursuing a way through a science, can move, as a
thinking being, on various levels of reflection [Besinnung] and can keep reflection
vigilant. (QCT, 181-82)

I hear in these words an invitation for all who employ calculative approaches in
their thinking—and this includes those who center rationality upon reason-seeking and
giving—to complement (or perhaps better, preface) such thinking with reflection as the
“calm, self-possessed surrender to what is worthy of questioning.” With regard to the
rose, Heidegger says that Leibniz’ strict principle of reason “holds in the case of the rose,
but not for the rose; in the case of the rose, insofar as it is the object of our cognition; not
for the rose, insofar as this rose stands alone, simply as a rose” (POR, 38; original italics,
my underlining). Analogously, can we envision theology as, on the one hand,
appropriately employing reason-seeking and giving as it reflects upon religious belief
and experience “objectively”—but also giving itself with equal Gelassenheit to what is
worthy of questioning in religious experience and belief as its simply stands?
Notice also that Heidegger sets aside for a moment the abstract noun of “science”
in favor of speaking to persons who do science: “. . . every researcher and teacher of the
sciences, every man pursuing a way through a science . . . .” These persons, he says, can
move in various levels of thinking. I hear that as his affirmation of the possibility that all
those who employ calculative thinking can embrace noncalculative thinking, and can
move from within the why to outside the why, and back again. I daresay he would
endorse the converse path of noncalculative to calculative back to noncalculative thinking
as well. Indeed, isn’t this the practice of the effective and compassionate physician, who
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moves seamlessly from encountering the patient as person needing care to applying the
skills and techniques of medicine in diagnosis and treatment in an “objectified” manner,
and back again to patient as person?112
Analogously, can we envision persons doing theology and persons doing science
addressing the issue of global climate change and its consequences113—on the one hand,
within the realm of reason-seeking and giving and its causal chains, and on the other
hand, beyond it in the realm of wonder and enchantment of that which is, as it simply
stands? And in so doing, what might the distinctive contribution of theology be, as
contrasted with, say, poetry and art? I shall touch on this possibility in Chapter 4 by
examining Heidegger’s treatment of the relation of art and poetry to technology. This can
expressed as a guiding question: What can theology learn from Heidegger’s explication
of the relation of art and poetry to technology?

3.5

Chapter Summary
What is truth? This chapter examines Heidegger’s deconstruction of this question

as it stands, in light of thinking the question of truth out of thinking the question of
Being. On the face of it, the question, What is truth?, seems to imply that truth is
something “out there,” and that our task is to find it, represent or otherwise conceptualize
it, and justify the results. Instead, recovering the pre-Socratic understanding of truth as
disclosedness, Heidegger declares instead that “Dasein is already both in the truth and in

112. My father, Dr. C. E. Carlson, general practitioner in Minnesota for more than 40 years, was
such a physician.
113. See Section 5.4 below.
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untruth” (BT, 223; also see Section 3.1). In Being and Time, this follows from positing
Dasein as the clearing, or site, that makes it possible for entities to show themselves. In
Basic Questions of Philosophy, the truth/untruth duality is thought out of the
disclosing/self-concealing essence (presencing) of Being itself, untethered from Dasein.
In these two works, Heidegger critiques the customary understanding of truth as
the correctness of assertions—more precisely, the agreement, or correspondence, of an
assertion about something with that thing itself. (Here, “thing” means any entity or being
that is.) Moreover, he traces the trajectory from the pre-Socratic notion of truth as
disclosedness to its transmutation over time to truth as correctness. In so doing,
Heidegger explicates Plato’s “disastrous philosophical definition” of the essence of
something as its whatness. (This illuminates a portion of the trajectory we are following
in this inquiry of comportment to things.)
Contemporary theologian J. Wentzel van Huyssteen works with a functional
definition of truth that subordinates truth to rationality. Based upon his
postfoundationalist model of rationality, theology is characterized in terms of seeking the
best reasons available for one’s beliefs, values, and actions. On his view, this
characterization of theology significantly strengthens the basis for genuine and fruitful
interdisciplinary activity between theology and science. Heidegger’s extensive critique of
Leibniz’ Principle of Reason brings to light that the disclosure of Being happens outside
the orbit of reason-seeking and giving, beyond the reach of the why.
The customary formulation of theology as reflection on religious experience and
belief is illuminated by Heidegger’s distinction between two very different modes of
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reflection: Reflexion and Besinnung. The former is based upon representational,
conceptual thought—calculative thinking, for short; the latter, translated as mindfulness,
is “nothing but an inquiry into the self-disclosure of being” and is “basically determined
and shaped by the truth of being” (Mindfulness, xxiii-xxiv). I contend that, despite van
Huyssteen’s laudable extension of the notion of rationality beyond propositional
language, construing the essence of theology in terms of reason-seeking and giving
appears to confine theology as a reflective activity to Reflexion.
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Chapter 4: Technology and the RST Relation

Weeks before his death on May 26, 1976, Heidegger addressed the issue of the
relationship between modern technology and modern science in the form of a question:
Is modern natural science the foundation of modern technology—as is
supposed—or is it, for its part, already the basic form of technological thinking,
the determining foreconception and incessant incursion of technological
representation into the realized and organized machinations of modern
technology?114
This question arises for Heidegger from the forgottenness of Being in “the age of a world
civilization stamped by technology” (ibid.) In his view, taking up the question of the
essences of modern natural science and modern technology and their interrelation could
become a compelling way to engage the question of Being and thereby “prepare the
possibility of a transformed abode of man in the world” (ibid., 4).
This chapter will examine Heidegger’s analysis of the essences of modern
technology and modern empirical science and their interrelation, together with his
explication of the relationships of art and poetry to technology and to the holy and

114 Martin Heidegger, “Neuzeitliche Naturwissenschaft und Moderne Technik” (“Modern Natural
Science and Technology”),” in Research in Phenomenology 7 (1977): 3, http://0-gateway.proquest.com
.bianca.penlib.du.edu/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:pao-us:&rft_dat=xri:pao:article:h148
-1977-007-00-000001:1.These words are part of Heidegger’s written greetings to those attending the 10 th
annual Heidegger Conference. For more information about this colloquium and subsequent conferences,
see www.heideggercircle.org.
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divine.115 In the first two sections, I shall examine Heidegger’s twin claims that the
common essence of modern technology and modern empirical science is beyond the
control and mastery of humankind—and yet heralds the source for the “saving power” in
the face of the extreme danger posed by this common essence. These claims are
examined in relation to the nature of art and poetry in the first two sections, respectively
(4.1 Art and the Essence of Modern Technology and 4.2 Poetry, Technology, and the
Holy/Divine). The third section (4.3 The Thing, Science, and the Fourfold) explicates
Heidegger’s contrasting analyses of scientific objectification and thingness as thought out
of the fourfold of earth and sky, gods and mortals. In the fourth section (4.4 Modern
Science, Technology, and Thinking), I shall engage the interrelation of the essences of
modern science and modern technology with respect to Heidegger’s explication of
thinking. This will entail examining the profound differences that Heidegger draws
between calculative thinking—which characterizes modern science and technology—and
reflective, meditative thinking. With regard to the RST relation, our primary guiding
question throughout the chapter is: What can theology learn from Heidegger’s treatment
of these themes in its own thinking and speaking of, and with, religion and science?

115. In Section 5.2, I shall highlight key elements of Ian Barbour’s analysis of ethics in relation to
technology.
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4.1

Art and the Essence of Modern Technology
Heidegger’s essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,”116 is taken by some

commentators to be the most important single expression of his thinking regarding the
essence of technology.117 Most of the main themes of this essay are prefigured in the four
lectures that Heidegger initially delivered in December 1949 (and subsequently revised)
under the overall title of “Insight into That Which Is” (“Einblick in das was ist,” hereafter
“Einblick”).118 Heidegger describes the QCT essay as “an expanded version” of the
second Einblick lecture, “Das Gestell,” (QCT, x), which I find somewhat misleading.119
These lectures also develop in detail Heidegger’s notion of the fourfold of earth and sky,
mortals and divinities—a theme absent from the QCT essay but one that I shall take up in
Section 4.3.

116. In Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays (QCT), 3-35 (see
chap. 1, n. 51). The QCT essay (“The Question Concerning Technology”) was first published in 1954 and
subsequently presented as a lecture in 1955 in the series “The Arts in the Technological Age” sponsored by
the Bavarian Academy of Fine Arts (QCT, x).
117. See, for example, Richard Rojcewicz, The Gods and Technology: A Reading of Heidegger
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), and Carl Mitcham, Thinking through Technology:
The Path between Engineering and Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 49-55, 257.
118. The four Einblick lectures are: “Das Ding” (“The Thing”), “Das Gestell” (“The Enframing”),
“Die Gefahr” (“The Danger”), and “Die Kehre” (“The Turning”). These four lectures, as subsequently
revised, are presented together in German in the first half of GA79 and presented together for the first time
in English translation in the first half of Martin Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into
That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking, trans. Andrew J. Mitchell (Bloomington, Indiana
University Press, 2012). Partial information about earlier publications of these lectures in German and in
English translation may be found in QCT, ix-x.
119. On the one hand, “das Gestell” does provide Heidegger’s detailed explication of the essence
of modern technology. On the other hand, several main themes in the QCT essay are not found in “Das
Gestell” but are prefigured in one of the other three Einblick lectures: for example, “causality” in “Das
Ding,” “Hervorbringen” in “Die Gefahr,” and Hölderlin’s couplet in “Die Kehre.” Thus I suggest that the
QCT essay could be described more accurately as a stand-alone, creative re-weaving of key notions and
themes from each of the earlier Einblick lectures, together with some new material that identifies “art” as
possibly confronting the essence of modern technology.
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In the QCT essay, Heidegger thinks the essence of technology out of his critique
of causality. In his view, causality—and technology—are modes of revealing. This is the
basis for his claims that technology is “never a human handiwork,” nor something neutral
or “merely technical,” but rather a force beyond humankind’s ability to control and
master. He distinguishes modern technology from technology as understood by the
ancient Greeks and argues that the essence of the former poses an extreme danger to
humankind. Surprisingly, he also contends that a saving power is heralded by this very
danger. Furthermore, he claims that, while humankind cannot control the essence of
technology, we nonetheless participate in the revealing of this essence and thereby
influence its impact upon our future. Finally, Heidegger defends the possibility that art
may confront the extreme danger posed by the essence of modern technology. The
purpose of this section is to unpack these claims.
Heidegger begins his analysis of the question of the essence of technology by
critiquing the widespread understanding of technology as a means for achieving some
end through human activity. Heidegger does not dismiss this instrumental,
anthropological interpretation of technology out of hand; indeed, in his view, such an
interpretation is correct, as far as it goes. On the one hand, the correct “always fixes upon
something pertinent in whatever is under consideration” (QCT, 6). However, “the merely
correct is not yet the true,” he says, because only the latter can “uncover the thing in
question in its essence” (ibid.).120

120. Once again, Heidegger seeks to probe the essence of something by starting with its customary
meaning. Cf. Section 3.2 above, in which I show that Heidegger approaches the question of truth by
analyzing the widely-held understanding of truth as correspondence of statements with things.
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Heidegger locates the means-ends binary that characterizes the instrumental view
of technology within causality. The traditional philosophical presentation of causality
posits four causes—material, formal, efficient, and final—which together connote the
bringing about of effects, or results. Thought phenomenologically, however, these four
causes are “four ways of being responsible [that] bring something into presence” (9).
“Causality” is therefore a revealing, or unconcealment, expressed in Greek as aletheia.
Heidegger notes that its Latin translate is veritas—“truth” in English—which “we . . .
usually understand as the correctness of an idea” (12). I shall show that Heidegger’s
understanding of technology—in both its modern and ancient forms—depends in a
central way upon his critique of the customary understanding of causality.
To recap: the conventional, instrumental understanding of technology is a way of
revealing or unconcealment, when thought phenomenologically. As for “revealing” itself,
Heidegger posits two primary modes: revealing as a “bringing-forth” (Hervorbringen)
that allows that which is before us to appear without coercion, and revealing as a
“challenging forth” (Herausfordern) that demands or provokes such appearance.121 In his
view, technology may manifest itself in either mode: modern technology as
Herausfordern, and Hervorbringen (poiesis, in Greek) as the mode of the ancient Greek
understanding of technology as techne. Techne encompasses “not only the activities and
skills of the craftsman, but also . . . the arts of the mind and the fine arts” (13). Techne
does not exhaust Hervorbringen as a mode of revealing, however, since the former
requires human activity. Indeed, Heidegger regards physis as “poiēsis (Hervorbringen) in
121. Literally, Her-vor-bringen (hither-forth-bringing) (QCT, 10, n. 9) and Her-aus-fordern
(hither-out-challenging) (QCT, 14, n. 13).
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the highest sense,” since it is “the arising of something out of itself” and needs no human
intermediary (10). (The blooming of a rose, and Nature itself—often, but misleadingly,
according to Heidegger, equated with physis—are manifestations of physis.)
The “challenging forth” mode of revealing (Herausfordern) does not in itself
completely characterize modern technology, however. In order to enfold other aspects of
modern technology within a unifying essence, Heidegger employs a constellation of
verbs and their cognates, based upon the German infinitive, stellen. Stellen has several
meanings, including “to put into place, to order, to arrange, to furnish or supply, and, in a
military context, to challenge or engage.” Heidegger gathers together these various senses
of stellen and its cognates under the rubric of Ge-stell (Enframing) in order to name the
essence of modern technology.122
Expressed compactly, Ge-stell names “that challenging claim which gathers man
thither to order the self-revealing as standing reserve [Bestand]” (19).123 A few pages
later, the essence of modern technology is characterized as “the way in which the real
reveals itself as standing-reserve” (23). All that is stands ready for further employment at
the beck and call of others: “Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be
immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further
ordering” (17). Moreover, Enframing is not a framework or structure but rather, in

122. See Lovitt’s detailed explication of Ge-stell from stellen and its cognates (QCT, 15, n. 14).
123. Other translators prefer to translate Bestand as “supply,” “stock,” or “reserve” (as in “coal
reserves”).
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Lovitt’s translation, “a calling forth, a demanding summons” (19, n. 17).124 Ge-stell is
manifested in the ceaseless activity of producing, assembling, and ordering. In its
essence, modern technology is not a noun but a verb of aggression.125
What is the relationship of humankind to the essence of modern technology?
Clearly, Heidegger does not see humankind as able to control this essence, for this
essence is the revealing of being itself in our time. Is the essence of modern technology
something completely independent of humankind? On the contrary. He asks and
answers: “Does this revealing happen somewhere beyond all human doing? No. But
neither does it happen exclusively in man, or decisively through man” (24). How so?
Humankind participates in this revealing through modern science, the character of which
is epitomized by mathematical physics (21-23).126 Thus, Heidegger rules out human
passivity. We are active participants via modern science in the essence of modern
technology as the revealing of being itself in this era. But the question remains: Is our
124. Andrew Mitchell defends translating Ge-stell as positionality rather than Enframing:
“Heidegger explicitly and painstakingly distinguishes what he means by positionality from any sense of
‘enframing’ as the term has previously been translated. . . .Heidegger marks the difference himself when he
explicitly distinguishes between positionality, das Ge-Stell, and framework, die Gestelle (GA79: 65/61).
The spread of positionality is thus not a framework that surrounds from without, but, in part, a process of
conscription (Gestellung) that adopts and compels whatever it encounters into the order of standing
reserve” (Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, trans. Mitchell, xi).
125. “Ge-stell” did not always have this sinister connotation in Heidegger’s work. In 1936, he
presented three lectures, now available to us as a single essay, “On the Origin of the Work of Art" in Martin
Heidegger, Off the Beaten Track, trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), 1-56. (Hereafter Off the Beaten Track is cited as OBT.) In this essay, Heidegger
employs “Ge-stell” simply as “placement” in order to explicate the notion of figure: “What we here call
‘figure’ is always to be thought out of that particular placing [stellen] and placement [Ge-stell] as which
the work comes to presence when it sets itself up and sets itself forth” (OBT, 38). As Heidegger explains in
the essay’s Appendix, the understanding of Ge-stell as placement is to be taken in the sense of “the
gathering of the bringing forth” (OBT, 54)–i.e., in the spirit of Hervorbringen. He asserts, however, that the
“derivation” of Ge-stell as the essence of modern technology “is the more essential one since it corresponds
to the destiny of being” (ibid.).
126. In Section 2.2 above, I briefly discussed Heidegger’s explication of mathematical physics in
Being and Time.
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participation in the essence of modern technology via modern science our destiny, our
fate?
From the characterization of the essence of modern technology as Ge-stell,
Heidegger moves to establish three primary claims: first, Ge-stell is the supreme danger
facing humankind in this era; second, yet Ge-stell heralds a saving power in the face of
such extreme danger; and third, while humankind cannot control Ge-stell nor the saving
power to which it points, we necessarily participate in its revealing and thereby
participate in shaping our future. I now unpack these claims—and in the process reply—
to those who see Heidegger as a fatalist.
Heidegger draws upon his earlier critique of the customary analysis of causality to
examine the danger posed by Ge-stell. Earlier, he stated that “[t]echnology is a mode of
revealing” (13) and contrasted ancient and modern technology in terms of their modes of
revealing as Hervorbringen and Herausfordern, respectively. Now he characterizes the
mode of revealing of modern technology more specifically: “The essence of [modern]
technology, as a destining of revealing, is the danger” (28, my emphasis). Let us unpack
this claim in three steps to understand the following: “destining of revealing,” the danger
inherent in such destining, and Ge-stell itself as the supreme danger.
First, what does Heidegger mean by destining (Geschick)? Heidegger gives this
name to the “sending-that-gathers [versammelde Schicken] which first starts man upon a
way of revealing” (24).127 The destining-sending link is perhaps clear, but how is
destining also a gathering, a starting, and a revealing? These general characteristics of
127. I shall examine Heidegger’s explication of Geschick in The Principle of Reason in Section
5.4 below.
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destining can be heard in Heidegger’s reformulation of the customary understanding of
causality as a revealing:
The four ways of being responsible bring something into appearance. They let it
come forth into presencing [An-wesen]. They set it free to that place and so start it
on its way, namely, into complete arrival. The principal characteristic of being
responsible is this starting something on its way to arrival. (QCT, 9; my emphasis)

Heidegger reads destining into his earlier reinscribing of the four causes by
pointing out that “[t]o start upon a way” ordinarily means “to send” (24). Thus, destining
(Geschick), he says, is a “sending” (Schicken) that is a “starting.” The gathering aspect of
destining resonates with Heidegger’s rethinking of “efficient cause” in the standard
example of the silver chalice for differentiating among the four causes. Heidegger
contends that the silversmith is not the efficient cause as the maker or producer of the
chalice. Rather, the silversmith “considers carefully and gathers together the three
aforementioned ways of being responsible and indebted” (8, my emphasis). Also, recall
that Heidegger views causality as a unified co-responsibility within bringing-forth, which
“brings hither out of concealment into unconcealment” (11). Thus, causality—and
destining, by association—is embedded within “revealing.”
Second, Heidegger contends that destining of revealing is itself danger as such.
That is, “danger” is not merely one of the qualities or characteristics (among many) of
destining, but is constitutive of the destining of revealing. Furthermore, it is danger as
such for any mode of revealing and for any period: “In whatever way the destining of
revealing may hold sway, the unconcealment in which everything that is shows itself at
any given time harbors the danger that man may quail at the unconcealed and may
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misinterpret it” (26, my emphasis). Thus, Heidegger’s analysis implies that
Hervorbringen—as techne and, more generally, as poiesis—entails danger, as well as
Herausfordern in the guise of Ge-stell. For example, when the unconcealed is everywhere
embedded in a “cause-effect coherence,” theology faces the danger of reducing the
mystery of God to the “causality of making” (ibid.). Similarly, when nature presents itself
as a matrix of calculable matter and forces, “correct” results may obtain, he says, but “the
true will withdraw” (ibid.).
Thus, Heidegger’s critique of the customary understanding of causality paves the
way for introducing the notion of “destining” and his claim of the danger inherent in the
destining of revealing in all of its various modes, including—but not limited to—the
essence of modern technology. Indeed, the central importance of destining in Heidegger’s
thought extends well beyond his analysis of technology in its ancient and modern forms:
“It is out of this destining that the essence of all history (Geschichte) is determined”
(ibid., my emphasis).
Third, in Heidegger’s view, the destining of revealing in our time as Ge-stell is
the supreme danger in two senses. In the first instance, humankind itself is in danger of
becoming mere standing-reserve (as discussed earlier). The very essence of what it means
to be human is at stake. This danger is masked, Heidegger points out, by the delusion that
the equipment, systems, and processes of modern technology can provide a path toward
mastery of the earth. In the second, and more important, instance, Ge-stell not only
conceals, but threatens to banish, all other modes of revealing. “When Enframing holds
sway, regulating and securing of the standing reserve marks all revealing” (27). In sum,
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the extreme danger posed by Ge-stell is its totalizing character as a mode of revealing and
its threat to the essential nature of mankind:
The threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal
machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affects man
in his essence. The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it
could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to
experience the call of a more primal truth. Thus, where Enframing reigns, there is
danger in the highest sense. (QCT, 28)

Is Heidegger, then, a fatalist in the face of the essence of modern technology as
Enframing? As a mode of revealing, Heidegger understands Enframing as a sending-thatgathers, a sending forth that starts humankind on a way, or path, of revealing. Is Ge-stell,
then, as such a sending/starting, also a fatalistic, doom-laden determining? Some have
thought so.128 In what follows, I shall argue otherwise by a close reading of Heidegger’s
engagement with Hölderlin’s lines,
But where danger is, grows
The saving power also.
(QCT, 28)
Heidegger hears in these words of Hölderlin that “. . . the coming to presence of
technology harbors in itself what we least suspect, the possible arising of the saving

128. See, for example, Andrew Feenberg’s threefold critique of Heidegger’s analysis of the
essence of technology as ahistoricism, substantivism (equivalently, “fatalism”), and “one-dimensionalism”
in Andrew Feenberg, Questioning Technology (New York: Routledge, 1999) and Heidegger and Marcuse:
The Catastrophe and Redemption of History (New York: Routledge, 2003). His critique is challenged by
Iain Thomson in Iain Thomson, Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
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power” (32).129 His defense of Hölderlin’s claim hinges upon examining the nature of
“essence” itself.
Heidegger begins by acknowledging that, up to this point in the lecture, he has
used the term essence in its customary sense as the whatness of something. But limiting
the meaning of essence to whatness with respect to modern technology runs the risk of
mistakenly regarding Enframing as a genus within which Hervorbringnen and
Herausfordern are regarded as two “species” of revealing. Enframing would then
mistakenly be regarded as a means of classifying equipment, processes, and people.
Interpreting essence merely as whatness entails imputing to the merely technological the
essence of modern technology itself. From such a mistaken perspective, “the steam
turbine, the radio transmitter, and the cyclotron . . . [and] the man at the switchboard and
the engineer in the drafting room” (29) exemplify the challenging forth of all that is in
terms of standing-reserve. Instead of such demonizing, Heidegger asserts that such
equipment, processes, and people are within Enframing but are not themselves
instantiations of the essence of modern technology.
Probing more deeply into the nature of essence itself, Heidegger turns from its
customary understanding as a noun (Wesen) to its original form as a verb (wesen). In
verbal form, wesen, like währen, means “to last or endure” (30)—but not in a permanent
sense, as Plato and Aristotle thought. With this deeper understanding of essence at hand,
Heidegger re-engages Hölderlin’s couplet to probe for the saving power associated with
the extreme danger of Enframing. As an essence (better yet, as an “essencing” [31]),
129. Here, Heidegger understands “to save” to mean “to fetch something home into its essence, in
order to bring the essence for the first time into its appearing” (QCT, 28).
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Enframing is an enduring. Heidegger now hears in währen (to endure) the associated
words, wahren (to watch over, to keep safe, to preserve) and gewähren (to warrant, to
vouchsafe, to grant) (31, n. 24).
From these resonances, Heidegger explores whether, in some sense, Enframing
itself might be a granting—despite its fundamental characterization as a challenging
forth. He asks: What actually, and perhaps alone, endures? His twofold answer: “Only
what is granted endures. That which endures primally out of the earliest beginning is
what grants” (31). In a restricted sense, then, the enduring-granting relation is reciprocal.
Heidegger subsequently removes the restriction and expands the scope of this claim:
Every destining of revealing comes to pass from out of a granting and [comes to
pass] as such a granting. . . .The granting that sends in one way or another into
revealing is as such the saving power. (QCT, 32; my emphasis and insertion)

Here, Heidegger is saying that, without exception, every destining of revealing
comes to pass as a granting, and therefore is as such the saving power—despite the
danger inherent in destining itself. That is, every destining of revealing—Enframing
included (28)—not only harbors the saving power but, in a sense, is thereby itself the
saving power.
These remarkable claims illuminate a deep ambiguity within the essence of
modern technology. On the one hand, Ge-stell blocks revealing in the sense of
Hervorbringen, and its totalizing character threatens to conceal revealing itself. On the
other hand, Ge-stell “first starts man upon a way of revealing” (24). Indeed, Heidegger
says that “[t]he challenging revealing has its origin as a destining in bringing-forth
[Hervorbringen]” (29-30). But destining is not consigning to a predetermined outcome.
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As a destining of revealing, Ge-stell does entail the possibility of revealing as an
“outcome,” so to speak. However, revealing itself cannot be domesticated. “Revealing is
that destining which, ever suddenly and inexplicably to all thinking, apportions itself into
the revealing that brings forth and that also challenges, and which allots itself to man”
(29).
Given this deep ambiguity within the essence of modern technology,130 Heidegger
points to the essential role of humankind:
On the one hand, Enframing challenges forth into the frenziedness of ordering
that blocks every view into the coming-to-pass of revealing and so radically
endangers the relation to the essence of truth. On the other hand, Enframing
comes to pass for its part in the granting that lets man endure—as yet
unexperienced, but perhaps more experienced in the future—that he may be the
one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the coming to presence of
truth. Thus does the arising of the saving power appear. (QCT, 33)
But how are we to act upon this appeal for safekeeping? Heidegger’s response:
Everything, then, depends upon this: that we ponder this arising [of the saving
power] and that, recollecting, we watch over it. How can this happen? Above all
through our catching sight of what comes to presence in technology, instead of
merely staring at the technological. (QCT, 32)

In sum, Heidegger has argued for the possibility—and the urgency—of human
responsiveness in fostering the saving power paradoxically heralded by the extreme
danger of the essence of modern technology. On his view, however, “essential reflection”
upon technology is insufficient; “decisive confrontation” is needed as well (35).
Heidegger looks to art—as expressed in “all the fine arts, in poetry, and in everything

130. I shall discuss Ian Barbour’s characterization of technology as the “ambiguous exercise of
power” in Section 5.2 below.
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poetical”—for the possibility of such a confrontation. “On the one hand,” he says, such
art is “akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from
it” (ibid.). Yet such a possibility can only be realized if “reflection on art . . . does not
shut its eyes to the constellation of truth after which we are questioning” (ibid.).131 In the
next section, I shall examine Heidegger’s engagement of art, as poetry, with technology.

4.2

Poetry, Technology, and the Holy/Divine
Several years before composing the QCT essay, Heidegger engaged the question

of the essence of technology through the lens of poetry rather than art in general.
Heidegger’s essay, “Why Poets?,”132 is based upon a lecture that he delivered in 1946 to
commemorate the 20th anniversary of the death of the German poet, Rainer Maria Rilke.
In both essays, Heidegger engages the question of the essence of technology in relation to
Hölderlin’s couplet,
But where the danger lies, there also grows
that which saves.133
Unlike the appeal to art in the QCT lecture as a means for fostering the presencing of the
saving power, Heidegger lifts up poetry in “Why Poets?” as a pathway to the holy and
divine in relation to the saving power. As he does in the QCT lecture, Heidegger in this
essay regards poetry and art as closely related, if not synonymous. `

131. Heidegger explicates the relation of art and truth in a much earlier essay, “The Origin of the
Work of Art,” in OBT, 1-56.
132. Martin Heidegger, “Why Poets?,” in OBT, 200-241.
133. Note the slight differences between Young and Haynes’ translation here (OBT, 222) and
Lovitt’s translation (QCT, 28), which is included in Section 4.1 above

136

In this essay, Heidegger takes a free relation to Rilke’s poetry in the service of
Heidegger’s own compelling project, the question of Being—here thought in relation to
the question concerning technology. Heidegger does so by thinking with, as well as
against, Rilke, through a close engagement with several of Rilke’s poems. For Heidegger,
the guiding question in “Why Poets?”—in addition to the title itself—is his adaptation of
a poetic line by Hölderlin: Is Rainer Maria Rilke a poet in a desolate time? (202, 204).
Our guiding questions are rather different: What can we learn from this essay concerning
the essence of technology as the danger and the possibility of nurturing the saving power
therein? More broadly, how might the interplay between poetry and technology in this
essay illuminate possibilities for genuine, meaningful interaction among religion,
technology, and theology?
In “Why Poets?,” Heidegger thinks the danger of the essence of technology as the
danger in terms of the absoluteness of the will to will, rather than from the interpretation
of causality presented in the QCT essay. Nonetheless, many statements in “Why Poets?”
that name this danger clearly anticipate those found in the later essay. For example:
What has long threatened man with death, indeed with the death of his essence, is
the absoluteness of his sheer willing in the sense of his deliberate self-assertion in
everything. . . . What threatens man in his essence is the opinion that
technological production would bring the world into order, when it is exactly this
ordering that flattens out each ordo, that is, each rank, into the uniformity of
production and so destroys in advance the realm that is the perennial source from
which rank and appreciation originate out of being. (OBT, 221)
Heidegger quotes from several of Rilke’s poems in this essay, but he devotes by
far most of his attention to the following untitled “poem” (published posthumously), in
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order to engage Hölderlin’s couplet directly and thereby offer his own reflection on the
vital role of poetry in relation to technology.
As nature gives the creatures over
to the risk of dull desire and shelters
none in particular, in soil or bough,
so we too are not more dear to the utmost depth
of our being; it risks us. Only that we,
still more than plant or animal,
go with the risk, will it, sometimes even risk more (and not from
self-interest), than life itself does, by a breath
risk more . . . This fashions us, outside of all defense,
a safebeing, there where the gravity
of the pure forces takes effect; what saves us at last
is our defenselessness and that seeing it threaten
we turned it into the open
in order, somewhere, in the widest compass,
where law touches us, to say yes to it.
(OBT, 206-7; original italics, my underlining)
In the remainder of this section, I want to focus upon three things: Heidegger’s
reading of Rilke’s employment of “risk” in relation to the essence of technology as the
danger; Heidegger’s reading of lines 12-16 (underlined above) in relation to Hölderlin’s
claim regarding the “saving power”; and Heidegger’s characterization of poetry itself as a
path to the holy and divine.
In lines 1-5, Rilke tells us that Nature gives all living beings, including human
beings, over to risk and shelters “none in particular.” Heidegger says more: “The being of
beings [i.e., Nature itself, in Rilke’s terminology] is the risk” (209; my italics). Heidegger
understands the “giving over to risk” as a “double movement” of a casting off by
being/risk and a casting into being/risk. Such danger-laden riskiness characterizes the
138

very existence of all creatures, he says: “Beings are so long as they remain what is
continually being risked” (ibid.; my emphasis).
What is cast off by the being of beings (as the risk) is cast into the being of beings
(as the risk); so, despite the riskiness involved all round, beings are evidently “retained,”
in some sense. Heidegger puts it thus: “Although the unsheltered are risked, they are
nevertheless not abandoned” (210). Heidegger illustrates this claim by means of a scale
balance used to weigh items in the marketplace and by a reflection upon the notion of
“gravity,” which is contained in line 10. Based upon the etymological similarities among
the words in German for “to risk” (wagen), “balance” (Wage), “to weigh” (wiegen), and
other cognates Heidegger contends that, although the object on the balance is in “danger”
(in the sense of the uncertain outcome of the weighing), the object is nevertheless
sustained by the balance itself. “Thereby what is risked [by being placed on the balance]
is indeed unsheltered, but since it lies on the balance, it is retained by the balance” (ibid.).
He subsequently engages Rilke’s poem, “Gravity,” to characterize gravity as “the
center of beings in their entirety” (211). Gravity engages that which is cast off or let loose
by the risk by means of a tugging, a “pull or traction (Zug), toward the center” (ibid.).
Figuratively speaking, the “centrifugal force” acting on what is cast off is counterbalanced by the “centripetal force” that attracts it to the center. Consequently, Heidegger
establishes several equivalent expressions: “The gravity of the pure forces, the unheard
center, the pure Bezug (attraction), the whole Bezug, full Nature, life, the risk are all the
same,” and what they all name is “beings as such in their entirety” (212). By Heidegger’s
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lights, risk entails the retaining, and sustaining, by the being of beings (as risk itself) of
that which is risked.
In Heidegger’s reading of Rilke, the two differ diametrically in their view of “the
open.” As Heidegger sees it, Rilke characterizes the open in terms of the absence of
barriers (ibid.), whereas Heidegger thinks of “openness in the sense of the unhiddenness
of beings, an unhiddenness that lets beings as such come to presence” (213).
Furthermore, on Heidegger’s view, Rilke’s characterization of the open in terms of the
absence of all barriers implies that humankind is excluded from the open, as “encounter”
is inevitable with the presence of humankind but impossible without the arising of
barriers. Thus, plants and animals are in the world, but humankind is before the world—
and hence not in the world. But for Heidegger, humankind (as Dasein) is definitely in the
world—indeed, as being-in-the world. For Heidegger, this exclusion of humankind from
the open is another indication of Rilke’s metaphysical thinking (214).
From this explication of “the open,” Heidegger re-examines the relationship
between humankind and risk as expressed by Rilke in lines 5-10. These lines tell us that
we, unlike animal and plants, “go with this risk, will it, sometimes risk even more . . .
than life itself does”—and do “by a breath.” Heidegger ties his exegesis of these lines
primarily to his articulation of the essence of technology.134 For Heidegger, to go with the
risk does not imply going along with the risk, in the sense of doing so out of free choice.
Rather, it means that the risk “for man . . . is specifically represented . . . as something set
before him” (215). Yet humankind is not passive in this process. As that risk,
134. In this essay, Heidegger does not name the essence of modern technology as Ge-stell.
However, he does refer to its cognate, das Gestellte, as “that which is set up” (OBT, 215).
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Nature is brought before man by human re-presentation [Vor-stellen]. Man sets
upon the world as the entirety of objectiveness before himself and himself before
the world. Man delivers [stellt zu] the world unto himself and produces [stellt her]
Nature for himself. (OBT, 215; bracketed material in original)
We can hear in these words Heidegger’s earlier critique of science as the epitome
of representational, objectifying thinking. Rilke tells us that humankind wills this risk
(aka Nature).135 Heidegger tells us that this will “is the self-assertion whose intention has
already posited the world as the entirety of objects that can be produced” (216).
Humankind is in a closed loop: to “know” nature, humankind objectifies it and “represents” it to itself as nature.
Yet, Rilke tells us, we “sometimes risk even more . . . than life itself does.” Who
are these people that risk in such a way? Rilke offers no specific response, nor does
Heidegger . . . yet. Nonetheless, Heidegger asserts that something can be said about the
character of these persons. If the essence of the being of beings is the will (thinking with
Rilke), they must be persons who will even more, but in a different sense. They “. . . stay
more in keeping with will as the being of beings. They accord rather with being that
shows itself as will” (223).
Next, Heidegger turns to Rilke’s remarkable claims that, first, this “risking more”
“fashions outside of all defense, a safebeing”; and second, that “what saves us at last is
our defenselessness . . .” (lines 12-13). Here, Rilke invites us to consider how safebeing
can be realized, outside of all defense. But how is it that we are defenseless, and in what
sense does defenselessness “save” us? For Heidegger, we are blind—and therefore
135. Heidegger contends that Rilke’s representation of Nature as risk binds him to thinking Nature
“metaphysically in terms of the essence of the will” (OBT, 209).
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defenseless—before the threat to our essence as human beings from the essence of
technology, in that we mistakenly regard technology as something neutral, something
merely cultural, and something within humanity’s power to control and master. Our blind
defenselessness, he says, is centered in the growing hegemony of technological thinking:
“So long as man is set fast in deliberate self-assertion and establishes himself by the
absolute objectification in departure against the open, he himself promotes his own
defenselessness” (223).
In what way, and in what sense, then, does our defenselessness before the essence
of technology save us? For Rilke, “. . . seeing it [defenselessness] threaten we turned it
into the open in order, somewhere, . . . , to say yes to it” (lines 13-16). Heidegger
expresses this turning into the open as a reversal: “. . . defenselessness in reverse is that
which saves us” (224). The reversal spoken of here is the step of turning around from our
customary human tendency to flee danger in whatever form in order to seek security by
looking for and constructing a defense. In this sense, Heidegger says, defenselessness—
as occasioned by the essence of modern technology (Ge-stell)—“sends us a safebeing”
(225).136 I suggest that these claims are consonant with Heidegger’s later claim in the
QCT essay that Ge-stell not only harbors the “saving power” but, in a sense, is the saving
power.137

136. Heidegger articulated this claim earlier in his explication of risk in relation to the scale
balance: “Only so long as what is risked rests safely in the risk, can it follow the risk, follow it, that is, into
the unshelteredness of what is risked. What is risked is unsheltered; but not only does this not exclude a
safebeing in its ground, it necessarily implies it.” (OBT, 210; my emphasis)
137. Cf. “It is precisely in Enframing, . . . in this extreme danger that the innermost indestructible
belongingness of man within granting may come to light, , , ,” (QCT, 32).
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But who are those people who can point the way to such a reversal—to the
seemingly impossible possibility of saying “yes” to our defenselessness in the face of the
essence of technology as the absolute will to will?
Heidegger begins this essay by describing the “desolate time” to which
humankind—and poetry itself—are called to respond. He characterizes the current age as
“the world’s night,” and “determined by God’s keeping himself afar, by ‘God’s default’”
(200).138 There is a loss of enchantment, of wonder, in our time. “Not only have the gods
and God fled, but the radiance of divinity is extinguished in world-history” (ibid.). By
“desolation,” Heidegger means that “the essential realm in which pain and death and love
belong together is withdrawn” (205). Heidegger understands this desolation, this default
of God, as a total loss of ground, an abyss. He describes the fundamental human
imperative in our time in terms of responding to this condition:
Assuming that a turning point in any way still awaits this desolate time, it can
only come one day if the world turns radically around, which now plainly means
if it turns away from the abyss. In the age of the world’s night, the abyss of the
world must be experienced and must be endured. However, for this it is necessary
that there are those who reach into the abyss. (OBT, 200-201)
“Why Poets?” poses two fundamental questions: First, are poets in general—and
specifically, Rilke himself—capable of “reaching into the abyss”? Second, are poets
especially, or even uniquely, qualified to reach into the abyss of the world’s dark night?
(Why poets and not, for example, scientists or theologians?) Heidegger provides an
important marker: “To be a poet in a desolate time means: singing, to attend to the track
138. On Heidegger’s view, this default of God does not affect the possibility of authentic Christian
faith and life. “However, the default of God . . . does not contradict the fact that a Christian relationship to
God continues among individuals and in the churches, and it certainly does not disparage this relationship
to God” (OBT, 200; my emphasis).
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of the fugitive gods. This is why the poet, at the time of the world’s night, utters the
sacred” (202). Heidegger returns to his understanding of poetry as “song” in the last few
pages of the essay by way of reflecting upon the “breath” that enables those who risk to
“even risk more” (lines 7-9).
In these lines, Rilke tells us that those who risk more than life do so by a breath.
Customarily, we would read this as risking such by only a little bit more, e.g., “by a hair”
more. Rather, Heidegger invites us to link “breath” directly with “language.” He writes:
The breath by which those who risk more risk more does not only or primarily
mean the hardly noticeable (because fleeting) measure of a difference; rather, it
signifies directly the word and the essence of language. The ones who by a breath
risk more risk it with language. (OBT, 238)

The riskiness of reversing defenselessness by turning into the open can only take place, if
at all, within the realm of language.
But not just any sort of talk or speech will do. To be language for a desolate time,
it must be language uttered without self-interest (line 7), without objectification, without
seeking to produce anything. It must be language that faces the world’s dark night
unflinchingly, language which nevertheless moves us from ever-present unwholeness
toward wholeness. Such language is song, he says, because it says more.139 Who utters
such language? Heidegger writes: “The ones who risk more are the poets, but poets
whose song turns our defenselessness into the open” (239). Such poetry can be a pathway
to the divine and holy:

139. Heidegger notes that Rilke writes in his “Sonnets to Orpheus,” “Song is existence” (OBT,
237). Heidegger cites this same three-word claim by Rilke in the closing section of his “letter” to the
participants of the Second Consultation on Hermeneutics at Drew University in April 1964. (See
Pathmarks, 62, and Section 2.4 above.)
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Only in the widest compass of the whole [line 15], is the holy able to appear.
Because they experience unwholeness as such, poets of the kind who risk more
are underway on the track of the holy. Their song sanctifies over the land. Their
song celebrates the unbrokenness of the globe of being. The unwhole, as the
unwhole, traces for us what is whole. What is whole beckons and calls us to the
holy. The holy binds the divine. The divine brings God closer. (OBT, 240)
I close this section by suggesting that Heidegger’s explication of Rilke’s poetry—
and poetry in general—illuminates common ground for poets and theologians.
First, Heidegger explicates “safebeing” in part by reflecting upon “security” as
“without care” (sine cura)—that is, without resorting to “deliberate self-assertion”
through technological thinking, production, and utilization (223). He and Rilke both think
against the customary meaning of “security” as that (unattainable) state in which the risks
of disease, death, and other misfortunes are successfully held at bay. Surely this resonates
with the generally widespread impulse in religion to challenge egoic-centeredness (as
well as, for example, tribal- and nationalistic-centeredness). Can theologians join poets in
inviting reflection upon what truly constitutes “security,” and what “turning into the
open” where it lies (if it is not in a crucial sense identical to such “turning”), might look
like?
Second, Heidegger insists that poets illuminate the wholeness (i.e., “the
unbrokenness of the globe of being”) within the unwholeness that co-constitutes
existence itself. Otherwise said, poets see the enchantment of the earth as it is now, in the
midst of its unwholeness. Heidegger expresses this stance in the midst of desolation in
terms of song—song as existence. I hear in “song” the human—and theological—notion
of hope. Heidegger declares: “This era is neither decay nor decline. As destiny it lies in
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being and lays claim to man” (240). Can theologians join poets in giving expression to
the wholeness within unwholeness in ways that can be heard today?140

4.3

The Thing, Science, and the Fourfold
In this section I shall engage Heidegger’s thinking of “the thing” in relation to

science and to the holy/divine as expressed by the fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and
divinities. To do so, I draw primarily upon the first of his four Einblick lectures, “The
Thing” (“Das Ding”).141 This section is an attempt to think the RST relation in terms of
science and the holy/divine, “mediated,” in a sense, by their mutual connectivity with
what Heidegger calls thingness (das Dinghafte)--that is, that which makes something a
thing rather than an object.
“The Thing” is curious in a number of aspects. This work contains no overt
mention of “technology”—much less any discussion of its essence and the danger and
saving power to be found therein. Nor does this initial lecture explicate the primal notion
of “revealing”—much less Heidegger’s basic distinction between the revealing modes of
“bringing-forth” (Hervorbringen) and “challenging-forth” (Herausfordern), as in the QCT
essay.142 That is to say, Heidegger does not lay out a thesis or provide a plan of analysis
in this first lecture. Instead, the notions of nearness and distance, causality and thing,

140. See, for example, John Chryssavgis, Beyond the Shattered Image (Minneapolis: Light & Life
Publishing, 1999), and contrast the immediacy of enchantment that he expresses with Thomas Berry, The
Great Work: Our Way into the Future (New York: Bell Tower, 1999), in which re-enchantment of the earth
is projected into the future.
141. Martin Heidegger, “The Thing,” in PLT, 161-84.
142. “Herausfordern” is first introduced in “Das Gestell” and then contrasted with
“Hervorbringen” in “Die Gefahr.”
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world and worlding, and the fourfold and thinking evidently provide the appropriate
context, in Heidegger’s view, for engaging the question of technology fruitfully.
Heidegger provided a brief introduction (Hinweise) for the original Einblick
lecture series in which he reflects upon the notion of nearness in relation to distance.143
Heidegger gives no definition for “nearness” in these opening paragraphs, but asserts that
it has nothing to do with “distance” in the sense of quantification: “Short distance is not
in itself nearness. Nor is great distance remoteness” (PLT, 163). In order to reach this
elusive nearness, in the essay on “the thing” Heidegger interrogates the notion of jug as
something “near to us” and asks, “What makes the jug a thing?”
Once again, Heidegger approaches the central theme before him by rethinking the
customary explication of causality. As I discussed in Section 4.1 above, his critique of
causality in the QCT essay led to a thinking of causality as a unified “co-responsibility”
of bringing forth (QCT, 9-11). In “The Thing,” however, his analysis of causality—and
of thingliness itself—hinges upon the crucial distinction between thing and object. Here,
Heidegger characterizes “object” in the sense of Gegenstand: i.e., that which lies before
us, opposite us, or stands over against us.
He engages the question, What makes the jug a thing?, by critiquing the
application to this question of the customary framework of the four senses of causality:

143. The Hinweise (GA79, 3-4) consists of seven paragraphs that precede the four Einblick
lectures; “Das Ding” is found in pp. 5-23. However, in Hofstadter’s translation of the stand-alone,
expanded 1950 version of “Das Ding” (GA7, 167-87), these paragraphs (now eight in number) have been
incorporated into “The Thing” (PLT, 163-64). Heidegger subsequently engages “nearness” in each of the
individual Einblick lectures, as well as in the QCT essay itself.
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i.e., material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, final cause.144 In Heidegger’s view,
each of the four senses of causality, when understood conventionally, fails to illuminate
the thingliness of the jug.
Heidegger begins his analysis by positing a working characterization of the jug as
a “vessel . . . that holds something else within it” (PLT, 164). Then he applies the four
senses of causality to the example of the jug, using conventional language such as the
following: “The jug’s holding is done by its base and sides” (ibid.) (formal cause); “The
jug consists of that earth . . .” (165) (material cause); “Self-support is what the making
aims at” (ibid.) (final cause); and “its being made by the potter . . .” (166) (efficient
cause). He does not say that such statements are incorrect, but rather that they obscure the
nature, or essence, of the jug as a jug. The statements pointing to formal and material
causes of the jug miss the mark because Heidegger argues that it is the void that holds
(167). The statements indicating final and efficient causes are misleading, he says,
because they are based upon the implicit assumption that the jug as something made
constitutes its essence: “The jug is not a vessel because it was made; rather, the jug had to
be made because it is this holding vessel” (166).145 He concludes that the traditional
understanding of causality cannot “reach” the nature, or essence, of the thing as thing.
Scientific attempts completely miss the thingly character of the jug, according to
Heidegger. Scientifically speaking, the jug is filled with air; filling the jug with wine

144. However, these different senses of causality are never explicitly named as such in “The
Thing.”
145. Heidegger has critiqued the notion that the “madeness” of something constitutes its essence
in a number of earlier works. See, for example, his critique of the dominant interpretation of the “thingness
of the thing” in terms of Aristotle’s matter-form binary in “The Origin of the Work of Art” (OBT, 8-12).
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simply displaces the air by a liquid. To a scientist, talk of the jug’s “void” is merely
“semipoetic,” Heidegger says (167). He does not deny the correctness of these scientific
statements, and he acknowledges that, by such statements, “science represents something
real . . .” (168). Heidegger’s objection, however, is this: “Science always encounters only
what its kind of representation has admitted beforehand as an object possible for science”
(ibid.). In so doing, he says, scientific knowledge “annihilates” things as things in the
following sense: “ . . . not only are things no longer admitted as things, but they have
never yet at all been able to appear to thinking as things” (ibid.; my emphasis).146 In the
language of “nearness,” viewing the jug though the lens of science prevents it from
coming near to us. The reality of the jug remains distant, opaque.
Yet, for Heidegger, the difference between thing and object apparently is not an
absolute difference, nor is representation a determining criterion for distinguishing
between them. It is possible, he says, for a thing to become an object without losing its
thingliness “if we place it before us, whether in immediate perception or by bringing it to
mind in a recollective re-presentation” (165). As he says shortly thereafter, “The jug
remains a vessel [i.e., a thing] whether we represent it in our minds or not” (ibid.).
Nonetheless, we cannot derive the thingness of the jug from its independent standing
forth nor from such representation or objectification.
To sum up, the thingliness of the jug is not necessarily lost when it appears to us
as object in its independence as standing-forth in immediate perception or represented
146. Heidegger locates the origin of this annihilating characteristic of science in Plato’s
conception of the “presence of what is present in terms of the outward appearance” (PLT, 166). Cf., for
example, Heidegger’s critique of Plato’s fateful conceptualization of the essence of that which is in terms
of its “whatness,” taken to be its look, or aspect, that is, its idea or eidos (BQP, 56); also discussed above in
Section 3.2).
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recollectively in our minds. Rather, the thingliness of the jug disappears when science
enframes the standing forth of the jug in a manner predetermined by its conceptual
assumptions. It is not our encounter per se with the thing as object that annihilates the
thing, but rather the objectification of the thing as mere object, via the prevailing
paradigm of the specific science employed at the moment.
Speaking affirmatively, Heidegger declares: “The jug’s thingness resides in its
being qua vessel” (167). Heidegger proceeds to articulate a “fourfold” understanding of
the jug in a manner very different from the customary “fourfold” senses of causality. As a
vessel, the void of the jug takes in what is poured in and retains it, thence to give it as a
gift in the outpouring. “The jug’s jug-character consists in the poured gift of the pouring
out” (170). As water or wine, the gift in the outpouring may slake thirst or be part of an
act of consecration. In the outpoured water or wine for mortals, whether from rock-spring
or sun-drenched vineyard, “sky and earth dwell” (ibid.). If outpoured for consecration,
the water or wine “is the libation for the immortal gods” (ibid.). Thus, the fourfold of
earth and sky, mortals and divinities—each in its own way, yet enfolded together—
dwells in the “gift of the outpouring” (171). The jug, as thing rather than scientifically
grasped object, brings together the four elements of the fourfold in nearness to one
another.
Moreover, the jug gathers the fourfold together in a way that stays [weilt] the
fourfold—not as a mere persistence but a staying that “brings the four into the light of
their mutual belonging” (ibid.). This light of mutual belonging is a mirroring that “sets
each of the four free into its own, but it binds these free ones into the simplicity of their

150

essential being toward one another” (177). This “binding” in freedom is in the sense of
mutual betrothing, entrusting (171). This is how things bring the elements of the fourfold
together in nearness.147 Heidegger calls this mirror-play “the world,” which presences as
“worlding”—a primal term for Heidegger, unexplainable by other notions: “As soon a
human cognition here calls for an explanation [of the world’s worlding], it fails to
transcend the world’s nature, and falls short of it” (177).
In what way and when do things as things come about? And what is the humanthing connection? By Heidegger’s lights, just as human beings cannot command the
saving power within the essence of modern technology to appear, neither can they make
things appear. Yet just as vigilance is required by mortals for the saving power to appear
in the face of the extreme danger of Ge-stell, vigilance is required for things to appear
(179). Such vigilance requires “stepping back” from representational, explanatory
thinking to “a thinking that responds and recalls” (ibid.). Such vigilance is all of a piece
with dwelling in the world as world (180)—a theme I shall engage in Section 5.1 below.
On Heidegger’s view, do holy and divine allude merely—or even primarily—to
anti-Christian, even pagan, manifestations of the religious impulse? Some have thought
so.148 Less than two weeks following his delivery of an expanded version of “The Thing”
on June 6, 1950, Heidegger wrote a letter to a young student—presumably someone who
attended his lecture. (The letter is appended to the lecture as an “Epilogue.”) Heidegger
formulates the student’s inquiry as follows: “[W]hence does thinking about Being receive
147. For another example, see Heidegger’s analysis of George Trakl’s poem, “A Winter Evening,”
in Martin Heidegger, “Language,” in PLT, 192-208.
148. See, for example, Hans Jonas, “Heidegger and Theology,” in Drew University, Consultation
on Hermeneutics, 2nd (see chap. 2, n. 87).
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(to speak concisely) its directive?” (181). Heidegger’s reply illuminates connections
among thinking, responding, and erring, as well as the scope of the “divine” in his
thinking. In view of this second theme in his letter, recall that Heidegger begins “Why
Poets?” with references to the “default of God” and the flight of God and the gods (OBT,
200; cited above in Section 4.2). Heidegger indicates in this letter that, for him, the
“divine” extends beyond Athens to Jerusalem. Resonances may also be heard with the
classical Christian doctrine of Deus absconditus, in which absence does not imply
abandonment.
The default of God and the divinities is absence. But absence is not nothing;
rather, it is precisely the presence, which must first be fully appropriated, of the
hidden fullness and wealth of what has been and what, thus gathered, is
presencing of the divine in the world of the Greeks, in prophetic Judaism, in the
preaching of Jesus. (PLT, 182)

In closing this section, I want to raise a few questions for further thought
prompted by “The Thing” that bear on thinking the RST relation. First, in some
significant sense, can religion, science, and theology be said to be near each other—
despite their obvious differences? (I shall engage this question in Section 5.1 below and
in the Epilogue.)
Second, is the “border” between object and thing open, closed, or
“semipermeable,” figuratively speaking? On the one hand,
An independent, self-supporting thing [such as a jug] may become an object if we
place it before us, whether in immediate perception or by bringing it to mind in a
recollective representation. . . . [Nevertheless] the jug remains a vessel whether
we represent it in our minds or not. (PLT, 164-65)
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On the other hand, however, Heidegger writes: “A mere shift of attitude is powerless to
bring about the advent of the thing as thing, just as nothing that stands today as an object
in the distanceless can ever be switched over into a thing” (PLT, 179).
And third, in “Why Poets?,” Heidegger includes and reflects upon a letter of
Rilke’s in which Rilke laments the loss of the “thingness” of things. He contrasts the
“empty indifferent things, sham things” coming from America, produced by modern
technology, with the things of his grandparents (house, spring, clothes)—each “a vessel
in which they found the human, and preserved and added the human to it” (OBT, 218).
Does the practice of religious rites, and the use of things therein, nurture the “thingness of
things” whose loss Rilke laments? More generally, in hierophany, in which “profane”
objects (Gegenstände) become signifiers of the “sacred,” do objects become things?

4.4

Modern Science, Technology, and Thinking
Let us return to Heidegger’s recurring question weeks before his death regarding

the science-technology relation, quoted in full in the first paragraph of this chapter: “Is
modern natural science the foundation of modern technology . . . or is it . . . already the
basic form of technological thinking . . . ?” On the face of it, Heidegger’s view seems
clear enough in the QCT essay: “Because the essence of modern technology lies in
Enframing, modern technology must employ exact physical science. Through its so
doing, the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science”
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(QCT, 23). A tilt toward the primacy of technology over the sciences also seems apparent
in the following lines by Heidegger from What Is Called Thinking?149 a few years earlier:
However, their essence [i.e., the essence of the sciences] is frankly of a different
sort from what our universities today still fondly imagine it to be. In any case, we
still seem afraid of facing the exciting fact that today’s sciences belong in the
realm of the essence of modern technology, and nowhere else. . . . A fog still
surrounds the essence of modern science . . . It arises from the region of what is
most thought-provoking—that we are still not thinking; . . . . (WCT, 14)
On Heidegger’s view, then, engaging the question of the essence of thinking may
disclose the essence of modern science and, possibly, its relation to the essence of
modern technology. (One might also ask whether it is meaningful to speak of “the
essence of modern science and modern technology.”) The purpose of this section is to
unfold Heidegger’s analysis of the nature of thinking in view of our questions concerning
these essences and their interrelation and to suggest some insights for thinking the RST
relation.
We begin with Heidegger’s startling claim, “Science does not think” (WCT, 8).
Heidegger does not intend to disparage science, for he immediately follows this assertion
with another: “. . . nonetheless science always and in its own fashion has to do with
thinking” (ibid.). Moreover: “When we speak of the sciences as we pursue our way, we
shall be speaking not against but for them, for clarity concerning their essential nature.
This alone implies our conviction that the sciences are in themselves positively essential”
(14). Nonetheless, on Heidegger’s view, there is an “unbridgeable gulf” between thinking
and the sciences; only a “leap” can link them (8). These statements support our attempt to
149. This work is a compendium of 21 lectures on thinking that Heidegger delivered in 1951-52
before his retirement from the University of Freiburg (WCT, v).
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engage the question of the essence of modern science by examining Heidegger’s
explication of the essence of thinking.
How is it, then, that science fails to think? Heidegger characterizes “science” as
one-sided, despite the unarguable fact that each science typically engages the entities in
its domain of analysis from several perspectives. In his view, the one-sidedness of
science stems from its inherent inability to examine its own essence. “The essence of
their sphere —history, art, poetry, language, nature, man, God—remains inaccessible to
the sciences. . . . The essence of the spheres I have named is the concern of thinking”
(33).
Heidegger does not consider the inability of science to examine its own essence to
be any sort of defect, however. “The sciences are fully entitled to their name, which
means fields of knowledge, because they have infinitely more knowledge than thinking
does” (ibid.). But what is at issue for him is ignoring the “other side” of science—
namely, its essence. For Heidegger, the “covering up” of the gap between the two sides
leads to a “leveling” of views: “Everything is leveled to one level. Our minds hold views
on all and everything, and views all things in the identical way” (ibid.).
As for modern technology, Heidegger contends that its essence is manifested in
what he calls “one-track thinking.” As Heidegger tells us, the word “track” is chosen
intentionally to evoke “rails” and “technology” (26). Tracks and rails connote a sense of
single-mindedness at the core of technology that brooks no ambiguity:
This one-track thinking, which is becoming even more widespread in various
shapes, is one of those unsuspected and inconspicuous forms, mentioned earlier,
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in which the essence of technology assumes dominion—because that essence
wills and therefore needs absolute univocity.150 (WCT, 26)
Heidegger links “one-track thinking” and “one-sided view” in a way that, I
suggest, begins to illuminate the relation between the essences of modern science and
modern technology:
For it is only on the plane of the one-sided uniform view that one-track thinking
takes its start. It reduces everything to a univocity of concepts and specifications
the precision of which not only corresponds to, but has the same essential origin
as, the precision of technological process. . . . one-track thinking is not coextensive with the one-sided view, but rather is building on it even while
transforming it. (WCT, 34; my emphasis)

I hear in these words a mutual interdependence between one-track thinking (that, for
Heidegger, manifests the essence of modern technology) and the one-sided view (that, for
Heidegger, is characteristic of modern science). As Heidegger says, the two are “not coextensive,” but one-track thinking requires the one-sided view as a basis while
subsequently transforming that base.
Heidegger locates the essence of scientific and technological thinking in “ideaforming”—i.e., the forming of ideas and their representations.151 To illustrate, Heidegger
reflects upon the human experience of simply standing before and beholding a tree in
bloom. This reflection is informed by recalling that the Greek word, eido, is the origin of
the word “idea” and means “to see, to face, meet, be face-to-face” (41). Heidegger traces
150. As Heidegger sees it, the aim of modern physics is to provide that univocity with regard to
nature. Despite the increasing inscrutability of its representations of that which is, modern physics “is
challenged forth by the rule of Enframing, which demands that nature be orderable as standing-reserve”
(QCT, 23).
151. Cf. Heidegger’s treatment of “idea-forming” and “representation” in BQP (56, 156) and
discussed above in Section 3.2.
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the back-and-forth beholding of the blossoming tree “in the head” and “outside the head”
as scientifically analyzed, yet directly encountered. He asks:
. . . while science records the brain currents, what becomes of the tree in bloom? .
. . What becomes of the man—not of the brain but of the man, who may die under
our hands tomorrow and be lost to us, and who at one time came to our
encounter? What becomes of the face-to-face, the meeting, the seeing, the
forming of the idea, in which the tree presents itself and man comes to stand faceto-face with the tree? (WCT, 42)
Heidegger’s purpose is to call into question the presumed superiority of the
scientific comprehension of the human encounter of a blooming tree. “Whence do the
sciences derive the right to decide what man’s place is, and to offer themselves as the
standard that justifies such decisions?” (ibid.). In Heidegger’s view, the blooming tree, in
effect, disappears under the scrutiny of science; the tree no longer can “stand where it
stands” (44). In the language of the previous section, scientific analysis has “annihilated”
the thingness of the tree.
Heidegger is pointing to a “split-screen” seeing, or visioning, of that which is. The
sciences “explain to us that what we see and accept is properly not a tree but in reality a
void, thinly sprinkled with electric charges here and there that race hither and yon at
enormous speeds” (43). Otherwise said, when we simply behold the blooming tree, we
behold it as a thing—not as a scientifically scrutinized object. Heidegger appears to be
saying that it is not the scientific “seeing” of the tree per se that he finds problematic, but
rather it is the widespread view that labeling other ways of seeing are less valid—or even
invalid. A question for this inquiry, raised at the close of the previous section, continues
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to linger: Can we hold both ways of “seeing” the blooming tree without privileging—or
patronizing--either one?
Let us examine more closely the role of “representation” in idea-forming. On
Heidegger’s view, it arises from the customary understanding of truth as “correctness” as
determined by the correspondence, or conformance, of statements (i.e., propositions) to
“facts.” Briefly put, “An idea is called correct when it conforms to its object” (38).
Holding this traditional view of truth entails bringing before us (i.e., presenting) in a
comprehensible manner (thus, re-presenting) such objects, or “facts” about them, in order
to determine if they conform to our statements about them.152
In a much earlier essay, “The Age of the World Picture,” Heidegger examines the
notion of “representation” in some detail.153 He does so in order to clarify his claim that
the essence of modern science (Wissenschaft) is research (OBT, 59)—comprised of
“[p]rojection and rigor, method and constant activity” (65). He contrasts representing in
the modern (i.e., “scientific”) sense with apprehending in the Greek sense. Apprehending
is the opening of oneself to “that which rises up and opens itself; that which, as what is
present, comes upon man” (68). Thus, that which is apprehended does not depend upon a
“first look” from humankind; “[r]ather, man is the one who is looked upon by beings”
(ibid.). In apprehending, we behold a revealing in the spirit of Hervorbringen, a bringing
forth, without coercion. In modern science, however, “representation” means “to bring
the present-at-hand before one as something standing over-and-against, to relate it to
oneself, the representer, and, in this relation, to force it back to oneself as the norm-giving
152. See my earlier discussion of this in Section 3.2.
153. Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” in OBT, 57-85.
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domain” (69, my emphasis). Otherwise said, the employment of representing by modern
science places representing in the service of Herausfordern—the coercive, challenging
forth mode of revealing.154
On Heidegger’s view, however, representation per se is not inherently coercive
(i.e., forcing). Recall that he states in “The Thing” that things may become objects
(Gegenstände) without losing their thingness—even in representation. “An independent,
self-supporting thing may become an object if we place it before us, whether in
immediate perception or by bringing it to mind in a recollective re-presentation” (PLT,
167). A few lines later, he adds: “The jug remains a vessel [i.e., a thing] whether we
represent it in our minds or not” (ibid.).
However, in modern scientific representing, the projection plans and
methodologies of research that hold sway at any given point in time determine the
manner by which objects are brought before us. In the language of Thomas Kuhn, the
prevailing paradigms in “normal science” circumscribe the realm of the knowable. These
paradigms are forcing in the sense that they provide the norms, enforceable in “normal
science,” for adjudicating between science and non-science. But what is the origin of this
forcing? Does it rest in modern scientific representing as such, or elsewhere?
Modern science progresses because the fruits of scientific research drive the
constant search for additional results. By means of such constant activity, science
autonomously establishes its own “coherence and unity” (OBT, 64). Modern science—
unlike science before the modern era—is able to “take possession of its own complete

154. I thank Frank Seeburger for this formulation of the “forcing” nature of modern science.
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essence” (ibid.). These words point to an autonomous, dominating dynamism within
modern scientific research. I suggest that this same dynamism is expressed in describing
the extreme danger posed by Ge-stell:
But Enframing does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and
everything that is. As a destining, it banishes man into that kind of revealing
which is an ordering. Where this ordering holds sway, it drives out every other
possibility of revealing. (QCT, 27; my emphasis)

That is, modern science and modern technology both derive from, so to speak, the same
essence—an autonomous, dominating dynamism.
As the title of this work indicates, the notion of call is central to Heidegger’s
explication of thinking. Heidegger explicates the multiplicity of meanings in this word in
connection with parsing the primary question of his inquiry as four interrelated
questions155 that point to a single meaning: What is it that calls on us to think? That is,
what makes a call upon us that we should think and, by thinking, be who we are?
(121).156 This fourth question is decisive because it puts us into question. It is also
decisive, he says, because it “does not just give us something to think about, . . . [but] it
entrusts thought to us as our essential destiny . . .” (ibid.; emphasis added).157

155. Each of the four questions is rendered in several ways as a question. For example: (1) “What
is it to which we give the name ‘thinking’? (2) [H]ow does traditional doctrine conceive and define what
we have named thinking? (3) What is called for on our part in order that we may each time achieve good
thinking? (4) [W]hat is it that calls us, as it were, commands us to think? (WCT, 113-14). The fourth
question is restated extensively in (ibid., 114-21).
156. In WCT, the question of Being is linked to the question of thinking. Heidegger devotes
several chapters in Part II to parsing a fragment of Parmenides that he penultimately renders as “Useful is
the letting-lie-before-us, so (the) taking-to-heart too: beings in being” (228). He concludes that what is to
be thought about, what calls us, is the “presence of what is present” (240), i.e., the Being of beings (244).
157. I shall examine the thinking-destiny relation in Section 5.4 below.
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Heidegger employs etymology to recover multiple meanings in “to call” and “to
think.” In addition to the customary meaning of “to call” in the sense of “to signify” or
“to name,” “to call” also means “to commend, entrust, give into safekeeping . . . to call
into arrival and presence; to address commandingly” (118). By including these meanings,
Heidegger hears the decisive question in What Is Called Thinking? as “What is that
which appeals us to think? What is it that enjoins our nature to think, and thus lets our
nature reach thought, arrive in thinking, there to keep it safe?” (ibid.).
Heidegger then examines the close relation among thinking, thought, thanks, and
memory from the “decisively and originally telling word . . . thanc [Gedanc]” (139).158
Thanc, he says, “is the gathered, all-gathering thinking that recalls” (139). Thus,
according to Heidegger, thinking is rooted in memory. Yet “memory” means more than
recollection of the past. Rather, its root meaning is “a concentrated abiding with
something,” a “devotion” to that something, which encompasses past, present, and future
(140). Furthermore, he says, the thanc is pervaded by this original memory and what is
designated by the word “thanks” (141).
If thinking is grounded in thanks, what are we giving thanks for? Heidegger
writes: “But the highest and really most lasting gift given to us is always our essential
nature . . .” (142). And if thinking is a thanking for this “endowment,” what does it mean
for us to thank? He replies: “Pure thanks is . . . that we simply think—think what is really
and solely given, what is there to be thought” (143). This appears to be another way of
saying that “thinking is our essential destiny.”
158. The etymological connections at play among thanc with thinking, thought, thanks, and
memory are evident from the German equivalents of the latter: namely, Denken, Gedachtes, Dank, and
Gedächtnis, respectively (GA8, 143).
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I turn now to describe briefly Heidegger’s characterization of meditative thinking
as the antithesis of modern scientific thinking. In his 1955 “Memorial Address” 159to the
people of Messkirch, his home town, Heidegger continues with his thesis in What Is
Called Thinking? that “[m]ost thought-provoking in our thought-provoking time is that
we are still not thinking” (WCT, 6). Despite the extensive planning, research, and
inquiries everywhere, Heidegger insists that “man today is in flight from thinking (DOT,
45). Yet, despite the thoughtlessness that springs from such flight, “we do not give up our
capacity to think” (ibid.). He examines the apparent paradox of the absence of thinking
with the presence of planning, etc. by contrasting what he calls meditative thinking
(besinnliche Denken, Nachdenken) with calculative thinking (rechnenden Denken)160 —
another hallmark of modern scientific thinking, along with representing. Calculative
thinking resonates with the determining characteristic of modern scientific research as
constant activity:
. . . calculation is the mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such
thinking remains calculation even if it neither works with numbers nor uses an
adding machine or computer. Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever
new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities.
Calculative thinking races from one prospect to the next. Calculative thinking
never stops, never collects itself. Calculative thinking is not meditative thinking,
not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything that is.
(DOT, 46)

159. Martin Heidegger, ‘Memorial Address,” in Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans.
John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 43-57. (Hereafter, Discourse on
Thinking is cited as DOT.)
160. GA16, 525-26. English translations of Nackdenken include: to meditate, contemplate, ponder,
ruminate, reflect. English translations of rechnen include: to calculate, compute, count, reckon. Beolingus—
Your Online Dictionary, s.v.v. “Nachdenken” and “rechnen,” accessed October 26, 2012, http://dict
.tuchemnitz.de/dings.cgi?lang=en&service=deen&opterrors=0&optpro=0&query=Nachdenken&iservice=
&comment=&email=, and http://dict.tuchemnitz.de/dings.cgi?lang=en&service=deen&opterrors=
0&optpro=0&query=rechnen&iservice=&comment=&email=.
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Meditative thinking is thinking that dwells on the meaning of events and trends,
thinking that ponders the threat of rootlessness in our time (46-48). Such thinking, he
says, is the essence of being human. Meditative thinking makes possible comportment
toward technology that would enable us to use technical devices, but to freely let go of
them at any time (54).161 (Heidegger is not anti-science, as both modes of thinking are
necessary: “. . . each [is] justified and needed in its own way” [46].) Heidegger calls this
comportment “releasement toward things” (die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen) (54) and
“openness to the mystery” (55); such comportment, he says, keeps us open to the hidden
meaning in technology.162
By Heidegger’s lights, meditative thinking is essential for such comportment;
releasement toward things will not happen on its own. Furthermore, mankind’s essential
nature is at stake. If calculative thought comes to reign someday as the singular way of
thinking, “man would have denied and thrown away his own special nature—that he is a
meditative being” (56). That is why the threat that calculative thinking, the hallmark of
Ge-stell, may come to dominate all modes of thinking is a supreme threat. “Therefore,”
Heidegger says, “the issue is the saving of man’s nature. Therefore, the issue is keeping
meditative thinking alive” (ibid.)

161. Recall that Heidegger characterizes the enactment-sense of Christian life experience in terms
of “comportment” as discussed earlier in Section 2.1. Also, in this passage, “comportment” is the translate
of die Haltung (GA16, 528), which also means “attitude,” “posture,” and “approach.” Online Dictionary
English-German, s.v. “Haltung,” accessed October 26, 2012, http://www.dict.cc/?s=Haltung. Cf.
“comportment” as a translation of Verhalten (see chap. 2, n. 66).
162. These descriptions of meditative thinking resonate with the characterization of reflection, in
the sense of Besinnung, and Besinnung in the spirit of Gelassenheit, as discussed earlier in Section 3.4.
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4.5

Chapter Summary
Broadly speaking, this chapter engages the RST relation indirectly by bringing

modern science and technology into relation with the holy and divine through poetry and
art. The chapter offers Heidegger’s explication of the common essence that is served by
modern science and technology that threatens to extinguish all other ways of thinking and
comportment to all that is. In so doing, the essential nature of what it means to be human
is fundamentally threatened.
Briefly stated, this common essence is an autonomous, aggressive dynamism that
purports to fashion its own essence. That essence is manifested in the essence of modern
technology in its mode of the revealing of Being as “challenging forth.” It is manifested
in the essence of modern science in calculative thinking. In contrast, Heidegger posits
revealing forth as the primal mode of the revealing of Being, and meditative thinking as
the essence of humankind. In turn, the calculative thinking of science manifests itself in
objectification, which reduces all things to objects (Gegenstände). In contrast, things
gather the elements of the fourfold of earth and sky, mortals and divinities, in a “mirrorplay” that fashions the “worlding” of the world.
Paradoxically, Heidegger holds that a saving power grows where the supreme
danger of modern technology resides. Vigilance on the part of humankind is essential to
fostering this growing saving power; art, poetry, the nurturing of the fourfold, and
meditative, reflective thinking are seen by Heidegger as vital in service of such vigilance.
Meditative, reflective thinking is rooted in thanking for the gift of our essential nature
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and in memory, as devotion to the task of thinking “what is really and solely given, what
there is to be thought” (WCT, 143).
By Heidegger’s lights, poetry (inclusive of art) heralds the growing saving power
in the face of the extreme danger posed by the essence of modern technology and science
as song—understood as language that points to the wholeness within the unwholeness of
the world’s “dark night.” Poetry locates the “saving power” in defenselessness that
foregoes ultimately futile attempts to build walls to ward off the extreme danger posed by
modern technology and science. Such poetry, Heidegger says, can be a pathway to the
holy and divine.
With regard to the formulation of theology as “reflection on religious experience
and belief,” this chapter raises questions and possible opportunities: At the end of Section
3.4, we asked, what sense(s) of reflection—Reflexion, Besinnung, or both—appropriately
characterize(s) theology? Here, we ask the same question differently: What form(s) of
thinking—calculative, meditative-mindful, or both—appropriately characterize theology?
Heidegger regards poetry as a pathway to the holy and divine. Taking for a
moment that theology regards itself similarly, in some sense, does “reflection on religious
experience and belief” incorporate the sense of “reaching into the abyss occasioned by
the world’s dark night”? Does this formulation of theology include pointing to the
growing saving power in the midst of the extreme danger of the essence of modern
technology? More specifically, can theology so understood articulate the paradox that
such saving power is located in defenselessness?
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To sum up, poetry and meditative, mindful thinking, each in their own way, are
paths for confronting the essence of modern technology. Are these paths completely
separate, or do thinking and poetry “belong together,” in some sense? We take up this
question in the next and final chapter.
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Chapter 5: Ethics and the RST Relation

Heidegger never wrote an “Ethics” in the form of a separate publication by that
title. On his view, the question of ethics must be thought from the question of the truth of
Being. Such thinking, he says in “Letter on ‘Humanism’,”163 departs from regarding
ethics and ontology as disciplines within the field of philosophy (P, 269). Instead,
thinking the truth of being leads Heidegger back to the Greek term, ethos, which means
abode or dwelling. On his view, the truth of being and the essence of what it means to be
human are inseparable from “ethics”—understood in its originary meaning:
If the name “ethics,” in keeping with the basic meaning of the word ethos, should
now say that ethics ponders the abode of the human being, then that thinking
which thinks the truth of being as the primordial element of the human being, as
one who eksists, is in itself originary ethics. (P, 271)
This chapter examines Heidegger’s explication of ethics in terms of abode or
dwelling, thought out of the question of the truth of being, with an eye toward thinking
the RST relation. Briefly put, the “arc” of the chapter is the linking of dwelling and
destiny in light of the thinking-poetry relation. In the first section (5.1 Ethics and the
Place of Being), I shall examine Heidegger’s treatment of the dwelling-building duality
in relation to thinking and the poetic. In the second section (5.2 Ethics, Technology, and
Values), I shall discuss Ian Barbour’s analysis of the role of values in ethics and its
relation to technology, in light of Heidegger’s critique of the notion of “value” itself. The
163. Martin Heidegger, “Letter on ‘Humanism’,” in Pathmarks (P), 239-76.
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third section (5.3 Ethics and Nihilism) focuses upon Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche’s
explication of nihilism, in terms of “value” and “the will to power.” In the final section of
this chapter (5.4 Ethics and Destiny), I shall examine Heidegger’s explication of
“destiny” as the Geschick of Being, in contrast to its customary interpretation as
something determined by fate. Finally, I shall conclude this entire inquiry with a brief
Epilogue (The Question of Being and the RST Relation).

5.1

Ethics and the Place of Being
For Heidegger, ethics, as ethos, is abode, or dwelling. More precisely, as quoted

above, he says that ethics “ponders the abode of the human being.” Hence, ethics is the
link between thinking, or pondering, and abode, or dwelling. Furthermore, dwelling
clearly involves building, in some sense. In this section I shall draw primarily upon two
works of Heidegger that engage the dwelling-building duality—first, from the
perspective of thinking, “Building Dwelling Thinking,”164 and second, from the
perspective of poetry, “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . . .”165
On Heidegger’s view, dwelling “is the manner in which mortals are on the earth”
(PLT, 146). Furthermore, building, in its originary sense, is dwelling. These claims are
based primarily upon his explications of the verb, bauen (to build), its older cognate,
buan (to dwell), and bin (the first person form of the verb “to be”).166 He writes: “The

164. Martin Heidegger, “Building Dwelling Thinking,” in PLT, 141-59.
165. Martin Heidegger, “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . .,” in PLT, 209-28.
166. This move is consistent with his characterization of this work as a venture that “traces
building back into that domain to which everything that is belongs” (PLT, 143).
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way in which you are and I am, the manner in which we humans are on the earth, is
Buan, dwelling” (145). Yet our ordinary understanding of “building” and “dwelling”
suggests that the relation of the former to the latter is that of a means to an end, or goal.
On Heidegger’s view, this is correct, in a sense, but also misleading, as “to build is in
itself already to dwell” (144).
Heidegger notes that bauen also connotes the manner in which the buildingdwelling link is manifested: “. . . to cherish and protect, to preserve and care for,
specifically to till the soil, to cultivate the vine” (145). He extends this agriculturallygrounded understanding of “building”167 beyond that of the cultivation of growing things
to “building” in the sense of constructing edifices. Thus, he writes: “To dwell” means “to
remain at peace within . . . the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature” (147).
Its fundamental character is “sparing and preserving”—not only protecting from harm but
leaving each thing “in its own nature.” More specifically, the sparing and preserving
inherent in dwelling safeguards the “fourfold” of earth and sky, divinities and mortals.168
It does so by “bringing the presencing of the fourfold into things” (149).
Heidegger illustrates the connection between dwelling and the fourfold by the
example of a bridge:
The bridge is a thing; it gathers the fourfold,169 but in such a way that it allows a
site for the fourfold. By this site are determined the localities and ways by which
167. The German word for farmer is Bauer.
168. Cf. the earlier discussion of the fourfold in Section 4.3 above.
169. Here, Heidegger once again draws upon the ancient meaning of “thing” as a gathering or
assembling. (He elicited this meaning in his earlier work, “The Thing.” See my discussion of this in Section
4.3 above.) This meaning is in contrast to the conventional representing of “thing” as “an unknown X to
which perceptible properties are attached” (PLT, 151).

169

a space is provided for. . . . Space is in essence that for which room has been
made, that which is let into its bounds. That for which room is made is always
granted and hence is joined, that is, gathered, by virtue of a location, that is, by
such a thing as the bridge. (PLT, 152)

On this view, the bridge is not built upon a pre-existing site or location; rather, the bridge
provides a site for the fourfold and is itself a location (153, emphasis added). Moreover,
as a location, the bridge makes room for and shelters the fourfold (156). From this
explication of “space,” Heidegger proceeds to derive the customary understanding of
“space” in terms of extension and its quantifiable formulation in terms of dimensions
(153-54).
His analysis also illuminates the relation of space to humankind. Space is not
something that lies above and over us. Rather, “space” in its primal sense is “always
provided for already within the stay of mortals” (154). As mortals, we stay within things
in the fourfold, even if they are beyond our immediate reach. We dwell with these things;
that is who we are. “The relationship between man and space is none other than dwelling,
strictly thought and spoken” (155).
Although building “produces things as locations,” the things produced, such as
bridges, are not to be understood as a result or consequence of such building. Rather,
such building is
. . . a producing that brings something forth. For building brings the fourfold
hither into a thing, the bridge, and brings forth the thing as a location, out into
what is already there, room for which is only now made by this location . . . .
(PLT, 157; original emphasis)170
170. Such building, he says, is “accomplished” (PLT, 157). In “Letter on ‘Humanism’,” he writes:
“To accomplish means to unfold something into the fullness of its essence, to lead it forth into this
fullness—producere” (P, 239).
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Thus, he says, building is a “distinctive letting-dwell” (156).
Furthermore, building and thinking are essential for dwelling, but not necessarily
sufficient:
Building and thinking are, each in its own way, inescapable for dwelling. The
two, however, are also insufficient for dwelling so long as each busies itself with
its own affairs in separation instead of listening to one another. They are able to
listen if both—building and thinking—belong to dwelling, if they remain within
their limits and realize that the one as much as the other comes from the workshop
of long experience and incessant practice. (PLT, 158)

We shall see an analogous claim for thinking and poetry with respect to dwelling in his
work, “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . .,” to which we now turn. The title of this lecture is
taken from a poem of Hölderlin’s that Heidegger engages throughout this work.
In this lecture, Heidegger argues that it is poetry that “first causes dwelling to be
dwelling” (PLT, 213). He challenges widespread views of poetry as “a flight into
dreamland” or “part of literature” (211). Poetry is not otherworldly, he says: “Poetry does
not fly above and surmount the earth in order to escape it and hover over it. Poetry is
what first brings man onto the earth, making him belong to it, and thus brings him into
dwelling” (216).
So how is it that poetry is so “down to earth,” and what is its connection to the
dwelling-building duality? Let us take this two-part question as our guide. With respect to
the first half of our question, Heidegger declares that language is the gateway toward
discerning the essence, or nature, of any thing: “Language beckons us, at first and then
again at the end, toward a thing’s nature” (214). Moreover, human beings are not in
control of language—quite the reverse. Heidegger regards the “unbridled yet clever
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talking, writing, and broadcasting of spoken words” across the globe as an inversion of
the true relationship of language to humankind.
Poetry has this “down-to-earth” character, Heidegger says, because, in a sense to
be described, it “measures” dwelling. “Poetry is . . . measure-taking—its taking, indeed,
for the dwelling of man” (221). Moreover, “poetry . . . is the primal form of building.
Poetry first of all admits man’s dwelling into its very nature, its presencing being. Poetry
is the original admission of dwelling” (224-25). In what follows, I sketch Heidegger’s
defense of these claims.
As in “Building Dwelling Thinking,” Heidegger employs here the “fourfold” of
earth and sky, divinities and mortals, in his analysis of the building-dwelling duality and
of “measure-taking,” in particular. Here, poetry seeks to take the measure of the
“between” of sky and earth. Heidegger calls this “between” the dimension (218). The
measuring, or spanning, of this dimension, he says, is central to what it means to be
human: “. . . man spans the dimension by measuring himself against the heavenly. Man
does not undertake this spanning just now and then; rather, man is man at all only in such
spanning” (ibid.).
But how does poetry take the measure of this “dimension”? Heidegger writes:
The measure consists in the way in which the god who remains unknown, is
revealed as such by the sky. God’s appearance through the sky consists in a
disclosing that lets us see what conceals itself, but lets us see it not by seeking to
wrest what is concealed out of its concealedness, but only by guarding the
concealed in its self-concealment. Thus the unknown god appears as the unknown
by way of the sky’s manifestness. This appearance is the measure against which
man measures himself. (PLT, 220-21)
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Heidegger is saying that the sky, which is familiar to humankind, is alien to the unknown
god but nonetheless a medium for that god to evince the very character of this god’s
unknownness to mankind.171 In Hölderlin’s words, by such measuring, “man not
unhappily measures himself against the Godhead” (217). Heidegger says more: such
measuring is integral to the essential nature of humankind.
Like building and thinking, poetry and dwelling “belong together, each calling for
the other” (225). Moreover, poetic measuring-taking is essential for building, Heidegger
contends, in order for humankind to continue to be capable of cultivation and
construction upon the earth:
Man does not dwell in that he merely establishes his stay on the earth beneath the
sky by raising growing things and simultaneously raising buildings. Man is
capable of such building only if he already builds in the sense of the poetic taking
of measure. (PLT, 225)
Otherwise said, this poetic building “takes the measure” of the dimension between earth
and sky that is shared by subsequent building and thinking as they belong together in
dwelling.172
In sum, ethics, as the pondering of dwelling (ethos), is a peaceful protecting and
“letting be” of each thing in its own nature. Building, thinking, and—above all—poetry,
are each indispensable for dwelling through their relationship to the fourfold of earth and
sky, divinities and mortals. Building is primordially a gathering of the fourfold into
things. Building is thus a producing, a bringing-forth, of things into dwelling. Poetry

171. In “Why Poets?,” Heidegger identifies poets as those who are capable of reaching into the
“abyss of the world’s dark night” from which the gods have fled (OBT, 200-201); also see Section 4.2.
172. I thank Frank Seeburger for pointing out these interrelationships.
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“first causes dwelling to be dwelling” (213) by taking the measure of the dimension
between earth and sky. In such measure-taking, poetry discloses—and yet safeguards—
the unknowableness of the self-concealing god against which, Heidegger says, mankind
has always measured itself. By such poetic measure-taking, we manifest our essential
nature as human beings. No lesser measure-taking quite measures up.
Three questions for Christian theology come to mind in light of Heidegger’s
explication of thinking and poetry in relation to dwelling. Does Christian theology, in its
own way, attempt to take the measure of the between of earth and sky? Is such measuretaking consonant with formulating theology as reflection on religious experience and
belief? Does Christian theology appropriately disclose the unknown god [here, Deus
absconditus] in its self-concealing?
I conclude this section by gathering some pointers from Heidegger regarding the
relation between poetry and thinking—all with an eye toward thinking the RST relation.
The discussion above in this section clearly indicates that, on Heidegger’s view, poetry
and thinking each “belong together” with dwelling. Do they themselves also belong
together, in some sense? In “The Nature of Language,”173 Heidegger writes of the
“neighborhood of poetry and thinking.” Expressed figuratively, this phrase means, he
says, “that the two dwell face to face with each other, that the one has settled into facing
the other, has drawn into the other’s nearness” (OWL, 82).174 Compactly stated, the

173. In OWL, 57-108 (see chap. 1, n. 41).
174. Recall that Heidegger does not render “nearness” in spatio-temporal terms. He explicates this
point in “The Nature of Language” (OWL, 101-5) as well as in “The Thing,” which I discussed above in
Section 4.3.
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neighborhood of poetry and thinking means “the encounter of the two facing each other”
(ibid.).
For Heidegger, the heart of language itself occasions this neighborhood of
thinking and poetry. Furthermore, nearness, as “Saying,” brings about this neighborhood,
rather than the other way around:
Neighborhood means: dwelling in nearness. Poetry and thinking are modes of
saying. The nearness that brings Poetry and thinking together into neighborhood
we call Saying. Here, we assume, is the essential nature of language. (OWL, 93)
By “Saying,” Heidegger means “to show, to make appear, the lightingconcealing-releasing offer of world” (107). Poetry and thinking “Say” in divergent ways.
For reflective thinking (besinnliche denken), “Saying” is the giving of Being by means of
the gift of the word: “the word gives Being” (88). For poetry, “saying” is song: “In the
poet’s song, the word appears as mysterious wonder” (89). The divergence of their
Saying (the Same thing differently) is the encounter of thinking and poetry. Thinking and
poetry draw near to each other in Saying the Same, albeit in divergent ways. The
neighborhood occasioned by this nearness harbors the divergence of their Saying.175 In
sum, despite the divergent modes of their saying, poetry and thinking are brought
together in nearness by Saying itself as that which illuminates as well as conceals the
essential nature of all that is.
Three questions for thinking the RST relation: Are religion, science, and theology
“near” to each other, in some sense? Is their possibly a neighborhood in which their
175. Heidegger expresses this similarly In What Is Called Thinking?: “The essential closeness of
poesy and thinking is so far from excluding their difference that, on the contrary, it establishes that
difference in an abysmal [abgründigen] manner” (WCT, 134; GA8, 139).
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divergences can encounter each other? What Sameness, so to speak, might “occasion”
such a neighborhood? These closing questions prepare us for thinking the essence of the
RST relation in terms of nearness and neighborhood. But before addressing in the
Epilogue this crucial matter for our inquiry, we shall proceed in the final three sections of
this chapter to establish the connection between dwelling and destiny.

5.2

Ethics, Technology, and Values
In this section, I shall examine the central role of values in Ian Barbour’s analysis

of the ethics-technology relation in light of Heidegger’s critique of the notion of “value”
itself. In Ethics in an Age of Technology,176 Barbour conducts his analysis of this relation
through the lens of values that promote the well-being of human life (individually and
socially) and the environment. In contrast, Heidegger contends that employing the notion
of “value” leads to the objectification of that which is “valued” and paradoxically reduces
its essential worth.
Barbour outlines and critiques three basic views of technology: technology as
liberator, technology as threat, and technology as ambiguous instrument of power.
Broadly speaking, the first two views are optimistic and pessimistic views of technology,
respectively, while the third view—the view which Barbour defends—holds that
technology’s “consequences depend upon its social context.” Barbour’s point is not that
technology is inherently neutral, but rather that “[t]echnologies are social constructions,

176. Ian Barbour, Ethics in an Age of Technology: The Gifford Lectures 1989-1991 Volume 2 (San
Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1993). (Hereafter cited as EIAT.)
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and they are seldom neutral because particular purposes are already built into their
design” (EIAT, 15).
Barbour contrasts these three views of technology in terms of how the sciencetechnology relation is understood. Compactly stated, technological optimists tend to
regard technology as derived from science (“applied science”), whereas pessimists
generally regard technology as “uncontrollable” and a driver of science itself. In each of
these two cases, the technology-society relation is seen unilaterally as technology shaping
society. The third view of technology as ambiguous instrument of power sees the sciencetechnology relation contextually, with no universal pattern in terms of dominance. In this
third view of technology, the combinations of science-society, technology-society, and
science-technology are understood as mutually influencing (EIAT, Chapter 1).
Barbour bases his view of ethics upon a functional definition of “value.” He
defines “value” as “a general characteristic of an object or state of affairs that a person
views with favor, believes is beneficial, and is disposed to act to promote” (26). On this
view, “values” are subject-centered—akin to the view held by J. Wentzel van Huyssteen
and others that “rationality” is subject-centered.177 As characteristics, values in effect,
“sort” the class of all “objects and states of affairs” into two disjoint subclasses—those
possessing the characteristic or value, and those that do not. Functionally speaking,
“values” differentiate, partition. Barbour justified this definition several years earlier by
noting that, since “values” so defined are held by persons, “values” are amenable to
empirical investigation by social scientists:

177. See my earlier discussion of this point in Section 3.3 above.
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Data on attitudes and beliefs can be obtained through verbal testimony,
questionnaires, and interviews; data on patterns of behavior can be obtained from
research on allocation of time and effort, and on actual choices among
alternatives.178

Typically, he says, reasons are given or principles cited to justify and promote specific
values. For Barbour, “ethics” is the domain of “[p]rinciples of right and wrong in human
actions, and good and evil in the consequences of actions” (EIAT, 27). Briefly put, ethics
is the examination of the “justification of [one’s] value commitments” (26).
Barbour posits six human values (three individual, three social) and three
environmental values with which to evaluate technology: In summary form, these values
are:

Figure 1: Values Relevant to the Appraisal of Technology
__________________________________________________________________
Individual values
Social values
Environmental values
__________________________________________________________________
food and health
meaningful work

social justice
participatory freedom

resource sustainability
environmental
protection
personal fulfillment
economic development
respect for all
forms of life
__________________________________________________________________
Source: Figure 2 in Barbour, Ethics in an Age of Technology (EIAT), 81.

His analysis of human values is conducted from three primary perspectives: science,
philosophy, and religion. He argues that all three are interdependent and essential for
responding to the challenges of an increasingly technological world. Barbour lists several
178. Ian Barbour, Technology, Environment, and Human Values (New York: Praeger, 1980), 60.
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values purported to be intrinsic to science, such as disinterestedness, freedom of thought,
and fidelity to truth. However, he holds that such characteristics—even if they were
perfectly realized in practice—are insufficient to serve as a basis for “an adequate social
ethic” (28-29). Nonetheless, science can contribute to ethics in at least three ways: by
illuminating the biological, social, and psychological constraints upon human behavior;
by providing “increasingly reliable estimates of the consequences of our decisions”; and
by contributing to “the worldview within which our decisions are made” (32-33, original
emphasis). Philosophy contributes to making ethically-based choices in a technological
society in three primary ways: by clarifying ethical concepts, by examining the
universality and consistency of ethical principles, and by providing metaphysical
frameworks for understanding ultimate reality (33, 41). Specifically, Barbour holds that
philosophically-framed approaches to ethics need to incorporate rights and duties
(deontological) as well as results (teleological) to be effective. “I will use both a broad
evaluation of consequences (going beyond Utilitarianism and cost-benefit analysis by
including nonquantifiable values) and a defense of rights and duties that avoids
absolutism” (36). Religion also plays an essential role in ethical decision-making, he
contends, because ethical principles alone are insufficient to motivate ethical action,
“which involves the will and the affections as well as the intellect” (41). He summarizes
the interplay among these three perspectives regarding human values as follows:
In later chapters, then, I will frequently be drawing on science, especially for its
estimates of the consequences of alternative technological policies and its
understanding of the interdependence of humanity and the nonhuman world. I will
be drawing on philosophy in referring to both the good of society and individual
human rights. From the Christian tradition I will draw on distinctive insights
concerning each of the six values discussed here . . . . (EIAT, 55)
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With respect to the three primary environmental values listed above, Barbour
similarly argues for indispensable contributions by science, philosophy, and religion. For
example, environmental science, centered on the concepts of “ecosystem” and
“ecological sustainability,” illuminates the physical and biological constraints within
which ethical decisions are called for (60). He contends that process philosophy, as
developed by Whitehead and his followers, values both human and nonhuman forms of
life, yet “give priority to human needs without being anthropocentric” (70-71, original
emphasis). Finally, Barbour holds that religious traditions can be sources for defending
environmental values, although he acknowledges a mixed record in Christianity.
Barbour’s defends two primary claims in Ethics in an Age of Technology. First,
technology can be controlled in a democratic society by the proper governance,
assessment, and redirecting of technology (213 et seq.). Second, his nine posited human
and environmental values can significantly influence each sphere of the control of
technology. For example, he supports methods of technology assessment that attempt to
analyze the direct and indirect effects of new technologies—or of major changes in
existing technologies—upon the environment as well as the economy and such effects
upon specific stakeholder groups (229-31). Barbour readily acknowledges that tradeoffs
among these posited values—such as meaningful work and environmental protection—
are frequently necessary. On his view, scientists have no privileged position on such
tradeoffs. Indeed, “the basic decisions about technological policies are value-laden and
political” (231, original emphasis). He concludes that fundamental judgments on
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complex matters concerning technology that involve incommensurable values must
ultimately be made by elected officials—albeit in view of the best scientific analysis
available.
Barbour concludes his analysis of the technology-ethics relation by calling for a
“reorientation of technology toward justice, participation, and sustainability” (258). On
his view, education, political involvement, and “catalytic crises” can contribute to a “new
social paradigm,” but a “vision of alternatives” is arguably most important (264-68). He
contends that religion and theology can contribute in significant ways to such visions.
The Biblical prophetic tradition of judgment, repentance, and hope can foster needed
changes in attitudes and values. Process theology emphasizes the intrinsic value and
interdependence of both human and nonhuman forms of life. For Barbour, values are
embedded in alternative visions that can direct the appropriate employment of technology
to serve the common good:
New visions can provide the motivation and direction for creative social change. .
. . They summarize a set of values, using concrete images rather than abstract
principles. . . . Let us keep before us that image of the spinning globe [as first seen
by astronauts on the moon] with its natural environments and its social order. Let
us imagine technology used in the service of a more just, participatory, and
sustainable society on planet earth. (EIAT, 266-67)
On Barbour’s view, then, values provide standards that enable one to differentiate
between the favorable and unfavorable, the beneficial and unbeneficial, and the
worthwhile and worthless. Human and environmental values, expressed in scientific,
philosophical, and religious terms, such as those presented here, can significantly
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contribute to the appropriate governance, assessment, and redirecting of technology in
democratic societies.
I now examine Heidegger’s critique of the notion of “value” itself. Thinking from
the standpoint of the question of the truth of being and of the nature of thinking itself,
Heidegger contends that, in the very act of valuing, something quixotically leads to a
paradoxical de-valuation, as it were, of that to which some value is assigned. He
summarizes his argument in “Letter on ‘Humanism’”:
To think against “values” is not to maintain that everything interpreted as “a
value”—“culture,” “art,” “science,” “human dignity,” “world,” and “God”—is
valueless. Rather, it is important to finally realize that precisely through the
characterization of something as a “value” what is so valued is robbed of its
worth. That is to say, by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is
admitted only as an object for human estimation. But what a thing is in its being is
not exhausted by its being an object, particularly when objectivity takes the form
of value. Every valuing, even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It
does not let beings: be. Rather, valuing lets beings: be valid—solely as the objects
of its doing. . . . To think against values therefore does not mean to beat the drum
for the valuelessness and nullity of beings. It means rather to bring the clearing of
the truth of being before thinking, as against subjectivizing beings into mere
objects. (P, 265; emphasis added)
Heidegger’s claim that the very act of valuing a thing necessarily drains it of worth
(Würde) rests upon his view that the very process of imputing value (Wert) to things
amounts to “subjectivizing beings into mere objects.” That is, every valuing is performed
by someone (i.e., a human “subject”) before whom the object or state of affairs is brought
to a stand (Gegenstand): i.e., is objectified. Thus the process of valuing (i.e., evaluation)
necessarily occurs within the orbit of human significance and meaning. Furthermore, he
says, such objectification does not exhaust “what the thing is in its being.” This statement
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heralds the approach that unfolds in Heidegger’s critique of value: namely, to think the
question of value from the standpoint of the question of being.
Heidegger asks: “What does ‘value’ mean ontologically? How are we to
categorize this ‘investing’ and Being-invested?” (BT, 68). For his responses to these
questions, we shall turn first to Introduction to Metaphysics179 and then to Being and
Time, respectively. As we turn to these works, let us recall Barbour’s definition of value
as “a general characteristic of an object or state of affairs that a person views with favor,
believes is beneficial, and is disposed to act to promote” (EIAT, 26).
In Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger’s discussion of “value” occurs in the
context of his discussion of the distinction, traditional in the specific terms at issue at
least since Hume and Kant, between “Being and the ought”—or between what is and
what should be.180 On Heidegger’s view, the ultimate ground for the eventual opposition
between Being and the ought arises in Plato’s notion of the whatness of Being in terms of
idea and Plato’s claim that “the idea of the good” (i.e., the “highest idea”) lies beyond
Being so understood: “. . . the ought arises in opposition to Being as soon as Being
determines itself as idea” (IM, 211). “This process is completed in Kant,” Heidegger
says, since the ought (in the form of the categorical imperative) is in total opposition to
Being (taken by Kant as nature).
The notion of “value” arises as a response to the “chasm” between Being and the
ought that is created by thinking Being reductively as the Being of beings, in various

179. Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). (Hereafter cited as IM.)
180. I thank Frank Seeburger for this clarification.
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interpretations. Under these conditions, the role of the ought as the standard, or measure,
of all that is, is endangered. “Value” arises to ground the ought, but “value” does not
exist: “. . . because values stand opposed to the Being of beings, in the sense of facts, they
themselves cannot be” (212). Therefore, although values provide “the measure for all
domains of beings—that is, of what is present at hand”—one must settle for validity. In
sum, perhaps we can say that “value” is the reductive expression of “the ought” that
properly belongs to Being as something distinguished from it—and something that
accordingly (and “nihilistically”) “is” not.
Heidegger addresses the second question regarding “investing with value” in his
interpretation in Being and Time of Descartes’ characterization of Thinghood, understood
ontologically in terms of material nature. In such an understanding of Thinghood,
Heidegger claims that “values” such as “useful” or “useless,” “beautiful” or “ugly,” are,
in effect, merely labels affixed to things; they tell us nothing new about the essence of the
objects or states of affairs that are matters at hand. Every thing that is—and values
themselves— turn out to be merely present-at-hand:
When we speak of material Thinghood, have we not tacitly posited a kind of
Being—the constant presence-at-hand of Things—which is so far from having
rounded out ontologically by subsequently endowing entities with valuepredicates, that these value-characters themselves are rather just ontical
characteristics of those entities which have the same kind of Being as Things?
Adding on value-predicates cannot tell us anything at all new about the Being of
goods, but would merely presuppose again that goods have pure presence-athand as their kind of Being. Values would then be determinate characteristics
which a Thing possesses, and they would be present-at-hand. . . . (BT, 99; original
emphasis)
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Valuing reduces that which is valued to its whatness, to merely its content-sense.181 In
other words, valuing reduces things to objects.182
By Heidegger’s lights, the process of valuing something amounts to “sticking” a
label on it, but this fails to add anything significant to our understanding of the thing.
Given Barbour’s definition of “value” as a “characteristic,” I suggest that his approach to
“value” may be vulnerable to the same critique. I say “may” here, because Heidegger is
critiquing Descartes’ understanding of Being as material nature. On one hand, Barbour
clearly views the metaphysical framework of process philosophy as superior to that of
Descartes’ “material nature” for understanding “reality.” On the other hand, Barbour
offers no explanation as to how the value “label” becomes affixed to the thing valued.183
To sum up, Heidegger’s critique of “value” makes no judgments concerning the
worthiness of the things valued. Indeed, on his view, the very act of “valuing” something
has the perverse effect of de-valuing it, in the sense of diminishing its worthiness. Viewed
ontologically, the inherent belonging together of Being itself and the ought is shattered
when Being is thought reductively as the Being of beings. Speaking figuratively,
“valuing” vainly attempts to span the chasm separating the ought from all that is (i.e.,
everything that “is”)—exposing the nonexistence of valuing itself. Viewed ontically,
attempts to think “value” in terms of characteristics or labels sever the thing valued from
its essence.
181. See Section 2.2 for an explication of presence-at-hand in contrast to readiness-to-hand.
182. See Section 3.3 on the thingness of the jug and the thing-object distinction.
183. To my mind, the challenge of explaining how values get affixed to things seems akin to the
challenge of explaining how assertions correspond to things in the conventional understanding of truth as
correctness.
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5.3

Ethics and Nihilism
In this section, I shall examine portions of Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche’s

explication of “nihilism” in terms of “values,” the “will to power,” and the relation
between the last man and the overman. In particular, I shall focus primarily on
Heidegger’s critique of Nietzsche’s compact expression of nihilism as “God is dead” and
Heidegger’s analysis of the relation of nihilism to thinking.184 Mindful of Heidegger’s
characterization of ethics in terms of “dwelling” (ethos), I shall take as a guiding question
for this section, the following section, and the concluding Epilogue: Where are the
“places” of religion, science, and theology in relation to ethics if nihilism characterizes
our past, present, and possible future (or lack thereof, as the case may be)?
On the face of it, Nietzsche’s claim would seem to be the death knell for religion
(or, at any rate, for theistically-based religion) and, consequently, for theology, taken as
reflection upon religious experience and belief. Indeed, Nietzsche’s word does refer to
the “death” of God, in the sense that “. . . faith in the Christian God is no longer tenable .
. . .”185 On Heidegger’s view, however, Nietzsche understood “Christianity” as “the
historical, secular-political phenomenon of the Church and its claim to power . . .”
(164)—what today is referred to by many theologians and other scholars as

184. In this section, I shall draw primarily from Heidegger’s works, “Nietzsche’s Word: ‘God Is
Dead’”, in Off the Beaten Track (OBT), 157-99, and What Is Called Thinking? (WCT).
185. Nietzsche’s words are from the fifth book of La Gaya Scienza, cited in OBT, 162.
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“Christendom.”186 Furthermore, Heidegger maintains that “Christianity” in Nietzsche’s
sense (i.e., Christendom) has nothing in common with what Heidegger calls “the
Christian life of the New Testament”187 nor with belief in “the Christian God of the
biblical revelation” (164).
The significance of Nietzsche’s aphorism, taken to express the essence of the
completion of nihilism, reaches far beyond matters of Christian belief/unbelief and the
Christian life of the New Testament. “God is dead” also points to the loss of meaning in
the entire realm of the supersensory:
If God—as the supersensory ground and as the goal of everything that is real—is
dead, if the supersensory world of ideas is bereft of its binding and above all its
inspiring and constructive power, then there is nothing left which man can rely on
and by which he can orient himself. (OBT, 163)
In terms of Heidegger’s explication of the relation of poetry and dwelling in Section 5.1
above, poetically taking the measure of the dimension between earth and sky no longer is
possible. But “man is man only in such spanning,”188 Heidegger says, so the very essence
of what it means to be human is at stake. Furthermore, seen in this light, the loss of
meaning across the entire realm of ideas envelops scientific thought as well as
theology.189

186. See for example, Douglas John Hall, The Cross in Our Context: Jesus and the Suffering
World (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003).
187. More precisely, Heidegger has in mind “the Christian life that existed once for a short time
before the Gospels set down in writing and before Paul disseminated his missionary propaganda” (OBT,
164).
188. In “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . .” (PLT, 218) and cited above in Section 5.1.
189. In the inaugural issue of Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science, the editors stated its
purpose in terms of responding to the loss of the supersensory. The writings of its founding editor, Ralph
Burhoe, reflect this basic purpose as well. See Section 1.2.2.
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Thinking with Nietzsche, Heidegger identifies the arc of the loss of the
supersensory with the history of Western thought. This history is the history of
metaphysics—taken to be, since the time of Plato and Aristotle, “the truth of beings as
such in their entirety” (157, 165). It is the destiny of metaphysics, Heidegger says, to end
(i.e., complete itself) in the loss of the supersensory:
Metaphysics is the space of history in which it becomes destiny for the
supersensory world, ideas, God, moral law, the authority of reason, progress, the
happiness of the greatest number, culture, and civilization to forfeit their
constructive power and to become void. (OBT, 165)
Nihilism, then, is a historical movement—not a “period of history.” As Heidegger puts it,
“Nihilism, thought in its essence, is . . . . the fundamental movement of the history of the
West” (163). Moreover, he says, “Metaphysics is an epoch of the history of being itself.
In its essence, however, metaphysics is nihilism” (198). Since the sciences are the
“offspring” of metaphysics (159), they are well within the reach of the “tandem” critique
of “metaphysics-as-nihilism” in this work. Let us keep before us, then, the question of
whether religion and theology are also.
In this regard, consider Heidegger’s characterization of the role of theology in the loss of
the supersensory that characterizes nihilism:
But when the pure faith in God as defined by the Church fades, when theology in
particular, as the doctrine of the faith, finds itself curbed and forced to one side in
serving its role as the normative explanation of beings in their entirety, . . . (OBT,
165, emphasis added).
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The study of “beings—as beings—in their entirety” is another characterization of
metaphysics. If theology is regarded as the “normative explanation” of such, does
theology itself, then, necessarily lie within the orbit of metaphysical thinking?
The loss of the supersensory is a consequence, or manifestation, of nihilism, but
not its cause. Instead, Nietzsche locates this cause in the dispensation190 of “value” by the
will to power (173). On Nietzsche’s view, the “death” of the supersensory is a
devaluation of (and by) the highest values—such as beauty, goodness, and truth (166). In
turn, this devaluation of the highest values by the highest values themselves, Nietzsche
says, necessarily leads to a “revaluation of all values” and a seeking of “what is most
alive” (ibid.).
Heidegger then examines Nietzsche’s definition of “value” in detail: “The
viewpoint of ‘value’ is the viewpoint of the conditions for preservation-increase in
regard to the complex structures, relatively enduring, of life in the midst of becoming”
(170). Heidegger expresses this simply as “. . . life in its essence proves to be that which
sets values” (171). By Nietzsche’s definition, the life-giving conditions of preservationincrease are for the sake of becoming, which, for Nietzsche, is equivalent to “the will to
power” and “being in the broadest sense” (172). Thus, the setting and dispensation of
values falls under the orbit of the will to power. “The will to power is the ground for the
necessity of dispensing values and the origin of the possibility of value-estimation” (172).
The relation of value and the will to power is reciprocal—in the sense that the will to
power is fundamentally thought out of the notion of “value” itself.

190. I.e., distribution, administration, or management.
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Nietzsche hyphenates the two conditions of life as “preservation-increase” to
emphasize two claims: first, that preservation is necessary for the increase of life; and
second, that preservation without increase inevitably leads to the decline of life (171). He
holds that the posited condition of continued increase in order for life to flourish holds for
the will to power as well: “To will at all amounts to the will to become stronger, the will
to grow . . . .”191 Thus the essence of the will to power is to constantly overpower (i.e.,
overreach) itself.
On Nietzsche’s view, the essence of the will to power is the essence of beings in
general. As Heidegger puts it, the essence of the will to power is “the fundamental trait of
all reality” (176). For Nietzsche, this amounts to an “overcoming” of metaphysics. For, if
the will to power establishes and dispenses all values, then all “values” posited by past,
present, and future metaphysical systems (such as truth, justice, etc.) are “devalued”—
i.e., deemed worthless, irrelevant. A new “value,” so to speak, has been established in
their place: namely, the will to power whose essence is to will itself. For Heidegger,
however, Nietzsche’s thought remains within the orbit of metaphysics because he
conflates being itself with the being of beings, thought by Nietzsche as the will to
power—fundamentally tied to the notion of “value”:
Because thinking in terms of values is grounded in the metaphysics of the will to
power, Nietzsche’s interpretation of nihilism, as the process of devaluing the
highest values and revaluing all values, is a metaphysical interpretation; it is
metaphysical, in fact, in the sense of the metaphysics of the will to power. (OBT,
187)

191. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, no. 675, from 1887/8, quoted in OBT, 175.
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Indeed, Nietzsche’s thought itself is nihilistic, because the revaluation that occurs after
the highest values are dethroned is. nevertheless, a value in itself. Nonetheless, both
thinkers agree that metaphysics has reached its “end”—in the sense of completing the arc
of its history from Plato and Aristotle to Nietzsche himself.
In Heidegger’s eyes, the value-centered thinking in Nietzsche’s treatment of
nihilism is disastrous for thinking the question of being. Nietzsche’s conflation of being
itself with the being of beings, understood as the will to power, reduces being itself to a
value. “. . . being has sunk down to a value in metaphysics” (193). Furthermore, in
Nietzsche’s value-centric metaphysical system, “God” is constituted as that which is of
the highest value, i.e., God is the “highest being” (194). Heidegger excoriates the
employment of this interpretation by
the faithful and their theologians who talk of the beingmost of all beings without
ever letting it occur to them to think about being itself and thereby become aware
that this thinking and that talking, from the perspective of the faith, is absolute
blasphemy when it is mixed into the theology of the faith. (OBT, 194)
If there is to be a “place” for theology, then, by Heidegger’s lights, it will have to break
out of the confines of metaphysical thinking.192 Is there a place for a non-metaphysical,
non-valuing theology?
Heidegger’s antipathy for thinking in “values” is expressed vividly in connection
with the Madman’s claim that “We’ve killed him [i.e., God]—you and I. We are all his
murderers.”193 (161, 194). Heidegger writes: “. . . to think in values is to kill radically”

192. Recall from my discussion in Section 2.4 above Heidegger’s admonition to theologians (since
at least the 1950s) to cease relying upon philosophy to shore up their theologizing.
193. Friedrich Nietzsche, La Gaya Scienza, section 125, quoted in OBT, 161.
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(196). He interprets the Madman’s exclamation and subsequent poetic explanations in
terms of the history of Western metaphysics, starting with the subject-object split
initiated by Descartes:
This killing means the elimination, through man, of the supersensory world that
has its being in itself. This killing identifies the process in which beings as such
are not absolutely annihilated, but rather become otherwise in their being.
However, in this process, man too, and above all, becomes otherwise. He
becomes the one who eliminates beings in the sense of beings in themselves. The
human uprising into subjectivity makes beings into objects [Gegenstand].
However, what is objective is that which, through representation, has been
brought to a stand. The elimination of beings in themselves, the killing of God, is
accomplished in the securing of duration through which man secures bodily,
material, spiritual, and intellectual durables; however, these are secured for the
sake of man’s own security, which wills the mastery over beings (as potentially
objective), in order to conform to the being of beings, the will to power. (OBT,
195)

We can hear in the closing sentence a foregrounding of his characterization of the essence
modern technology as Ge-stell—the challenging forth of all that is as standing-reserve
(Bestand). The “killing of God” is the forgetting of the question of being itself, the
reduction of beings in themselves to our objectification of them through representational
thinking, in an ultimately futile gesture to find security in certainty. In effect, Heidegger
issues a warning to theology in light of this “killing” of God:
God ceases to be a living God if in our continuing attempts to master the real we
fail to take his reality seriously beforehand and question it, if we fail to reflect
whether man has so matured toward the essence into which he is forced from out
of being that he withstands this destiny that sends him out of his essence, and does
so without the false relief of mere expedients. (OBT, 190)

In the face of the ever-increasing, essentially unstoppable exercise of the will to
power as the essence of the “real,” Nietzsche posits the overman (Übermensch) as “[t]he
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man whose essence is the essence that is willing and willed out of the will to power”
(188). The overman is the “successor” of the last man (letzte Mensch) in the sense that
the overman passes over—and overpasses—the last man. Who is the “last man,” also
named by Heidegger as the “erstwhile man”—that is, the former, one-time man?
According to Nietzsche’s metaphysics, erstwhile man is called erstwhile because
although his essence is determined by the will to power as the fundamental trait of
all beings, he nonetheless has not experienced and taken over the will to power as
this fundamental trait. (OBT, 189)

Otherwise said, the last man has not yet come into his own essence and embraced it as his
own.
Let us now turn to Heidegger’s examination of nihilism in What Is Called
Thinking? In this work, two different paths of the analysis and possible “resolution,” so to
speak, by Nietzsche and Heidegger, of the impasse reached by the “end” of metaphysics
come together. Whereas Nietzsche personifies the impasse and possible resolution in the
figures of the last man and overman, respectively, Heidegger expresses this impasse and
possible resolution by contrasting calculative thought with meditative thinking. As the
following two passages from this work clearly show, Heidegger draws these paths
together by linking the figure of the last man with man as animal rationale and then with
idea-forming, representational thinking:194
The man [the last man] whom he who passes over [the overman] overpasses is
man as he is so far. . . . Nietzsche calls him the as yet undetermined animal. This
implies: homo est animal rationale. . . . Man is the beast endowed with reason.
(WCT, 61)

194. Heidegger has previously linked the figure of humankind as animal rationale and calculative
thought in, for example, The Principle of Reason (129).
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In this species of last man, there, reason—the forming of representational ideas—
will inevitably perish in a peculiar way and, as it were, become self-ensnarled.
Ideas then limit themselves to whatever happens to be provided at the moment—
the kind of provisions that are supplied at the enterprise and pleasure of the
human manner of forming ideas, and are pleased to be generally comprehensible
and palatable. . . . The last man—the final and definitive type of man so far—fixes
himself, and generally all that is, by a specific way of representing ideas.195
(WCT, 62, emphasis added)

In sum, then, it can be said that nihilism, metaphysics, animal rationale, the last
man, calculative thought, and idea-forming/representational thought—all say the same
thing.196
Heidegger expresses the crisis of nihilism and its equivalences in terms of the figure of
the last man:
Is the man of today in his metaphysical nature prepared to assume dominion over
the earth as a whole? . . . Is the nature of this man of today such that it is fit to
manage those powers, and put to use those means of power, which are released as
the nature of modern technology unfolds, forcing man to unfamiliar decisions?
Nietzsche’s answer to these questions is No. (WCT, 65; emphasis added)

This can be heard as a question of the essence of humankind as well as a question of
destiny—a question to which we turn in the next and final section of this chapter.

195. On Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche, Nietzsche did not see the fundamental connection
between idea-forming, representational thinking and the essential nature of the last man. Rather, on this
reading, revenge characterizes this essential nature, and revenge itself is characterized by “the will’s
revulsion against time and its ‘It was’” (Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part II, “On
Deliverance,” quoted in WCT, 93).
196. For Heidegger, such a multiplicity of meanings “is the element in which all thought must
move in order to be strict thought. . . . we always must seek out thinking, and its burden of thought, in the
element of its multiple meanings, else everything will remain closed to us” (WCT, 71).
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5.4

Ethics and Destiny
The meaning of destiny is customarily associated with one or more of the

following interpretations: one’s fortune lot, or outcome; the succession of events that led
to the outcome; and/or that which predetermines such events and the resulting
outcome.197 This conventional meaning can be heard in the question Heidegger raises in
the final sentence of his closing “Address” in The Principle of Reason: “. . . what will
become of the earth and of human existence on this earth” (POR, 129). That is, what
result or outcome might we expect in facing this question of the future of planet earth and
its inhabitants?
Heidegger succinctly describes this customary interpretation of destiny as
follows: “We usually understand Geschick [destiny] as being that which has been
determined and imposed through fate: a sorrowful, an evil, a fortunate Geschick. This
meaning is a derivative one” (61). Heidegger hears the word “destiny” differently,
however. On his view, “Geschick” names a family of meanings derived from cognates of
the verb, schicken (“to send”), and original meanings of this pivotal word. For him,
Geschick is a nonfatalistic Geschick of Being.
The purpose of this section is to examine connections (if any) between destiny—
heard in the customary sense as well as in Heidegger’s interpretation of Geschick—and
ethics, understood in terms of “dwelling” (ethos). I shall argue that the question of
destiny—heard in either sense—is, at root, a question of dwelling. Thus, it could be said

197. Adapted from the definition of “destiny” from TheFreeDictionary, s.v. “destiny,” accessed
June 9, 2012, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/destiny.
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that dwelling is destiny. To support this claim, I shall draw upon Heidegger’s explication
of thinking and poetry and their interrelation in earlier sections.
In “Building Dwelling Thinking” and “. . . Poetically Man Dwells . . .,”
Heidegger establishes that thinking and poetry, in effect, belong together in dwelling.
Although neither by itself is sufficient for dwelling, they are each indispensable for
dwelling. Heidegger’s initially describes dwelling as “the manner in which mortals are on
the earth” (PLT, 146). Given this rather general description, can we say that dwelling is
destiny?
This increasingly seems to be the case, if we hear these words in their customary
meaning. Robust evidence continues to accumulate, strongly indicating that the past and
current manner of human activity across the globe is significantly affecting present and
future conditions for life on earth. Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees are cofounders of ecological footprint analysis, “an accounting tool that enables us to estimate
the resource consumption and waste assimilation requirements of a defined human
population or economy in terms of a corresponding productive land area.”198 The
worldwide per capita demand for productive land in 2001 was estimated to be 2.2
hectares per person, while the worldwide per capita supply to provide such productive
land sustainably (aka, “carrying capacity”) was only 1.8 hectares per person.199 The
difference is a worldwide unsustainable “ecological overshoot” of 0.4 hectares per

198. Mathis Wackernagel and William Rees, Our Ecological Footprint: Reducing Human Impact
on the Earth (Stony Creek, CT: 1996), 9.
199. Mathis Wackernagel, Dan Moran, Sahm White, and Michael Murray, “Ecological Footprint
accounts for advancing sustainability: measuring human demands on nature,” in Sustainable Development
Indicators in Ecological Economics, ed. Philip Lawn (Northampton, MA: 2006), 251, 255.
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person. Otherwise expressed, more than one “earth” is needed to maintain the current
demand for land, water, minerals, and energy to support human life and activity across
the planet. They describe “overshoot” and its consequences in stark terms:
The depletion of ecological assets systematically undermines the well-being of
people. Livelihoods disappear; irreconcilable conflicts emerge; families are hurt;
land becomes barren; and resources become more costly before eventually
running out. . . . If humanity does not react in time, we will face the prospect of
collapse.200

The growing ecological footprint of humankind is unmistakably impacting global
climate patterns, primarily by increasing the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG) in
the atmosphere. The most recent comprehensive assessment of global climate change
conducted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) includes these
summary statements:
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal . . . Observational evidence from
all continents and most oceans shows that many natural systems are being
affected by regional climate changes, particularly temperature increases. . . .
[Subsection 1]
Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the
th
mid-20 century is very likely [probability>90%] due to the observed increase in
anthropogenic GHG [greenhouse gas] concentrations. . . . [Subsection 2]
Continued GHG emissions at or above current rates would cause further
warming and induce many changes in the global climate system during the 21st
century that would very likely [probability>90%] be larger than those observed
during the 20th century. . . . [Subsection 3] (emphasis added)201

200. Ibid., 248.
201. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Core Writing Team (R. K. Pachauri and
A. Reisinger, eds.), “Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report: Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III
to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” (Geneva,
Switzerland: IPCC, 2007), 104 pp., https://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html.
The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) involved “more than 500 Lead Authors and 2000 Expert Reviewers”
(ibid., Foreward).
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Indeed, the increasing impact of humanity upon the face of the earth has been recently
recognized in a proposal to name the current geological epoch the “Anthropocene
Age.”—that is, the “Age of Man.”202
In the general and everyday sense of these terms, then, dwelling (or the lack
thereof) is unquestionably shaping our destiny.
Let us turn now to Heidegger’s understanding of destiny as the Geschick of being
and investigate ways in which thinking and poetry inform that understanding. In The
Principle of Reason, Heidegger identifies the history of Western thought with the history
of being, also understood as the Geschick of being. As we have seen in the previous
section, Nietzsche identifies this history with nihilism: “Nihilism is the destiny of [our]
own history” (OBT, 164). This history, Heidegger says, is marked by the self-revealing
and withdrawing of being (POR, 75). Moreover, the Geschick of being is not a one-way
“sending” of—or by—being to beings as passive recipients. Indeed, Heidegger contends
that a sense of reciprocity obtains between being and human beings via the Geschick of
being in a way that should put to rest any charges of fatalism in his construal of destiny:
As the ones bestowed by being in the Geschick of being we stand—and indeed do
so in accordance with our essential nature—in a clearing and lighting of being.
But we do not just stand around in this clearing and lighting without being
addressed; rather we stand in it as those who are claimed by the being of beings.
As the ones standing in the clearing and lighting of being we are the ones
bestowed, the ones ushered into the time play-space. This means we are the ones
engaged in and for this play-space, engaged in building on and giving shape to
the clearing and lighting of being—in the broadest and multiple sense, in
preserving it. (POR, 85, my emphasis)

202. See Paul J. Crutzen, “Geology of Mankind,” in Nature 415 (3 January 2002): 23,
doi:10.1038/415023a, and Elizabeth Kolbert, “Enter the Anthropocene Age of Man,” in National
Geographic 219, no. 3 (March 2011): 60-61, 64-65, 69-73, 75-77, 79, 81, 83, 85, http://0-search.proquest
.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/873247302?accountid=14608.
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This passage explicitly signals an active dimension in Heidegger’s characterization of the
essence of humankind.
Heidegger distinguishes between “the full Geschick of being” and the particular
epochs in which the “clearing and lighting of being” is manifested. On the one hand, he
declares that epochs cannot be derived from each other or tracked. On the other hand,
however, he asserts that each epoch leaves a legacy for the next. The legacy “always
comes from what is concealed in the Geschick . . .” (POR, 91). By Heidegger’s lights, the
legacy of each epoch since the pre-Socratics has been the forgotten question of Being
itself.
In the QCT essay, Heidegger characterizes the current epoch of the Geschick of
being as Ge-stell (Enframing), the essence of modern technology. In this work, examined
closely in Section 4.1 above, Geschick is translated as destining and described as a
“sending-that-gathers which first starts man upon a way of revealing” (QCT, 24). Ge-stell
is a particular form, or mode, of Geschick. More precisely, just as Nietzsche declares that
nihilism is the end, or completion, of Western history, so Heidegger regards Ge-stell as
the end, or fulfillment, of this history, whose single destiny is the Geschick of Being. In
contrast to destining of revealing as a bringing forth (Hervorbringen), Ge-stell is a
destining of revealing in the guise of a challenging forth (Herausfordern) that reduces all
that is to instrumental usefulness. Can we dwell in an epoch of Ge-stell?
Heidegger contends that, in every epoch, the Geschick of being poses a danger,
but its particular manifestation as Ge-stell poses a supreme danger in two senses: the loss
of humankind’s own essence and the possible elimination of humankind ever again
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entering into destining as revealing in a mode of Hervorbringen. Nevertheless, thinking
with the poets, Friedrich Hölderlin and Rainer Maria Rilke, Heidegger refutes any sense
of fatalism in facing the supreme danger of Ge-stell. He contends that poetry, inclusive of
art, can herald the saving power which lies near—and possibly within—this supreme
danger, as attested by Hölderlin:
But where danger is, grows
The saving power also.203
Despite Ge-stell’s characterization as challenging-forth, Heidegger contends that
Ge-stell “has its origin as a destining in bringing-forth” (QCT, 29-30; emphasis added).
Simply as a destining of revealing, Ge-stell comes to pass as a granting and
consequently, he says, is as such the saving power (32; original emphasis). By thinking
Ge-stell as the destining of revealing Being in our epoch, Heidegger has established that
Hölderlin’s dictum holds in the case of the supreme danger of the essence of modern
technology. Otherwise said, the inherent riskiness in Geschick—understood as the
destining of revealing Being in any epoch—is itself the door to the saving power to
preserve and protect humankind in its essential nature as it confronts Ge-stell.
In “Why Poets?,” Heidegger examines the relation between riskiness and the
saving power primarily by pondering Rilke’s remarkable claim that our defenselessness
in the face of risk is that which saves us. In his unpublished poem, Rilke speaks of risk in
three senses, which Heidegger interprets of thinking the question of Being. First,
Nature—life itself (i.e., Being itself, for Heidegger)—risks us (OBT, 208-9). Second, we
203. This is the translated version that appears in the QCT essay (QCT, 28). A slightly different
translation appears in “Why Poets?” “But where the danger lies, there also grows/that which saves” (OBT,
222). See Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
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go with the risk, Rilke says. On Heidegger’s reading, we go with it—not by going
passively along with it—but rather by willfully objectifying and re-presenting the world
to ourselves in order to attempt to manage and control this risk (215). Third, by
sometimes risking even more than “life itself does,” a safebeing is fashioned, “outside of
all defense” (207, 223). It is the poets, Heidegger says, who risk more. It is their song that
“turns our defenselessness into the open” (239). Again, it is the riskiness of it all that not
only opens the path to the saving power but, in a fundamental sense, constitutes the
saving power itself.
Let us return to Heidegger’s question at the close of the Address that follows the
13 lectures in The Principle of Reason: “. . . what will become of the earth and of human
existence on this earth” (POR, 129). This is the question of destiny as it is ordinarily
expressed. What do Heidegger’s explications in this chapter have to say in response? In
the preceding paragraphs, Heidegger tells us that the outcome to this question depends
upon locating a path to noncalculative thinking. In turn, locating such a path hinges on
rejecting the determination of the essence of human beings as the animal rationale—i.e.,
the reckoning, calculating creature. The question of humankind and the question of
thinking are inseparable. Heidegger regards finding a path upon which the thinking of the
essence of being is regarded as worthy of thought as “the world-question of thinking.”
Moreover, he says, “Answering this question decides what will become of the earth and
of human existence on the earth” (ibid.).
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A few years after delivering his lectures that comprise The Principle of Reason,
Heidegger stated that meditative thinking is humankind’s essential nature.204 So it seems
likely that the sought-after path would accommodate such thinking. However, I do not
hear Heidegger asserting that such a path is exclusively constituted by thinking of any
kind. Rather, as he says, he seeks a path upon which thinking can think the essence of
being. Thus, the path is not necessarily exhausted by thinking. Indeed, for Heidegger, the
Saying of the essence of Being is a shared responsibility of both thinking and poetry.205
To sum up, we have come “full circle,” so to speak, in thinking the dwellingdestiny relation out of the thinking-poetry relation. Thinking and poetry each belong
together with dwelling, and they belong together in their own right in the neighborhood
occasioned by the nearness of their shared responsibility of Saying Being, each in a
distinctive way. As I see it, thinking and poetry, in their belonging together, are upon the
path that Heidegger envisions to respond to his world-question of thinking. In that sense,
then, that which makes dwelling possible—thinking and poetry together—does determine
our destiny.

5.5

Chapter Summary
This chapter defends the claim that dwelling is destiny—established by the

belonging together of thinking and poetry. “Dwelling” (ethos) is the originary meaning of
“ethics” for Heidegger. “Dwelling” means the peaceful abiding on earth in the mode of
“letting be” (Gelassenheit). Building, thinking, and poetry are essential for dwelling.
204. See “Memorial Address,” in DOT, 56. Also see my discussion in Section 4.4 above.
205. See “On the Nature of Language” in OWL, 82 and 89-90 as discussed in Section 5.1 above.
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Here, thinking is the pondering, of dwelling (ethics), and poetry is the taking of the
measure of the dimension between earth and sky. Such measure-taking, Heidegger says,
has always been the means by which man has measured himself or herself. Thinking and
poetry also belong together in their own right in “Saying” Being—i.e., giving Being by
means of the gift of the word, each in its own distinctive way. On Heidegger’s view,
destiny is thought as the sending of Being (Geschick) rather than as some sort of fateful
outcome. Yet mankind is not a passive recipient of such sending, but instead is “engaged
in building on and giving shape to the clearing and lighting of being” (POR, 85).
The overarching context for this analysis is nihilism, variously interpreted as the
loss of the supersensory as well as the end, or completion, of metaphysics—which itself
is taken to be the history of Western thought. The loss of the supersensory, epitomized in
Nietzsche’s word, “God is dead,” speaks not only to the widespread and growing loss of
belief in the Christian God (or any god), but also the loss of meaning in ideas themselves
and belief in their power to inspire and transform. In response to this void, thinking in
values has come to the fore. Whether linked to “the will to power” in Nietzsche’s thought
or to Ian Barbour’s functional conceptualization, values now take the measure of all that
is. On Heidegger’s view, however, such talk of values arises from reductively thinking
Being as the Being of beings and ruptures the inherent belonging together of the Ought
and Being itself. (By purporting to take the measure of all that is, values themselves
cannot be and thus are irreparably separated from the Being of beings.)
The question of destiny is inseparable from the questions of the essence of
humankind and the essence of thinking. It can be heard in Heidegger’s formulation of
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Nietzsche’s question: “Is man in his metaphysical nature prepared to assume dominion
over the earth?” Heidegger and Nietzsche each thinks the question with regard to the
animal rationale—the customary and still dominant formulation of the essence of
humankind as the reckoning, calculating creature. Nietzsche responds by positing the
overman as successor to the last man. Heidegger thinks the question by positing
meditative, mindful thinking in contrast to calculative thinking.
With regard to the RST relation, these questions come to mind: First, thinking and
poetry belong to the same neighborhood, Heidegger says, drawn there by the nearness of
their shared responsibility to Say Being as Being. Despite their inherent divergences, is
there a “neighborhood” in which religion, science, and theology belong together, in
some sense? What might serve as a “catalyst,” so to speak?
Second, poetry, Heidegger says, takes the measure of the dimension between
earth and sky. If formulated as reflection on religious experience and belief, does
theology take the measure of earth and sky, in its own way? Or does theology, so
construed, remain “earthbound,” so to speak?
Third, in light of the growing “footprint” of humankind on the earth, is there
“room” on the path upon which noncalculative thinking can think and say Being for
calculative thinking as well?
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Epilogue: The Question of Being and the RST Relation

Three primary questions initially motivated this inquiry: First, in general, how are
the interrelations (if any) among religion, science, and theology to be understood?
Second, in particular, is there an important sense in which religion and science
(alternatively, theology and science) can be said to be in “dialogue”? And third, is there a
meaningful place for theology in the “public square” that is still dominated by the view
that science serves as the “gold standard” for rationality and truth?206
I have attempted to think the RST relation in light of these motivating questions
out of Heidegger’s engagement with the question of Being, in its many guises. In so
doing, cross-cutting threads of comportment to things, reflection, thinking, and destiny
have emerged. Each thread presences in two different modes: objectifying vs,
nonobjectifying (Section 2.4); Reflexion vs. Besinnung (Section 3.4); calculative thinking
vs. meditative, mindful thinking (Section 4.4); and fate vs. the sending of Being
(Geschick) (Section 5.4). Roughly speaking, the first elements in the first three pairs
collectively characterize modern science, whereas the second elements collectively
characterize religion (specifically, Christian religious life) (Sections 2.1-2.3).
However, I contend that no similar assessments can be made for theology—at
least in its common formulation as reflection on religious experience and belief. Indeed,
the binaries in comportment, reflection, and thinking serve to interrogate theology as to
206. As I briefly argued in Chapter 1, these questions fundamentally motivated the establishment
and early development of the academic field of RST studies.
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its essential nature. Thinking, with Heidegger, (Christian) theology is totally
nonobjectifying, but in what specific manner—like the blooming rose, poetry, or . . . ?
(Section 2.4). Is the essence of theology expressed in reflection as representional,
conceptual, calculative thought (Reflexion), or as mindful, meditative thinking
(Besinnung)—or both? (Sections 3.4 and 4.4). And does theology have anything of
significance to say with regard to the future of the earth and life upon the earth? (Section
5.4). As I see it, theology is the undetermined—or perhaps better, the underdetermined—
member of the RST triad.
Before commenting further on the “question of theology,” I propose expanding
the context for thinking the RST relation beyond that given earlier in Section 1.2 and the
ensuing inquiry in Chapters 2-5. In my view, the context for thinking the RST relation
today must also include the growing ecological footprint of humankind on the earth,
including its climate-altering consequences (Section 5.4).
In addition, I regard as essential three compelling “world-questions” posed by
Heidegger in these chapters: First, what will become of the earth and of human existence
on the earth? (POR, 129; see Section 5.4). As I have suggested earlier, this question
starkly expresses the question of destiny in its ordinary meaning. Clearly, however, it is
unanswerable as formulated. What Heidegger does say is that the unfolding of the
unknowable future depends upon answering a second question, expressed in two
equivalent ways. Is there a path upon which noncalculative thought can think Being?
(ibid.) In other words, is the essential nature of humankind that of the animal rationale
or ______________? (ibid.). Nietzsche filled in the blank with overman; Heidegger fills
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it with man as mindful, meditative thinker. The third question, Nietzsche’s question as
formulated by Heidegger, expresses all of this integrally: “Is man in his metaphysical
nature prepared to assume dominion over the earth?” (WCT, 65; see Section 5.3). I
suggest that the current and projected status of global ecology and these three worldquestions can serve to measure the significance of any attempt to think the RST relation
in the “Anthropocene Age” in which some scientists say we now live (Section 5.4).
As hinted in my questions for theology in Chapters 2-5, I contend that theology
must incorporate or otherwise accommodate, in some sense, both modes of comportment
to things, both modes of reflection, and both modes of thinking—including poeticizing—
in order to think and speak with significance about these compelling matters in the public
square, as well as in the academy, and in religious communities today. Such a “multimodal” formulation of theology can serve to mediate, or bridge, the singular modalities
that characterize religion and science. What is called for, in my view, are theologies that
can foster a thinking-thanking-poeticizing (Denken-Danken-Dichten) mode of interrelationality among religion, science, and theology. To develop these claims further, let
us return to the initial motivating questions.
I begin with the last question: Does theology have a legitimate place in the public
square? From the readings selected for this inquiry, Heidegger consistently affirmed such
a place for theology, but not without some conditions (Sections 2.3, 2.4, 3.3, and 5.3).
Briefly stated, the conditions are that theology think and speak in its own way,
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independent from science and philosophy.207 Heidegger states this unequivocally in his
letter to the Second Consultation on Hermeneutics at Drew University in 1964 (Section
2.4). Namely, theology’s major task is
not to borrow the categories of its thinking and the form of its speech from
philosophy or the sciences, but to think and speak out of faith for faith with
fidelity to its subject matter. If this faith by the power of its own conviction
concerns the human being as human being in his very nature, then genuine
theological thinking and speaking have no need of any special preparation in
order to reach people and find a hearing among them. (P, 55; emphasis added)

Roughly speaking, then, if theology has something to think and say that touches the core
of what it means to be human in today’s global context, then by all means it should do
such thinking and saying—and do it faithfully without any help from philosophy or the
sciences. Given, then, that theology has a legitimate “right” to be in the public square,
does it have a responsibility to be there? Heidegger’s PAT lecture supports such a view.
Therein he emphasizes that religion without theology would be mute; theological
concepts are necessary, Heidegger says, to grasp the “inconceivability” of faith (P, 50).
Thinking with Heidegger, I therefore suggest that a fundamental task of theology
is to assist faith-based religion in bringing its voice to the RST relation in the face of the
challenges of the Anthropocene Age. That is, out of their reciprocal relation,208 theology
can enable their joint participation with science in the academy, the public square, and in

207. In his 1927/28 lecture, “Phenomenology and Theology,” Heidegger did claim that theology
should demand of philosophy assistance in clarifying the ontological concepts that undergird theological
concepts (P, 53). However, as I have shown in Section 2.4, later works do not mention any such role for
philosophy.
208. “Theology . . . not only . . . makes faith and that which is believed its object, but . . . itself
arises out of faith” (P, 46). See Section 2.3 above.
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scientific and religious communities to fashion effective responses in the mode of
bringing forth (Hervorbringen) and letting be (Gelassenheit).
Second, is there an important sense in which religion, science, and theology can
be said to be in “dialogue”? Taking “dialogue” at first in its ordinary meaning, we are
asking whether some important interconnections or “common ground” exists among
them. Do they “belong together” in some sense? Heidegger examines the belonging
together of thinking and poetry in terms of nearness and neighborhood. He holds that
they belong to one neighborhood that is occasioned by the nearness of Saying. Each
“Says” Being in its own way; Being is given by the gift of the Word.209
What is it that might occasion a “neighborhood” for religion, science, and
theology? I suggest that the unprecedented perils—and opportunities—in the unfolding of
the Anthropocene Age and Heidegger’s three world-questions may qualify. Thinking
ontically, the most thought-provoking thing today, in my view, is that we have barely
begun to acknowledge—let alone respond to—the unsustainable, climate-altering
patterns of resource use and waste generation that threaten all life on earth. Thinking
ontologically, that which threatens the extinction of Dasein threatens the elimination of
the clearing for the disclosure of Being. Simply put, the survival of Dasein is essential for
the truth of Being. I am suggesting that the unprecedented power of humankind to alter
decisively the conditions necessary for life on this planet places this facticity at the
“border,” so to speak, between the ontical and the ontological.

209. See “On the Nature of Language” in OWL (82, 89-90). Also see Section 5.1.
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For thinking and poetry, the Same that is the nearness that occasions their
neighborhood of belonging together lies in the commonality of that which they do—i.e.,
giving Being as the gift of the word. For religion, science, and theology, could it be a
common commitment to gazing steadfastly and truthfully into the abyss brought into view
by the emergence of the Anthropocene Age and the three world-questions of Heidegger
and Nietzsche? I am suggesting that the Same for the RST relation is not common
activity but, first of all, commonality that springs from steadfast, truth-filled gazing at the
abyss together, yet each element doing so in its own way.
Of course, there already is much staring at—and some looking into—the abyss,
but reaching into it is another matter. Studies and reports come to the public’s attention
regularly, pointing to the ecological “cliff” we face in a matter of decades, if not sooner.
Although many individual, local, regional, and national actions are underway, the
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere continues to rise and glaciers and
ice caps continue to melt. Focused, effective action on a worldwide scale is not yet on the
horizon. Thinking with Rilke and Heidegger, the essential nature of science and
technology leads to going with this risk by objectifying it in calculable terms as a basis
for fashioning defenses to ward off these dangers. Poets, in contrast, are those who risk
more by reaching into the abyss to fashion a safebeing, outside of all defenses. In so
doing, they take the measure of the dimension between earth and sky—and thereby the
measure of humankind; they sing of the wholeness within unwholeness, of a saving
power—precisely where the extreme danger lies. Can theology, in its own way, reach
into the abyss—or otherwise facilitate such reaching by religion, say—and join poetry in
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these tasks? And what about science? On Heidegger’s view, science does not—and
cannot—reach into the abyss, as it objectifies the abyss initially as something threatening
that stands over against us and subsequently as something representable to us and
amenable to conceptual, calculable analysis and technical management.
I suggest, however, that the RST relation itself, so to speak, can—and must—
reach into the abyss. The individual elements cannot do so by themselves; however, I
contend that such reaching together is possible and necessary. With respect to the first
motivating question concerning the interrelations among the elements of the RST
relation, the matter at issue is whether a mode of inter-relationality can be fashioned, out
of which a collegial reaching into the abyss might be possible. Simply put, we need the
very best science possible to understand and describe in ontic terms the intertwined
dynamics of human activity and the biosphere at local, relational, national, and global
levels and projected consequences. Such analyses can provide a basis for an initial set of
possible options for effective response. At the same time, in ontological terms, we need
to inculcate and nurture the spirit of Gelassenheit—noncoercive “letting be” that fosters
contentment with “enough,” so that all others may have enough. Heidegger locates the
spirit of Gelassenheit in mindful, meditative, remembering (besinnlich, nachdenkend,
gedenkend) thinking. This spirit is also nurtured in each of the world’s great religions as
the thread of the movement from egocentrism to concern for the well-being of the other.
Thinking mindfully and meditatively in the spirit of Gelassenheit, modifications and
additions to these initial options for responsible action may emerge. Here, the content-,

211

relational-, and enactment-senses of the phenomenon of Gelassenheit in the
Anthropocene Age are all in play.
An example of reaching into the abyss from out of the RST relation is
thoughtfully articulated in For the Common Good, co-authored by ecological economist
Herman Daly and theologian John B. Cobb, Jr.210 They provide an extensive, rigorous
critique of unfettered neoclassical economics and its subordination of the environment to
economic processes and its axiomatic basis in individual self-interest. Instead, they call
for constraining the size of the economy within the sustainable limits of the environment
at local, regional, national, and global levels. Furthermore, they insist upon regarding
individuals primarily as persons-in-community: “We believe human beings are
fundamentally social and that economics should be refounded on the recognition of that
reality” (Daly and Cobb, 164). While they acknowledge the great strength of marketdriven economic systems to bring supply and demand into equilibrium without central
planning, they hold that such activity should be subordinate to maintaining the ecological
integrity of the planet and fostering the well-being of all persons.211
Daly and Cobb anchor their vision of biocentrism and the ultimate worth of
human beings living in community out of an explicit religious vision, which they call
theocentrism (ibid., Chapter 20). I pass over the details of theocentrism to cite a passage

210. Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, Jr., For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economy
toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon, 1994).
211. In a move consonant with Heidegger’s recovery of originary meanings of familiar words,
Daly and Cobb ground the primacy of the environment over economic activity by drawing upon Aristotle’s
distinction between chrematistics and oikonomia (Daly and Cobb, Common Good, Chapter 7). The former
focuses on short-term gains in exchange value for individuals, while the latter is the “economy of the
household” and is centered upon fostering the long-term well-being of all those in the household (ibid.,
138).

212

that arguably exemplifies the clear-eyed, yet hope-filled, character of their formulation of
the RST relation as Denken-Danken-Dichten:
Yet there is hope. On a hotter planet, with lost deltas and shrunken coastlines,
under a more dangerous sun, with less arable land, more people, fewer species of
living things, a legacy of poisonous wastes, and much beauty irrevocably lost,
there will still be the possibility that our children’s children will learn at last to
live as a community among communities. Perhaps they will learn also to forgive
this generation its blind commitment to ever greater consumption. Perhaps they
will even appreciate its belated efforts to leave them a planet still capable of
supporting life in community. (ibid., 406)
In my view, requiring “the very best science” in order to understand the interplay
between human activity and the biosphere that is decisively shaping our future
necessitates placing ecological economics as a primary and multi-faceted science in the
RST discourse. Michael Welker cites works by Ted Peters, Robert Russell, and others as
evidence that physics and biology have been the primary dialogue partners for theology
since the inception of the RST academic field in the 1960s.212 Given the urgency of
addressing unsustainable, climate-altering patterns of resource consumption and waste
generation, I strongly suggest that it is time to grant comparable status to the emerging
“trans-discipline” of ecological economics as a crucial discourse partner for religion and
theology.213

212. Welker briefly describes a succession of three “phases” in thinking the science-theology
relation: a methodological phase, a physics phase, and an emerging biology phase (Welker, “Science and
Theology,” 553).
213. Other theologians who have written insightfully about the interrelationships among religion,
economics, and the environment include Larry L. Rasmussen, Earth Community Earth Ethics (Maryknoll,
NY: Orbis, 1996) and Rosemary Radford Reuther, Integrating Ecofeminism, Globalization, and World
Religions (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005). For a treatment of the science of ecological
economics itself, see, for example, Herman E. Daly and Joshua Farley, Ecological Economics: Principles
and Applications (Washington, DC: Island Press, 2004). They write: “. . . ecological economics is not a
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Let us return one more time to the formulation of theology as reflection on
religious experience and belief. Expressed in this way, can theology possibly make the
contribution of bridging the singular modalities of religion and science sketched above
that seems called for? I suggest that Heidegger’s examination of different modes of the
comportment to things, reflection, thinking, and destiny uncover latent meanings in this
formula that can provide a path for genuine RST dialogue. Such a path entails a common
commitment to desire-free gazing at the abyss, followed by reaching into it together in
fruitful dialogue and mindful response.
Consider the first half of the formula, “reflection on religious experience.” On
Heidegger’s view, the meaning, or sense, of religious experience, taken as the
phenomenon of religious life, unfolds in three “directions”—content-sense (the apostolic
proclamation), relational-sense (having become, grounded in faith), and enactment-sense
(comportment to everyday life) (Section 2.1, 2.3). His multi-faceted, phenomenological
explication of the essence of religion (as factical life experience, oriented by faith) guards
against forms of theological reflection that seek to objectify the essence of religion and
therefore reduce it (as a science would) to its content-sense, that is, its “whatness.”214
As for the second half of the theological formulation, “reflection on . . . religious
belief,” Heidegger compactly links theology, faith, and belief in the PAT lecture:
“Theology is the science of that which is disclosed in faith, of that which is believed” (P,

discipline, nor does it aspire to become one. For lack of a better term, we call it a ‘trans-discipline.’ . . .
Real problems do not respect academic boundaries” (Daly and Farley, Ecological Economics, xvii).
214. Recall Heidegger’s critique of Troeltsch’s objectification of religion: “Religion is for him an
external object and can as such be integrated into different material complexes (as appropriate to different
philosophical ‘systems’)” (PRL, 20). See Section 2.1.
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45). That is, the content-sense of the phenomenon of believing is “not some coherent
order of propositions about facts or occurrences which we simply agree to” (ibid.), but
rather, is “Christ, the Crucified God” (44). The knowledge or understanding that faith has
of itself is found in believing. On Heidegger’s view, then, faith is the undisclosed bridge
that links the two halves of the customary formulation of theology as reflection on
religious experience and belief.
The chief matter at issue for both halves of this formulation of theology, however,
is the manner, or mode, in which such reflection is carried out—i.e., within the orbit of
representational, conceptual thought or mindful, meditative thought. Of equal importance
is the mode, or manner, of theology’s comportment toward things (objectifying or not)
and its thinking (calculating or mindfully meditative). I suggested at the beginning of
this Epilogue that, roughly speaking, religion is characterized by nonobjectifying
comportment to things, meditative thinking, and mindful reflection, while science is
characterized by the complementary cluster of objectifying comportment, calculative
thought, and reflexive (egocentric) reflection. In part, my inquiry has delineated these
two clusters as a compact expression of Heidegger’s claim that religion and science are
two fundamental—and fundamentally different—ways of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world.
I suggest, then, that what is called for in this emergent Anthropocene Age are
forms of theology that can bridge, or “traverse,” both of these modes of Being-in-theworld. Forms of theology are needed to nurture and bring to intelligible public expression
the ethic of love of neighbor, near and far, and the sacredness, or enchantment, of this
earth as our ethos (dwelling-place). On the one hand, such theological forms should
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engage science in academic dialogue regarding “boundary sensitivities and . . .
conceptual limits,” as Michael Welcker calls for (Welker, “Science and Theology,” 558).
On the other hand, theological forms are needed to help overcome the “muteness” of
religion in the public square and the “deafness” of science to the relational- and
enactment-senses of whatever phenomena are at issue in the public square. Such
descriptions of theological engagements seem consistent with those expressed by Philip
Hefner (and others) that the arenas for RST dialogue today must include the public square
as well as the academy and religious and scientific communities. (See Sections 1.2.1 and
1.2.2.)
Let me say a bit more about “traversing.” I think that, for such theological
“shuttling” between religion and science as modes of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world to be
fruitful, it must grow out of the common gazing before the abyss. By “gazing,” I intend to
connote Heidegger’s recovery of the root meaning of weil (typically taken to mean
“because” in the sense of reason-seeking and giving) as weilen (in the earlier sense of
tarrying, remaining still, keeping to oneself). He writes: “The while [das Weilen] . . .
names the simple, plain presence that is without why—the presence upon which
everything depends . . .”—that is, ground (POR, 127).215 In sum, “gazing” means “being
present.” I hear in these words the tonalities of Gelassenheit and Hervorbringen: being
present together—religion, science, theology—in releasement to the bringing-forth of the
abyss. Speaking figuratively (as I have been doing for some time), theology must
“while” awhile with religion and science before that which is—the abyss of the emerging

215. See also Section 3.3 above.
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Anthropocene Age and the world-questions of Heidegger and Nietzsche—and wait (not
await) for that which must be done to come forth.
Let us imaginatively return once more to the common gazing upon the abyss by
religion, science, and theology. Recall that, on Heidegger’s view, the comportment to
things—whether objectifying or non-objectifying—derives from Dasein’s distinctive
modes of Being-in-the-world. Recall the “double-seeing” of the rose as, on the one hand,
outside the why (“it blooms because it blooms”) yet within the why, when it becomes an
object for our analysis and knowledge.216 He also declares that the research scientist can
“see double”:
Even if the sciences, precisely in following their way and using their means, can
never press forward to the essence of science, still every researcher and teacher of
the sciences, every man pursuing a way through a science, can move, as a
thinking being, on various levels of reflection [Besinnung] and can keep reflection
vigilant.217
That is, the science researcher and teacher “can move . . . on various levels of reflection”
by thinking mindfully as well as calculatively when doing science.
This example suggests that perhaps it is time to move from thinking the RST
relation in terms of nouns—religion, science, theology—to persons engaged in, or with,
them. Thinking with Heidegger, let us consider modes of Dasein in which “theologizing,”
“religionizing,” and “scientizing” are taking place. As we have seen in Being and Time
and elsewhere, these activities reflect modes of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. And as I
have argued (Section 2.2), these modes of Dasein, in a sense, “co-determine” Dasein’s

216. See The Principle of Reason, 35-37, and the discussion above in Section 3.3.
217. Heidegger, “Science and Reflection,” in QCT, 181-82. Quoted earlier in Section 3.4 above.
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comportment to the entities in Dasein’s environment. The ready-to-hand becomes
present-at-hand when Dasein’s mode shifts from that of everyday Dasein to the mode of
science, for example.
Could this shifting, or traversing, of Dasein’s modes of Being-in-the-world—and
the consequent comportment of Dasein to things in Dasein’s environment (objectifying or
non-objectifying)—suggest imagining the “dialogue” within each Dasein and among the
many Dasein, steadfastly gazing truthfully into the abyss? As I see it, this takes the
possibility of “dialogue” beyond that of, say, theologian and scientist (as envisioned by,
for example, Michael Welker) to that within each Dasein himself/herself. And is not that
already prefigured, in a way, by Heidegger’s example of the science researcher and
teacher quoted above?
I conclude this Epilogue by summarizing how this dissertation as a whole
supports my thesis statement on page 2 of this inquiry. First, I have engaged the work of
Ian Barbour and J. Wentzel van Huyssteen sufficiently to support my claim that
“contemporary explications of the religion-science and science-theology relations are
conducted in the mode of metaphysical (i.e., representational, reason-seeking and giving) thinking.” Second, in the course of examining several of Heidegger’s works that
are germane to matters of continuing importance in the RST discourse (as expressed in
the chapter titles), I have illuminated non-metaphysical modes of thinking that
complement metaphysical perspectives which presently dominate this discourse. And
third, I have imaginatively sketched from these resources a mode of interrelationality
among religion, science, and theology (i.e., Denken-Danken-Dichten) that incorporates
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both metaphysical and non-metaphysical thinking. In so doing, I have offered an
interpretation of Dialogue (exemplified by Cobb and Daly’s For the Common Good) that
I believe is pertinent to the unfolding challenges of the Anthropocene Age and the three
“world questions” posed by Heidegger and Nietzsche. I have attempted to think the
essence of the RST relation, in the sense of positing that these challenges and questions
now serve as minimal criteria for any significant formulation of the RST relation in this
epoch.
Finally, this inquiry has called into question the essential nature of theology itself.
Whereas I have argued that religion and science bifurcate rather cleanly along
nonmetaphysical vs. metaphysical lines, I see no such inherent clarity for theology.
Rather, the dualities in comportment to things, reflection, and thinking that come to light
in Heidegger’s works serve to interrogate the customary formulation of theology as
reflection on religious experience and belief. As I see it, the possibility of genuine
Dialogue in this current Age hinges on whether or not theology can—and will—traverse
nonobjectifying as well as objectifying comportment to things, mindful as well as
Cartesian reflection, and meditative as well as calculative thinking in its interrelations
with religion and science. By incorporating both modes of comportment to things,
reflection, and thinking, theology can legitimately claim its rightful place in the public
square, as well as in academia and religious communities. And if we accept Heidegger’s
claim that religion, science, and theology are different modes of Being-in-the-world for
us (as Dasein), then these tasks are not only for professional theologians but for each of
us as well.
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Appendix: Schema of the Dissertation
Thinking, with Heidegger, the Religion-Science-Theology Relation
Chapter 1: Introduction
Motivating
Questions
Context
Reformulated MQs







o
o

How are the interrelations among religion, science, and theology to be understood?
Is a relation of “dialogue,” in some sense, possible among these three elements?
Does theology have a rightful place in the public square dominated by the view that
science serves as the “gold standard” for rationality and truth?
Why RST? Religion-Science (Hefner, Barbour) vs. Theology-Science (Welker)  RST
Proffered “bridge”: theology as reflection on religious experience and belief
Significance of thinking RST relation: Whitehead (1926), Barbour (1966), Zygon (1966)
With regard to the RST relation (Gefragte), what is its essential nature (Erfragte)?
Does thinking its essence matter in any urgent, compelling way? If so, how?

Chapters 2-5: Threads
Q of Being
(formulations)

Sense of Being

Chapter Titles
(Befragten)

2. Phenomenology
& the RST Relation

Thread #1
Science
Religion
(i.e., religious
life)
Theology
Threads
#2-#5
Science

Role of philosophy? Is
theology a science?
Content-sense
(“whatness”)
Content-, relational(how) & enactment(how) senses
undetermined
Comportment to
things (2 forms: ↓)
objectifying
(Gegenstand, Objekt)

Religion

non-objectifying

Theology
Q of Being

Truth of Being

Place of Being

3. Truth
& the RST
Relation
Truth in religion,
science, theology?

4. Technology
& the RST Relation

5. Ethics
& the RST Relation

Status of technology
wrt RST relation?

Significance of RST
wrt dwelling (ethos)?

Reflection
(2 forms: ↓)

Thinking
(2 forms: ↓)

Destiny
(2 forms: ↓)

Reflexion

calculative

fate vs. Geschick
(i.e., sending of Being)
Besinnung
meditative
(mindfulness)
undetermined
The Question of Man, Mankind (der Mensch)

Epilogue: The Question of Being and (Rethinking)the RST Relation
Expanded
Context
Theology
Rethinking
the RST
Relation

Emergence of the Anthropocene Age (Crutzen); ecological footprint (Wackernagel, Rees)
Heidegger’s world-questions: What will become of the earth and its inhabitants? Is there a
path of noncalculating thought? Is man, in his metaphysical nature,. ready to assume
dominion over the earth? (Nietzsche)
Called to traverse (cut across) both forms of comportment, reflection, and thinking,
thereby revitalizing its customary formulation (see “proffered ‘bridge’” above)
 What is called for? A thinking-thanking-poeticizing mode of interrelationality, arising from
the commonality of steadfast gazing (being present) before the abyss of the emergent
Anthropocene Age.
 Bring the “trans-discipline” of ecological economics to the fore in thinking the RST relation.
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